Suchergebnisse

The paper analyses the impact India's position on the Korean question in the pre-1950 period had on the course of Soviet-Indian relations. When the U.S. brought up the issue of Korean unification before the U. N. in 1947, India, because of its concern about Communist expansion in Asia, supported Washington's objective of bringing about a non-Communist, unified Korea. At the suggestion of the U.S., an Indian was also appointed chairman of a U.N. Commission which was assigned the job of supervising elections in the country. Moscow refused to cooperate with the U.N. Commission headed by India's K. P.S. Menon. The U.S. then proposed that the U.N. should proceed with elections in South Korea. Despite Menon's personal opposition to the proposal, New Delhi, at the special urgings of the U.S., decided to support the American move. Later, at the U.N., India also voted for the recognition of the U.S.-backed South Korean government as the sole representative of all Korea. India's pro-American policy drew sharp protests from the Soviet Union. Moscow found it difficult to accept India's claim that it was following an independent policy. It was this perception of New Delhi's approach to questions such as Korea, and not ideological considerations, that shaped Moscow's policy toward New Delhi during the early years of lndia's independence.

Chester Bowles, who served as U. S. Ambassador in India during the last two years of the Truman Administration, conducted his diplomacy on the premise that rather than forcing India to side with the U.S., Washington should accept New Delhi's non-aligned policy and help its democratic experiment by participating in its economic development. This, in the long run, would persuade India to move closer to the West. He and his family also conducted a highly visible public diplomacy by mingling with the Indian people at different levels. Indian leaders, including Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, responded warmly to his overtures. India also decided to accept the provisions of the U.S. Mutual Security Pact. It, however, reacted coolly to Russia's support of Kashmir in January 1952, and spurned Soviet offers of aid made at the International Economic Conference in Moscow in April 1952. If the Bowles approach had continued under the new Eisenhower Administration, it is unlikely that Nehru wouldhave responded as warmly as he did to Moscow's moves after 1953, but Washington decided to replace Bowles and soon devised an Asian military alliance which India opposed and Pakistan eagerly joined. Thus, the abandonment of the highly successful Bowles approach paved the way for Soviet-Indian rapprochement.

According to the author, a careful and detailed study of Stalin's policy towards India shows that his policy was neither totally rigid nor consistently hostile, nor was it based on Moscow's lack of knowledge of what was happening in India. This contribution is devoted to a study of Soviet-Indian relations during 1946-47, a crucial period in the formulation of Stalin's policy towards India. India's foreign policy as outlined by Jawaharlal Nehru. (DÜI-Sen)

The author explores the impact India's position on the Korean question in the pre-1950 period had on the course of Soviet-Indian relations. India's stand at the UNO in 1947 regarding the issue of Korean unification. India's role in the U.N. Commission on Korea. India's Korean policy and its effect on Soviet policy toward India. (DÜI-Sen)

Chester Bowles vertrat die Ansicht, es sei besser, die bündnisfreie Politik Indiens zu akzeptieren und Neu-Delhi bei der Festigung der Demokratie und beim Aufbau seiner Wirtschaft zu helfen, als es zu einem Bündnis mit den USA zu drängen; dies werde - langfristig - Indien enger an den Westen binden. Diese Politik war erfolgreich. Nehru reagierte kühl auf Moskaus Unterstützung in der Kaschmir-Frage, und er wies das sowjetische Wirtschaftshilfeangebot vom April 1952 zurück. Aber nach Bowles bot die Eisenhower- Administration Südasien militärische Bündnisse an, worauf Pakistan sofort einging, Indien aber ablehnte. Das Verlassen der Bowles- Position ebnete den Weg zur indisch-sowjetischen Annäherung. (KM)

Despite the general assumption of mutuality of interests, the USSR and the non-aligned countries have basic differences on several key issues. The issue of making the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace has been analyzed to focus attention on these differences.The USSR joined the US in abstaining when the issue first came up at the UN in 1971. Later it supported the non-aligned demand, but only because the American decision to transform Diego Garcia into a major naval base threatened its security interests. And when the US, under Jimmy Carter, proposed naval limitation talks, it enthusiastically responded, but only to seek parity. That still remains the Soviet position, even though statements are frequently issued in support of the non-aligned stand which seeks to eliminate all foreign military presence from the Indian Ocean. (Internat. Political Science Association)

Chester Bowles, who served as U.S. Ambassador in India during the last two years of the Truman Administration and later became the Assistant Secretary of State in the U.S. Department of State, conducted his diplomacy on the premise that rather than forcing India side with the U.S., Washington should accept New Delhi's non-aligned policy and help its democratic experiment by participating in its economic development. He and his family also conducted a highly visible public diplomacy by mingling with the Indian people at different levels. Indian leaders, including Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, responded warmly to his overtures. The author believes that if the Bowles approach had continued under the new Eisenhower Administration. Indo-Soviet friendship after 1953 would not have developed. (DÜI-Sen)

Critical assessment of the Soviet-Indian Friendship Treaty concluded in August 1971. The author thinks that Moscow's support of New Delhi under the aegis of this treaty during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war lessened India's dependence on the USSR. With the creation of Bangladesh, Pakistan no longer posed a threat to India. The study concludes that this treaty has not fulfilled the expectations of those who had seen it as providing a permanent framework for a special relationship between India and the USSR. (DÜI-Sen)