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AbstractBerlin is often taken to have exaggerated his case against positive liberty, since contrary to what he seems to argue, several versions of it do not logically justify coercion. A more historical interpretation of his warnings may save him from this accusation, yet on the other hand suggests his message is of little relevance for contemporary liberalism. In contrast to both these approaches, this essay considers a third and largely neglected aspect of "Two Concepts of Liberty," that speaks more directly to the challenges facing liberalism today: Berlin's warning that positive liberty invites the specific kind of coercion that parades as liberation, and that it does so according to a psychologically predictable pattern. After reconstructing this undercurrent in Berlin's critique of positive liberty, this essay also considers the relevance of Berlin's warnings to contemporary European debates on banning the Muslim veil in the name of liberation.

There is an increasing scholarly concern that liberalism comes into conflict with religious diversity. William Galston blames this tendency on 'Enlightenment liberalism', which places autonomous self-reflection at the heart of the liberal project. This article, however, proposes a culprit that is more prone to both disrespect and dogmatism: romantic liberalism, which idealises authentic self-expression. I develop this concept by revisiting the Danish cartoon controversy, allegedly a case of Enlightenment liberalism. This exercise reveals that Flemming Rose, the editor who commissioned the cartoons, invokes romantic rather than enlightened values in defence of the publication. In contrast to previous research, I show that Rose does not portray the disrespectfulness of the cartoons as a side-effect of trying to promote autonomy among Muslims. Rather, he argues in favour of artistic provocation as such, invoking a distinctly romantic understanding of freedom of speech, which in many ways runs counter to the ideal of autonomy. Adapted from the source document.

There is an increasing scholarly concern that liberalism comes into conflict with religious diversity. William Galston blames this tendency on 'Enlightenment liberalism', which places autonomous self-reflection at the heart of the liberal project. This article, however, proposes a culprit that is more prone to both disrespect and dogmatism: romantic liberalism, which idealises authentic self-expression. I develop this concept by revisiting the Danish cartoon controversy, allegedly a case of Enlightenment liberalism. This exercise reveals that Flemming Rose, the editor who commissioned the cartoons, invokes romantic rather than enlightened values in defence of the publication. In contrast to previous research, I show that Rose does not portray the disrespectfulness of the cartoons as a side-effect of trying to promote autonomy among Muslims. Rather, he argues in favour of artistic provocation as such, invoking a distinctly romantic understanding of freedom of speech, which in many ways runs counter to the ideal of autonomy.

Does an increasing emphasis on individual freedom in mass values erode or revitalize democratic societies? This paper offers a new approach to this debate by examining it through the lens of Isaiah Berlin, and his distinction between positive and negative freedom. I show that, contrary to the common assumption among scholars who study mass values regarding freedom, these do not consist of one dimension but two: negative and positive freedom. I also show that, while valuing negative liberty clearly leads a person to become more morally permissive and more condoning of non-compliance with legal norms, valuing positive liberty does not seem to have the same effects at all; in fact, it shows the very opposite relationship with respect to some of these attitudes. Thus, it matters what kind of freedom people value. The results rely on confirmatory factor and regression analyses on World Values Survey data from ten affluent Western countries in 2005–2006.

Contemporary attitudes in affluent Western societies are characterised by a growing emphasis on individual freedom. What, then, does this commitment to liberty entail for our openness to diversity; and ultimately for liberal democracy? Previous research on popular attitudes, for example by Ronald Inglehart, tends to assume that valuing freedom entails an encouragement of a plurality of life-styles. This thesis, by contrast, argues that there are several ideals of freedom in public opinion; ideals that may have opposing consequences for our permissiveness towards ways of life that differ from our own. The introductory essay in this book suggests that Isaiah Berlin's theory of positive and negative freedom provides a fruitful analytical framework, which helps theorise and empirically nuance our picture of popular ideals of freedom. Essay I goes on to present a novel, psychological, interpretation of Berlin's Two Concepts of Liberty. This essay also suggests that Berlin was critical not only of enlightened ideals of positive liberty, but also of romantic ones, which might be even more widespread today. Essay II then applies Berlin's framework to contemporary survey data. Through confirmatory factor and regression analyses, this essay demonstrates that Berlin's negative-positive distinction does in fact hold also in popular opinion; and that the two dimensions have rather different effects on moral and legal permissiveness. Essay III, finally, revisits a recent example of disrespect in the name of liberty: the Danish cartoon controversy. This essay develops the concept of 'romantic liberalism', thereby deepening our knowledge of romantic ideals of positive liberty, and their particularly disrespectful tendencies. Drawing on Isaiah Berlin, and his critique of positive liberty, the essays in this thesis together suggest that it is crucial for liberal democracy to recognise the existence of treacherous liberties: ideals that lead their supporters to ridicule, condemn, or even prohibit ways of life that differ from their own – all in the name of liberty. ; The Impact of Religion

It is often suggested that the distinguishing characteristic of public opinion in contemporary Western societies is a lack of shared moral guidelines in life: everything goes. The only ideal left is what is often called individualism, namely that of not accepting any given roles, values or ideals in life but instead striving towards being as free as possible to behave as one pleases. In the thesis that this chapter forms a part of, I offer a different understanding of the much discussed culture of individualism. In later chapters, I shall present data that allow us to question existing assumptions regarding the empirical nature of individualistic values. In this chapter, however, I begin by addressing what I believe is still an un-settled issue of just as much, if not even more, importance: the concept of individualism and how to define it. This chapter aims to equip us with the theoretical Wellingtons we need before venturing into the empirical swamp of individualism. We still know too little about individualism as a set of moral ideals concerning how human beings and society ought to behave. The root of the problem, I suggest, is that we lack a theoretically sound definition of what this kind of normative individualism is and what it is not; which in turn means we have no existing framework for making systematic comparisons between different versions of individualistic ideals. Here, I develop a definition of normative individualism and such a framework. In doing so, I do not only contribute to a more thorough understanding of individualism, but also to two closely related debates in political theory. Normative individualism, it is shown, amounts to valuing individual liberty of different kinds. Thus, the concept of individualism provides a new and rewarding entry to two classic conceptual questions which I also discuss: how to define freedom and how to define moral autonomy. ; Presented at the Nordic Network in Political Theory, 8th Annual workshop, Uppsala, Sweden, October 2008.

It is often suggested that the distinguishing characteristic of public opinion in contemporary Western societies is a lack of shared moral guidelines in life: everything goes. The only ideal left is what is often called individualism, namely that of not accepting any given roles, values or ideals in life but instead striving towards being as free as possible to behave as one pleases. In this paper, I shall question this understanding of individualism. I shall argue that, both conceptually and empirically, individualism is also a set of specific ideals, as opposed to the lack thereof. In this paper, I back up my argument both by theorizing and presenting two new empirical studies, one on Dutch and the other on Swedish survey data. These indicate there are no reasons to assume that just because one is an individualist in the sense that one values individual freedom, one would also condone egoism, freeriding and hedonism. Neither do individualists need to be alienated and lacking a larger goal in life than the pursuit of self-interest. Finally, one of the studies also suggests there are two types of individualistic ideals: one external and oriented towards freedom of action (exemplified by Pippi Longstocking) and another more internal and focused on freedom of thought (exemplified by Lisa Simpson). ; Workshop paper to be presented at the NOPSA Conference 2008, Tromsö, Norway.

This paper should be seen against the background of my dissertation project, in which I aim to sort out some of the empirical confusions concerning Ronald Inglehart's so-called self-expression values by developing more theoretically refined research hypotheses. I argue that much of the empirical disagreement on whether self-expression values promote democracy or not depends on the fact that their active ingredient, called liberty aspirations, actually consists of several very different and often conflicting conceptions of liberty that have been collapsed into one. Thus, contrary to what Inglehart and his colleagues assume, there can be no unambiguous relationship between liberty aspirations and democracy. The relationship very much depends on which conception of liberty we are discussing. We will not know where self-expression values come from, why they arise, and which kind of democracy they do (or do not) promote, unless we know which sort of liberty aspirations they actually capture. In order to do this, we cannot as Inglehart start with factor scores. Beginning in the proper end necessarily brings us back to political theory. ; Draft for workshop in Political Theory in Uppsala, Sweden, April 2007.

This paper is an outline of my dissertation project, which will deal with political psychology, civic values and participation. More specifically, I ask how the ideal of individualism affects a citizen's civicness. How does the fact that someone believes in the principle of individual independence in turn influence their tolerance, solidarity, participation and general engagement in politics? And what elements does the ideal of individualism consist of? Does it perhaps consist of different dimensions; and if so, do these different individualisms have varying effects on civic virtues? I here briefly comment on previous research on individualism and democracy and propose what I intend to do differently, followed by a dive into the empirical puzzle of individualism in the United States and in Sweden. I then develop a preliminary typology for what I call external and internal individualism. I also discuss why and how we should expect these different ideals to affect civic virtues. I further suggest that the issue of individualism and civicness relates to the larger question of how to balance the positive or 'republican' right to self-development through participation on the one hand, with the negative or 'liberal' right to privacy on the other. In this, my project actualizes a possible conflict at the heart of liberal democracy; a conflict between what Benjamin Constant calls the liberty of the ancients and that of the moderns. ; Dissertation plan to be presented at the SWEPSA 2007 workshop, Norrköping, Sweden, October 17-19

AbstractIs it true that national identity increases trust, as liberal nationalists assume? Recent research has studied this side of the 'national identity argument' by focusing on conceptions of the content of national identity (often civic or ethnic) and their links to social, rather than political, trust. This paper argues that if we take social identity theory seriously, however, we need to complement this picture by asking how varying the strength – rather than the content – of a person's sense of their national identity affects both their social and political trust. We break down the different dimensions of national identity, hypothesizing and empirically verifying that there are divergent links from national attachment, national pride, and national chauvinism to social and political trust. We do so with data from the US (General Social Survey) and the Netherlands (Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sciences ), thus expanding current knowledge of national identity and trust to a highly relevant yet neglected European case.