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SummaryThis first cross‐country analysis of the causes of corruption in religious organizations provides evidence in support of policy recommendations by Adam Smith. He argued that clergy are best constrained by competition among religious groups. Their appointment and promotion should, however, be regulated by the state. Both factors are shown to confine corruption. In contrast, David Hume's approach of supporting state religion and limiting entry into the religious market is not a promising strategy for mitigating religious corruption. More generally, these results suggest that the private sector may indeed be shielded from sprawling corruption as long as markets are sufficiently competitive.

We analyze the effect of state visits by the Catholic pope on human rights in the host country to understand how a small theocracy like the Vatican can exert disproportionate political influence in international politics. Our theory of the strategic interaction between the Catholic Church and host governments describes how the pope's use of conditional approval and criticism incentivizes governments to refrain from human rights violations. Drawing on a new dataset of papal state visits outside Italy and a novel identification strategy, we test for the first time whether governments react in anticipation of a papal visit by improving their human rights protection. Our empirical analysis offers robust evidence for this causal effect, which is supported by qualitative evidence.

We analyze the effect of state visits by the Catholic pope on human rights in the host country to understand how a small theocracy like the Vatican can exert disproportionate political influence in international politics. Our theoretical model of the strategic interaction between the Catholic Church and host governments shows how the pope's use of conditional approval and criticism incentivizes governments to refrain from human rights violations. Drawing on a new dataset of papal state visits outside Italy and a novel identification strategy, we test for the first time whether governments react by improving human rights protection in anticipation of a papal visit. Our empirical analysis offers robust evidence in support of this causal effect.

Many years ago, Emmanuel Todd came up with a classification of family types and argued that the historically prevalent family types in a society have important consequences for its economic, political, and social development. Here, we evaluate Todd's most important predictions empirically. Relying on a parsimonious model with exogenous covariates, we find mixed results. On the one hand, authoritarian family types are, in stark contrast to Todd's predictions, associated with increased levels of the rule of law and innovation. On the other hand, and in line with Todd's expectations, communitarian family types are linked to racism, low levels of the rule of law, and late industrialization. Countries in which endogamy is frequently practiced also display an expectedly high level of state fragility and weak civil society organizations.

AbstractMany years ago, Emmanuel Todd came up with a classification of family types and argued that the historically prevalent family types in a society have important consequences for its economic, political, and social development. Here, we evaluate Todd's most important predictions empirically. Relying on a parsimonious model with exogenous covariates, we find mixed results. On the one hand, authoritarian family types are, in stark contrast to Todd's predictions, associated with increased levels of the rule of law and innovation. On the other hand, and in line with Todd's expectations, communitarian family types are linked to racism, low levels of the rule of law, and late industrialization. Countries in which endogamy is frequently practiced also display an expectedly high level of state fragility and weak civil society organizations.

AbstractConstitutional democracy is in decline and many would-be autocrats try to transgress constitutional constraints. Here, we introduce the concept of militant constitutionalism, which suggests a number of constitutional rules that could make constitutions more resilient to attempts to undermine them. A first empirical evaluation, however, can link only few constitutional paths to enhanced constitutional resilience.

AbstractIn many modern nation states, both rich and poor, traditional law to this day plays an important role. Given the almost universal prevalence of traditional law, it is surprising how little we know about it. This is the first study that tries to take stock of traditional law from a cross-country perspective. We are also interested in the compatibility of traditional law with state-enforced law and, in particular, with the basic traits of the rule of law. Based on a sample of up to 134 countries, we find that no 'typical' traditional law exists, but that traditional law varies in many dimensions such as its timely enforcement, its impartiality, and its protection of basic human rights. Societies that rely extensively on traditional law score low regarding both the rule of law and per capita income. Historical and geographical factors are important predictors of the contemporaneous reliance on traditional law. State antiquity, for example, reduces the prevalence of traditional law, as does a high share of descendants from European populations.

Many years ago, Emmanuel Todd argued that differences in family organization - specifically the rules of inheritance, the number of generations living under one roof, and endogamous marriage - are reflected in the organization of the state. He also argued that different family types lead to different paths of economic development. Economists have long ignored these sweeping claims, but with increasing interest in the deep causes of economic development, family types have caught the attention of some economists. Here, we try to take Todd seriously and evaluate his predictions empirically. Relying on a parsimonious model with exogenous covariates, we find mixed results. On the one hand, countries in which authoritarian family types dominate have much higher levels of the rule of law and innovation than predicted by Todd. On the other, countries in which the communitarian family types dominate are characterized by racism, low levels of the rule of law, few checks on government, and late industrialization. Countries in which endogamy is frequently practiced display a high level of state fragility and have weak civil society organizations.

We analyze the effect of state visits by the Catholic pope on human rights in the host country to illustrate how a small theocracy like the Vatican can exert significant political influence in international politics. Our theoretical model of the strategic interaction between the Catholic Church and the government shows how the pope uses the threat of shaming to incentivize governments to refrain from violations of human rights. Drawing on a new dataset of papal state visits outside Italy and a novel identification strategy, we test the hypothesis that governments react in anticipation of a papal visit by improving human rights protection. The existence of such a causal effect is supported by the data.