Suchergebnisse

This book takes up a central question in jurisprudence: What difference can law make to normative reasons relevant to our actions? Following a critical examination of two competing models, an exclusionary model and a weighing model, Gur proposes a third way that aims to capture the strengths of both of these models while avoiding their pitfalls.

If you put it to a contemporary legal or political theorist that 'there is no moral obligation to obey the law' it is highly unlikely they would be taken aback or raise an eyebrow. For such a denial is not only a mainstream position in modern scholarly discourse about the obligation to obey the law, but possibly even the currently dominant one. For students who make their first foray into the literature on this topic, however, this fact often comes as a surprise. They are surprised because the above, highly influential scholarly view appears to fly in the fact of a basic idea they have absorbed from an early stage of their upbringing: the idea that law-abidingness is an integral part of good citizenship -- that being a good citizen, as we all ought to be, implies inter alia being a law-abiding citizen. How are we to explain the apparent tension between this common pre-theoretical conception and the strong current of scepticism among scholars? Adapted from the source document.