Suchergebnisse

This article seeks to explain why the World Bank's environmental performance is so uneven despite numerous reform efforts. I argue that a principal-agent model offers a potentially powerful tool for analyzing gaps between the mandates and performance of international organizations (IOs) such as the World Bank. The model is particularly useful when it is calibrated to recognize problems of antinomic delegation and the dual role an IO may have as both agent and principal. Antinomic delegation occurs when states ask IOs to take on complex tasks that are difficult to institutionalize. Recognizing that many IOs may be principal and agent at different stages of the policy process reveals more opportunities for agency slack that are not well addressed by the IO literature. This article presents these modifications to the principal-agent model and applies the model to the case of the World Bank. The case study demonstrates that the nature of the tasks being delegated and the incentives shaping both sides of the principal-agent relationship are key sources of disconnect between the institution's stated goals and its performance.

Egypt has a large food subsidy program that has created a relatively effective social safety net, but it has also drained budgetary resources and proved to be poorly targeted toward the poor. Discussions about reforming the system to improve its effectiveness have run into extreme political sensitivities surrounding the issue of food subsidies. Egypt, therefore, well illustrates the quandaries that policymakers and others contemplating food subsidy reform face in developing countries. This study examines the political economy of food subsidy reform in Egypt and discusses the economic and political advantages and disadvantages of nine possible reforms. The study concludes that the reforms that have the greatest chance of success are those that reduce the access of the wealthy while increasing the access of the truly needy, but the timing, sequence, and trade-offs of such reforms have to be taken into account before they are implemented. ; Non-PR ; IFPRI1 ; FCND

"International organizations (IOs) are essential and controversial actors in global governance, working on just about every imaginable issue that states cannot easily address individually. The Second Edition of International Organizations in World Politics offers a comprehensive overview of major IOs and regional organizations and their role in global governance. Tamar Gutner presents a variety of theoretical approaches to analyzing the roles and impact of large IOs, including the United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and World Trade Organization, and examines their historical development, governance structure, activities, and performance. For each IO, a detailed case study illuminates the constraints and challenges it faces in areas of contemporary global challenges like conflict resolution, development, the environment, trade, and financial crisis. The Second Edition includes updated coverage of IOs' responses to major world issues like the COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and other geopolitical tensions"--