Suchergebnisse

This article examines the political budget cycles in Chinese counties. The shift to a more performance‐based cadre evaluation and mobility system during the reform era has created an incentive structure for local leaders to increase government spending at strategically important time points during their tenure to enhance the prospect of official promotion. Such expenditures help local leaders to impress their superiors with economic and political achievements, especially those visible and quantifiable large‐scale development projects. At the same time, economic and fiscal decentralization increased the capacity of local leaders to influence government budget expenditures as the need rises. The hypothesized curvilinear relationship between a leader's time in office and increased spending was tested using a comprehensive data set of all Chinese counties from 1997 through 2002. The panel data analysis shows that growth in local government spending per capita is the fastest during a leader's third and fourth years in office.

This article examines local fiscal behavior in contemporary China against the backdrop of decentralized spending responsibilities and recentralized revenues. Vertical imbalance after the 1994 tax-sharing system reform, coupled with other features of the fiscal institutions, is not conducive to conservative local fiscal behavior. Moreover, a main driving force behind the expansion of local governments is the politically motivated intergovernmental transfer scheme. The center in effect "buys" political stability in sensitive areas while holding local leaders accountable for their tax efforts. A dynamic panel analysis of Chinese counties reveals that a million-yuan increase in general transfer payment and salary raise subsidies would add, respectively, fifteen and sixteen employees to the county government payroll, other things being equal. At the same time, increased subsidies from upper-level governments do not "crowd out" or significantly affect local tax effort. Additional dynamic panel data analysis at the provincial level produced similar findings.

This article explores the impact of organizational involvement on political participation in mainland China. The formal organizations in China today differ in the nature of organization and membership, which in turn lead to different effect on political participation. In contrast with the Communist Party and the "mass organizations," the reemerging civic associations have more voluntary and active members. Although providing similar benefits of vertical connections to official access and information as other formal organizations, they uniquely transcend the boundaries of the administrative or work units to bring together people with dissimilar background. Analysis of nationwide survey data shows that involvement in the Party or mass organizations provides some advantages in participation through official channels, while the constraining effect on unconventional activities did not materialize. Involvement in civic associations significantly facilitates all types of political participation. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright 2007.]

Decentralization in post-Mao China has widened regional gaps in the provision of basic education. Reforms since 1994 have not reversed that trend. More recently, the government started centralized spending projects on rural education, which have significantly narrowed the urban-rural gap in education spending since 2001. However, interprovincial disparities remain large and growing.

The relationship between the turnover of government leaders and economic performance has rarely been studied in authoritarian regimes. In mainland China the reforms of the past quarter century have increased the economic accountability of local leaders. At the same time, there is some evidence that informal and idiosyncratic factors are more likely to operate at lower levels of government. An analysis of a comprehensive panel data set shows that Chinese county leaders are frequently replaced and that revenue growth increases the probability of promotion of county chief executives. Newly installed or minority nationality chief executives are less likely to be replaced. Adapted from the source document.

Recruitment of young intellectuals such as college students has been an important part of the Chinese Communist Party's recruitment strategies for most of its history. Two of the college students that the Party recruited in the 1940s and 1960s went on to become the Party's top leaders in the 1990s and 2000s, and today's student Party members may well lead Chinese politics at various levels in future decades. This paper examines Party recruitment of college students in the reform era and highlights the impact of 1989. Since the 1990s the Party has stepped up its efforts at recruitment and ideological work on college students. Paradoxically the former is succeeding while the latter seems barely effective. Today's college students are striving to join the Party in large numbers, yet primarily out of a personal pragmatic concern for their future job searches and career advancement. Even student Party members do not have a strong commitment to the Party's sanctioned ideology. (J Contemp China/DÜI)