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The paper suggests measures aimed at raising efficiency and long-term sustainability of the pension system. Pension contribution rate, amount of budget transfer to the pension system, and total size of pension benefits in percent of GDP are found to exceed substantially levels typical for the OECD countries and emerging markets. Our major " bottleneck" is very low by international standards support ratio (i.e. number of contributors to pension fund per pensioner). Increase in the retirement age by 2 years for men and 5 years for women would bring life expectancy at retirement in Russia to the level typical for emerging markets. Provisional gain of the budget from this measure is estimated to vary from 1.4 to 2.3% of GDP. The objective of higher retirement age should be not budget gains but stabilization of replacement rate under forthcoming demographic crisis. Other measures suggested include in particular restoring basic pensions, fixing own sources of funds for each of the pension system tiers, and building barriers for running pension imbalances, and fostering late retirement for working aged.

Detailed estimates of the hydrocarbon rent for 1999-2009 are presented. Size, sources, and usage patterns of the hidden rent (which is not included into hydrocarbons prices, but provides the source of energy subsidies) are built for the first time. This part of the natural rent is estimated to vary from 8 to 17% of GDP. The largest losses in hydrocarbon rent were related, first, with subsidizing domestic users of natural gas, and second, with diminishing value added in the refinery sector. The obsolete refinery was implicitly supported with relatively low taxation regime. This support reflects overall soft budget constraint stance pursued by the government that constitutes an important impediment to the modernization of Russian economy.

We find that the present pension system is able to secure long-term formal sustainability. On the other hand, rapid fall of the replacement rate is expected, with the hardest period in 2018 to 2041, when ratio of average pension to average wage will be below 20%. Additional funds needed to keep this ratio at the level of 2006 amount to 2-3% of GDP in 2020-2041. Distributional implications of the pension reform are examined. The present value of losses born by elder cohorts from the reform are estimated to reach 9,9 bln roubles (in 2007 prices). The gender gap in pensions will increase substantially, to reach 36% by 2050. Measures addressing long-term problems of the pension system are discussed.

The quality of fiscal forecasts in 1999-2005 is examined. Substantial and systematic error in the key macroeconomic and fiscal forecasts is found. Independent forecasts generally prove to be even less accurate. One can conclude that fiscal planning was not based on conservative approach, envisaging purposeful underestimation of budget revenues. Full effect of erroneous prediction of external variables is calculated, taking into account direct, indirect impact, and implicit influence of stabilization measures by the government and the Central Bank. We find that shifts in exchange rate and inflation in response to increase in oil and gas prices set limits to spending windfall gains, as either the budget looses revenues due to the ruble appreciation or outlays are deflated with price growth.

Comprehensive analysis of stabilization fund design and management as a macroeconomic tool is suggested. Restrictions on the use of windfall revenues, stemming from fiscal and monetary sustainability conditions are presented. It is stressed that additional spending of windfall revenues inevitably results in real appreciation of the ruble. According to medium-term macroeconomic projections, if current high export prices sustain, the use of windfall revenues may be gradually raised, but still spending money from the Stabilization Fund of RF will remain quite limited through the year 2008.

Specific requirements on macroeconomic policy, stemming from the impact of external volatility on trade balance and fiscal revenues are studied. Income gains or losses of the Russian economy due to variation in the commodity prices are found to range from -9 to +12% of GDP over the last decade. Contribution of the government and the Central Bank to neutralizing windfall revenues is evaluated, an approach to sharing their functions is suggested. It is demonstrated that monetary policy in the post-crisis period has been aimed rather at restraining ruble appreciation, than at smoothing the effect of external volatility. Expediency to formulate fiscal policy objectives and budget rules in terms of structural deficit (adjusted for windfall revenues) is argued.

The paper analyzes, first, the contribution of hydrocarbon sector to GDP, export proceeds, and budget revenues, and, second, the impact of volatility of international oil prices on the Russian economy. It is found that the importance of the oil and gas sector for the Russian economy adjusted for changes in oil prices is steadily declining since 2000. The potential impact of hydrocarbon prices volatility on the Russian monetary situation is weakening. It is demonstrated that 6% to 11% of GDP is shifted from the oil and gas sector to the trade sector via transfer pricing mechanism. Taking this fact into account alters crucially estimated tax burden for the hydrocarbon sector: it is found to be below that for the rest of the industry until 2001, and close to the latter subsequently. The contribution of oil and gas taxes to the budget does not differ much from the share of this sector in the GDP. Recent increase in the share of windfall oil revenues taken to the budget has not been supported with adequate fiscal policies. Current fiscal situation remains robust, but continuation of these trends may make the budget vulnerable to external volatility. The oil sector has played a critical role in the recent economic growth. Still the effect of favorable terms of trade on growth has not been significant, as its possible impact has been damped down with measures taken by the monetary authorities to smooth the effect of external volatility.

The paper contains analysis of Russian public employment and its segments: public administration, education and health care, in 2000-2014. The per capita number of public sector employees in Russia substantially exceeds that of countries with comparable GDP per capita. The results of the region-level analysis do not support the hypothesis that the public sector acts as an "employer of last resort", smoothing the effect of the labor market shocks. At the same time the region-level analysis reveals a positive relation of fiscal transfers from other budgets, which in case of public administration underpins the "ratchet effect" - an increase in case of additional revenues and no effect in case of the decrease of the inflow. In all segments there is evidence of the "economy of scale": the negative relation between the per capita employment and regional population numbers. There is also some support of the hypothesis that public employment depends on the demand for public goods: we have found positive relation of employment in public administration with urbanization and of employment in education with the share of young population.

The recent slowdown of the Russian economy has fundamental roots and cannot be overcome by 'simple' measures like alleviation of monetary or fiscal policy. The major impediment to growth is marked weakness of the market environment, explained primarily with dominance of state-owned and quasi-state companies. Strong incentives for efforts to enhance efficiency by both business and public administration are required. The key objectives of policies needed to develop a new growth model are listed.

The impact of global aging on fiscal expenditure and possible ways to address this challenge are considered in the article. The authors conclude that if ambitious reforms are not implemented, relative spending on public health and social security may double by mid-XXI century. Pension reform should aim not only at avoiding excessive financial commitments, but more generally at securing due interests of all generations. A new approach to defining optimal pension policy is suggested. It is specified as a policy that mimics choices on work duration and savings, made by a person with full knowledge and long horizon. The best reaction to aging from this viewpoint is an increase in retirement age keeping constant leisure/labor ratio. This strategy ensures the stability of replacement rates and does not affect intergeneration accounts. Longer employment is feasible, as higher life expectancy is accompanied with proportional increase in healthy life expectancy.

In-depth analysis of international and Russia's experiences with implementing fiscal rules is presented. Theoretical and empirical evidences are suggested in favor of retaining the present fiscal rules with some modifications aimed at ensuring: a) a relatively stable level of federal budget expenditure with guaranteed full execution of all commitments; b) countercyclical fiscal policy, based on flexibleand proper reaction to revenue changes; and c) robustness of fiscal rules to internal and external shocks. The main new features suggested include modified calculation of the oil base price, different measurement of cyclical fiscal revenues, lower size of structural fiscal balance, and thorough specification of sources for each item of the balance. The modified rules envisage increased flexibility by relaxing to a pre-set extent and for a pre-set time spending limits in response to extreme shocks. The suggested version of fiscal rules has been tested by application to historical data for 2005-2015, and macro projections for 2015-2025.

The paper looks into the impact of the Western financial sanctions on the Russian economy. The results of modeling of capital flow components (taking into account the influence of other factors, including the fall in oil prices) demonstrate that, apart from the direct effect of constraints on foreign funding for sanctioned state-controlled banks, oil, gas and arms companies, there is also a significant indirect effect of lower inflows of foreign direct investment and worsening funding conditions for non-sanctioned companies. The overall negative effect on gross capital inflow in 2014-2017 is estimated at about $280bn. However, the effect on net capital inflow is significantly lower ($160-170bn) thanks to self-adjustment of Russian companies evident in utilization of foreign assets accumulated earlier for debt repayment and overall decrease in gross capital outflow. The estimated sanctions' effect on GDP is significant (-2.4 p.p. by 2017 as compared to hypothetical scenario without sanctions) but 3.3 times lower than the estimated effect of oil price shock.