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This article contributes to the philosophical debate on values in science by exploring how scientists themselves understand the proper role of moral, political, and social values in expert practice. I present findings from interviews with climate scientists who have participated as authors in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The climate scientists subscribe to the value-free ideal as a regulative ideal that applies both to the provision of knowledge to policymakers and how they engage with political issues in the public sphere. Yet their views on the moral responsibility of scientists and the aim of providing policy-relevant output challenge the value-free ideal. The article suggests ways in which their views can be relevant to the philosophical discussion. ; This article has been supported by the REFLEX project (Democracy and Expert Rule: The Quest for Reflexive Legitimacy, funded by The Research Council of Norway) at ARENA – Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo. ; publishedVersion

The role of scientists as experts is crucial to public policymaking. However, the expert role is contested and unsettled in both public and scholarly discourse. In this paper, I provide a systematic account of the role of scientists as experts in policymaking by examining whether there are any normatively relevant differences between this role and the role of scientists as researchers. Two different interpretations can be given of how the two roles relate to each other. The separability view states that there is a normatively relevant difference between the two roles, whereas the inseparability view denies that there is such a difference. Based on a systematic analysis of the central aspects of the role of scientists as experts – that is, its aim, context, mode of output, and standards, I propose a moderate version of the separability view. Whereas the aim of scientific research is typically to produce new knowledge through the use of scientific method for evaluation and dissemination in internal settings, the aim of the expert is to provide policymakers and the public with relevant and applicable knowledge that can premise political reasoning and deliberation. ; Norges forskningsråd ; acceptedVersion

The role of scientists as experts is crucial to public policymaking. However, the expert role is contested and unsettled in both public and scholarly discourse. In this paper, I provide a systematic account of the role of scientists as experts in policymaking by examining whether there are any normatively relevant differences between this role and the role of scientists as researchers. Two different interpretations can be given of how the two roles relate to each other. The separability view states that there is a normatively relevant difference between the two roles, whereas the inseparability view denies that there is such a difference. Based on a systematic analysis of the central aspects of the role of scientists as experts – that is, its aim, context, mode of output, and standards, I propose a moderate version of the separability view. Whereas the aim of scientific research is typically to produce new knowledge through the use of scientific method for evaluation and dissemination in internal settings, the aim of the expert is to provide policymakers and the public with relevant and applicable knowledge that can premise political reasoning and deliberation. © 2018. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

This article examines the role of medical doctors, AI designers, and other stakeholders in making applied AI and machine learning ethically acceptable on the general premises of shared decision-making in medicine. Recent policy documents such as the EU strategy on trustworthy AI and the research literature have often suggested that AI could be made ethically acceptable by increased collaboration between developers and other stakeholders. The article articulates and examines four central alternative models of how AI can be designed and applied in patient care, which we call the ordinary evidence model, the ethical design model, the collaborative model, and the public deliberation model. We argue that the collaborative model is the most promising for covering most AI technology, while the public deliberation model is called for when the technology is recognized as fundamentally transforming the conditions for ethical shared decision-making.

The paper "Neuroethics at 15: The Current and Future Environment for Neuroethics" by the Emerging Issues Task Force, International Neuroethics Society, addresses central challenges for neuroscience in the years to come. The authors provide examples of pressing ethical, legal, and political issues that arise from neuroscience and neurotechnology, including artificial intelligence (AI). The paper nicely illustrates how neuroscience and neurotechnology involve complex issues pertaining to epistemic uncertainty and conflicting values (for instance, between economic growth and commercial values and risks to users of the technology and to the environment). It also expresses an ambition that neuroethics should have a positive societal impact. The paper does not, however, reflect much on the proper relationship between neuroethics as academic research and the application of research and technology in real-world settings, i.e. how the translation between theory and practice should be conducted in this field of ethics (Bærøe 2014). How can, and should, neuroethicists have an impact, be policy-relevant, and inform the public? Moreover, the hope of further professionalization of neuroethics (in the Conclusion) raises the question of what constitutes expertise in this field. Does this expertise merit authority primarily in clarification and analysis of the cases at hand, or does it also give neuroethicists authority to make recommendations to policymakers and the public about what they should do? ; acceptedVersion

"Background: Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems hold great promise for the future development within a variety of sectors. At the same time, there is also great concern about harms and potential misuse of AI. Upscaling and implementing existing AI systems do already have the potential of affecting severely, and potentially irreversibly, fundamental social conditions for social interaction, professional autonomy, and political governance. Therefore, guiding principles and frameworks to support developers and governing authorities are emerging around the world to foster justified trust in AI research and innovation. Ultimately, these safeguarding institutions and mechanisms rely on human knowledge and wisdom. Health is an area that is expected to benefit from AI based technologies aimed at promoting beneficial, accurate and effective preventive and curative interventions. Also, machine learning technologies might be used to improve the accuracy of the evidence base for cost-effective and beneficial decision-making. How can bioethicists contribute to promote beneficial AI interventions and avoid harms produced by AI technology? What would be justified roles of bioethicists in development and use of AI systems? Method: The paper is based on literature review and philosophical reflection. Discussion: In this presentation, we will base our analysis on an analytical decomposition of the life cycle of AI systems into the phases of development, deployment and use. Furthermore, we will use a framework of translational ethics proposed by Bærøe, and identify a variety of structural tasks, as well as limitations to such, for bioethicists to undertake within this emerging multifold area of experts and disciplines. "