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AbstractBy discussing a large number of different examples, this paper argues that the class of so-called generic statements is much more heterogeneous that is usually recognized in the contemporary debate. It is claimed that the theoretical tendency towards overgeneralization or homogenization makes it impossible to adequately understand how generic statements function in language and to handle the dangers involved in generics that express and promote social stereotypes and prejudices. It is also argued that such overgeneralization involves what J. L. Austin described as the "fetishizing" of the true/false distinction. Several influential theories are criticized, including Sterken's error theory, Leslie's conception of weak generics, and the idea that generics involve loose talk.

Rawls's distinction between perfect and imperfect procedural justice relies on the notion of a procedure that is guaranteed to lead to a certain independently specifiable result. Clarification of this notion shows that it makes the distinction between perfect and imperfect procedural justice unreal, in the following sense: whether, in a particular case, we have an instance of perfect or imperfect procedural justice depends only on how we choose to specify the procedure that is being followed.

This is the first major study of J. L. Austin's philosophy in decades. Leading philosophers show the relevance of his work to current debates including scepticism and contextualism, the epistemology of testimony, and the semantics/pragmatics distinction. They demonstrate why Austin's work is of continuing value and interest to philosophers today.

How is linguistic theory related to linguistic practice? What do theoretical notions and models tell us about real-life language use? Are there any limits to what such notions and models can reasonably be taken to accomplish? These questions are fundamental to any serious investigation into the phenomena of human communication. The essays in this book show that philosophers and linguists of quite different brands have tended to give undue priority to their own favourite theoretical framework, and have presupposed that the descriptive scheme invoked by that framework constitutes a pattern to which any linguistic practice somehow has to conform. What unites the contributors to this volume is a critical attitude towards such essentialist aspirations. By investigating several concrete examples of this tendency - examples collected from such seemingly disparate areas as structuralism, contemporary analytic philosophy and feminist epistemology - the authors collectively manage to cast doubt on the very attempt to fit the whole of linguistic practice into a general theoretical mould

"This volume draws connections between Wittgenstein's philosophy and the work of Saul Kripke, especially his Naming and Necessity. Saul Kripke is regarded as one of the foremost representatives of contemporary analytic philosophy. His most important contributions include the strict distinction between metaphysical and epistemological questions, the introduction of the notions of contingent a priori truth and necessary a posteriori truth and original accounts of names, descriptions, identity, necessity and realism. The chapters in this book elucidate the relevant connections between Kripke's work and Wittgenstein, specifically concerning the standard meter, contingent apriori and rule-following. The contributions shed light on how Kripke's philosophical outlook was influenced by Wittgenstein, and how mainstream analytic philosophy and Wittgensteinian philosophy can fruitfully engage with one another. Kripke and Wittgenstein will be of interest to philosophers working on Wittgenstein, Kripke, and the history of analytic philosophy"--