Suchergebnisse

In the Turkish national elections of 12 June 2011 the ruling Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP, Justice and Development Party) registered an exceptional success in Turkish democracy. For the first time, an incumbent party had managed to increase its votes for three elections in a row and established its predominance. This article argues that the AKP, like the Christian Democrats in Italy, Liberal Democrats in Japan or Social Democrats in Sweden, has established a cycle of dominance that includes initial mobilization, expansion of core support through material benefits, delegitimization of the opposition and selective use of ideological rigidity and flexibility. It is through this cycle that the AKP consolidated its position as a right-wing party, unifying centre-right and Islamic constituencies and thereby accomplishing what the other right-wing parties in Turkey had failed to do in the past.

This article argues that socioeconomic changes within Islamist constituencies are critical parts of understanding of how moderate Islamists emerge and succeed. The diverging paths of economic reform in Turkey and Egypt have generated different effects on the Islamist constituencies in these two countries. Economic liberalization has played both a constitutive and a causal role in transformation of political Islam in Turkey by facilitating the growth of a strong devout bourgeoisie with vested interests in liberalism and democracy. With the growing support of this rising devout bourgeoisie, the moderate Islamists managed to transform Islamism into a democratic conservative party. In Egypt, in contrast, the way the state implemented economic reform prevented the formation of as strong and independent a devout bourgeoisie that could be assertive in political Islam. Instead, the lower-middle-class professionals, losers of reform, populated the Islamist constituency and entrenched Islamism in ideological positions rather than pragmatism. This ultimately led to the marginalization of the moderates in Egypt.

Ninth Mediterranean Research Meeting: Workshop 10 ; This paper compares impact of economic liberalization on political Islamic movements in Turkey and Egypt. This comparison focuses on the economic and cultural effects of integration with the international markets on the constituencies of political Islam, and how exactly these constituencies realign their political preferences as a result of this process. I argue that the divergence in the implementation of economic liberalization programs in Turkey and Egypt produce different results as to the economic and political orientation of the political Islamic constituencies in these countries. Implementation of a comprehensive economic liberalization program in Turkey facilitates the emergence of a devout bourgeoisie that is well-integrated with the international markets, whereas a more controlled and restricted liberalization program in Egypt limits the level of integration of political Islamic constituencies with international markets preventing the emergence of a devout bourgeoisie. Expansion of the devout bourgeoisie in Turkey in return generates a significant tide within the political Islamic movement towards democracy and liberalism resulting in the establishment of the Justice and Development Party. While in Egypt absence of such a forceful social change contributes to sustained hesitant and divided approach towards liberalism and democracy within mainstream political Islam. The paper primarily focuses on the experiences of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

After decades of multiparty politics, Turkey is no longer a democracy. A theory-upending case, the country has descended into a competitive authoritarian regime under the Justice and Development Party ( Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi—AKP), despite rising income and education levels and strong links with the West. What accounts for democratic breakdown in such an unlikely case? Instead of ideological and institutional factors, we offer a political economy account. We contend that the coalitional ties that the AKP forged with businesses and the urban poor through the distribution of public resources has altered the cost of toleration for the party leadership and their dependent clients, while reducing the cost of suppression for incumbents. This new political calculus led to increasing authoritarianism of the AKP government through securitization of dissent, mounting repression, and systematic violation of civil liberties.