Bridging Copenhagen and Paris: how Hungarian police accept anti-immigrant discourse
In: European security, Band 31, Heft 4, S. 597-616
ISSN: 1746-1545
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In: European security, Band 31, Heft 4, S. 597-616
ISSN: 1746-1545
World Affairs Online
In: European security, Band 31, Heft 4, S. 597-616
ISSN: 1746-1545
The report provides an insight into the most important hotspots of radicalisation in Hungary: the 2008-2009 Roma Murders, the "migrant-hunting" of László Toroczkai and the assaults on LGBTQI people orchestrated by György Budaházy. It outlines the underlying mechanisms and facilitating conditions of the hotspots, and situates them on the injustice-grievance-alienation-polarization (IGAP) spectrum. Our findings show that the proliferation of right-wing radical movements, coupled with the wider sociopolitical context, has had a significant effect on perpetrators. The growing public intolerance towards the Roma, migrants and LGBTQI people, the dominant political discourse, in tandem with the incompetence and/or ignorance of the authorities, are likely to have contributed to the outcome. As regards the IGAP spectrum, the feeling of grievance, injustice and, paradoxically, alienation were arguably not only shared by the perpetrators, but also by a significant proportion of the society at the time of the Roma Murders. Similarly, there is a growing consensus among Hungarians that migrants and LGBTQI people should have limited access to the resources and privileges of the community. Not only the perpetrators of the Roma Murders, but also Toroczkai and Budaházy may have had a reasonable expectation to be appreciated for what they have done by many.
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This report provides a brief presentation of the context, structures and stakeholders of (de-)radicalisation in contemporary Hungary. The prevalent form of radicalisation in present-day Hungary is right-wing extremism mixed with ethno-nationalist, antiestablishment and religious elements, shaped by the legacy of Trianon, the Horthyera1 and the fascist Arrow Cross Party (Nyilaskeresztes Párt).2 The most significant events that prompted radicalisation were party politics right after the collapse of the one-party system in 1989; the socio-economic situation and subsequent crisis of the socialist-liberal government in 2006; and the so-called "refugee crisis" in 2015. Rightwing polarisation led to the most shocking events in contemporary Hungary, the Roma murders in 2008-2009. Besides Roma, the usual targets of violence are Jews, migrants and the LGBTQI community. There have been several far-right group formations since the collapse of the communist regime in 1989. However, the FideszKDNP3 party alliance currently in power has systematically taken over the platform and narratives of Jobbik.4 While the latter has been moving to the centre, the former has become gradually more radical both in terms of political discourse and social policy. Fidesz has essentially closed the political space and monopolised right-wing radicalisation in Hungary; social-liberal values, the Roma, migrants and LGBTQI communities have been under constant attack by the government. As a consequence, efforts of de-radicalisation and reducing hate crime remain with stakeholders, such as NGOs, charities and religious organisations.
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Integrating the discursive and practice-based approach to securitisation, this article explores how the police function as the audience of securitising discourse. Taking the Hungarian case of border control, it looks into how the police accept and buy into anti-immigrant discourses of the political elite. Based on a questionnaire survey of Hungarian police officers, it demonstrates the potential of discursive legitimation in shaping officers' understanding of mass migration. It describes the ways in which attitudes and hence, arguably, practice can be conditioned by securitising discourse. The overall aim of the article is to advance the understanding of the narrative dimension of power struggles between police and the political elite, and how that structures the field of border security. Critical security scholars have pointed out that police filter securitising discourse based on their professional dispositions and preferences. However, the Hungarian case seems to suggest that discourse may, in fact, influence dispositions themselves
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In: Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences, Band 21, Heft 3, S. 539-558
ISSN: 1572-8676
AbstractThis article argues that phenomenological sociology has great potential to provide a strong theoretical support to the Sociocognitive Approach (SCA) in Critical Discourse Studies. SCA is interested in the interconnections between knowledge, discourse and society while placing subjectivity in the centre of its framework. It looks into the correlative relationship between personal- and socially shared knowledge, and the significance of these correlations to discourse production and interpretation. Analogously, phenomenological sociology explores the interrelated structures of subjectivity, knowledge and the social world. It systematically analyses the conditions and forms of intersubjective understanding and the mutually constitutive relationship between subjective- and objective knowledge. Given the considerable overlap between the subject matter of phenomenological sociology and that of SCA, the purpose of the article is to draw the attention of critical discourse analysts to a neglected but extremely resourceful field. Following a brief introduction to SCA, the article will address some of SCA's key concepts in conjunction with the phenomenological-sociological insight.
In this report, our objective is to provide a snapshot of the current situation of the governance and management of migration in Hungary, the regulatory landscape, citing and reflecting on developments and events occurred between 2011 and 2018. Section 1) gives a statistical overview of international migration to Hungary. The data displayed shows the main patterns of asylum seeker flows, their recognition rates and the scale of people being expelled from the territory. Section 2) outlines the political, cultural and socio-economic context in which migration management enfolds. It briefly introduces the linguistic and religious cleavages and the political and institutional arrangements of the state. Without engaging in a thorough analysis, we will try to pin down those critical socio-economic and political factors that are accountable for the current escalation of tensions. In doing so, we move on to Section 3) that gives an insight on how the constitutional organization of the state has been altered and restructured over the past years, thus establishing an ideological, legal and institutional base for the transformation of the migration and asylum framework. Section 4) accounts for the legislative and institutional framework of immigration and asylum by introducing the major Acts that govern the field, the authorities that are responsible for the implementation of the policy, and the Government's migration strategy. Since the recent developments fundamentally changed the scope of the framework, now representing its basic tenets, instead of discussing the amendments in a separate section, the refugee crisis driven reforms will be embedded here. In chronological order we will address all major amendments since 2015 that affected the legislative framework. Section 5) explains the legal status of foreigners, including asylum applicants, beneficiaries of international protection, the main categories of third country nationals legally residing in the country in terms of the type of residence permit they hold, irregular migrants, and unaccompanied minors. In describing the situation of asylum seekers, we will outline the first main stages of the application procedure. Finally, in Section 6) we will analyse the national framework compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights based on the Court's case law in relation to migration and asylum.
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In this report, our objective is to provide a snapshot of the current situation of the governance and management of migration in Hungary, the regulatory landscape, citing and reflecting on developments and events occurred between 2011 and 2018. Section 1) gives a statistical overview of international migration to Hungary. The data displayed shows the main patterns of asylum seeker flows, their recognition rates and the scale of people being expelled from the territory. Section 2) outlines the political, cultural and socio-economic context in which migration management enfolds. It briefly introduces the linguistic and religious cleavages and the political and institutional arrangements of the state. Without engaging in a thorough analysis, we will try to pin down those critical socio-economic and political factors that are accountable for the current escalation of tensions. In doing so, we move on to Section 3) that gives an insight on how the constitutional organization of the state has been altered and restructured over the past years, thus establishing an ideological, legal and institutional base for the transformation of the migration and asylum framework. Section 4) accounts for the legislative and institutional framework of immigration and asylum by introducing the major Acts that govern the field, the authorities that are responsible for the implementation of the policy, and the Government's migration strategy. Since the recent developments fundamentally changed the scope of the framework, now representing its basic tenets, instead of discussing the amendments in a separate section, the refugee crisis driven reforms will be embedded here. In chronological order we will address all major amendments since 2015 that affected the legislative framework. Section 5) explains the legal status of foreigners, including asylum applicants, beneficiaries of international protection, the main categories of third country nationals legally residing in the country in terms of the type of residence permit they hold, ...
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In this report, our objective is to provide a snapshot of the current situation of the governance and management of migration in Hungary, the regulatory landscape, citing and reflecting on developments and events occurred between 2011 and 2018. Section 1) gives a statistical overview of international migration to Hungary. The data displayed shows the main patterns of asylum seeker flows, their recognition rates and the scale of people being expelled from the territory. We briefly describe the demographic composition of third-country nationals residing in the country, closing the section with a few remarks on migratory balance. Section 2) outlines the political, cultural and socio-economic context in which migration management enfolds. It briefly introduces the linguistic and religious cleavages and the political and institutional arrangements of the state. Without engaging in a thorough analysis, we will try to pin down those critical socio-economic and political factors that are accountable for the current escalation of tensions. In doing so, we move on to Section 3) that gives an insight on how the constitutional organization of the state has been altered and restructured over the past years, thus establishing an ideological, legal and institutional base for the transformation of the migration and asylum framework. Section 4) accounts for the legislative and institutional framework of immigration and asylum by introducing the major Acts that govern the field, the authorities that are responsible for the implementation of the policy, and the Government's migration strategy. Since the recent developments fundamentally changed the scope of the framework, now representing its basic tenets, instead of discussing the amendments in a separate section, the refugee crisis driven reforms will be embedded here. In chronological order we will address all major amendments since 2015 that affected the legislative framework. Section 5) explains the legal status of foreigners, including asylum applicants, beneficiaries of international protection, the main categories of third country nationals legally residing in the country in terms of the type of residence permit they hold, irregular migrants, and unaccompanied minors. In describing the situation of asylum seekers, we will outline the first main stages of the application procedure. Reception conditions and detention of asylum seekers, however, being subject of another work package of the project, are out of the scope of the report. Finally, in Section 6) we will analyse the national framework compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights based on the Court's case law in relation to migration and asylum.
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In: Gyollai , D 2018 , Hungary - Country Report: Legal & Policy Framework of Migration Governance . RESPOND . https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1418573
In this report, our objective is to provide a snapshot of the current situation of the governance and management of migration in Hungary, the regulatory landscape, citing and reflecting on developments and events occurred between 2011 and 2018. Section 1) gives a statistical overview of international migration to Hungary. The data displayed shows the main patterns of asylum seeker flows, their recognition rates and the scale of people being expelled from the territory. Section 2) outlines the political, cultural and socio-economic context in which migration management enfolds. It briefly introduces the linguistic and religious cleavages and the political and institutional arrangements of the state. Without engaging in a thorough analysis, we will try to pin down those critical socio-economic and political factors that are accountable for the current escalation of tensions. In doing so, we move on to Section 3) that gives an insight on how the constitutional organization of the state has been altered and restructured over the past years, thus establishing an ideological, legal and institutional base for the transformation of the migration and asylum framework. Section 4) accounts for the legislative and institutional framework of immigration and asylum by introducing the major Acts that govern the field, the authorities that are responsible for the implementation of the policy, and the Government's migration strategy. Since the recent developments fundamentally changed the scope of the framework, now representing its basic tenets, instead of discussing the amendments in a separate section, the refugee crisis driven reforms will be embedded here. In chronological order we will address all major amendments since 2015 that affected the legislative framework. Section 5) explains the legal status of foreigners, including asylum applicants, beneficiaries of international protection, the main categories of third country nationals legally residing in the country in terms of the type of residence permit they hold, irregular migrants, and unaccompanied minors. In describing the situation of asylum seekers, we will outline the first main stages of the application procedure. Finally, in Section 6) we will analyse the national framework compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights based on the Court's case law in relation to migration and asylum.
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In the summer of 2015 Hungary constructed a 175 km long barbed-wire fence at its southern border with Serbia. New criminal offences and asylum procedures were introduced that limited access to refugee status determination and ignored agreed EU asylum policy, deterring and de facto preventing asylum seekers from entering Hungarian territory. This paper provides an analysis of these new measures, which criminalized asylum seekers, and the subsequent Hungarian policy in relation to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights – arguing that the Hungarian authorities excessively abused their discretion in implementing these new policies of immigration and border control.
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This report shows how the inhuman border protection and protection policies of the Hungarian government have triggered an adverse refugee reception environment. This is despite very few numbers of refugees currently in the country and even minimal number of people in the current reception system. As we have raised in the previous WP2 Hungary Border Management country report,1 there are grave cases concerning the implementation of the EU directives affecting the delivery of refugee reception policies as well. Moreover, the hostile reception policies are not only affecting refugees, but also activities as well as the morale of the humanitarian workers in the country. Hence, the hostility towards refugees starts with the political discourse that retains perennial crisis narrative, hits border management practices, ripples into reception policy, and has an adverse impact on the more general delivery of humanitarianism in the country.
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This report shows how the inhuman border protection and protection policies of the Hungarian government have triggered an adverse refugee reception environment. This is despite very few numbers of refugees currently in the country and even minimal number of people in the current reception system. As we have raised in the previous WP2 Hungary Border Management country report,1 there are grave cases concerning the implementation of the EU directives affecting the delivery of refugee reception policies as well. Moreover, the hostile reception policies are not only affecting refugees, but also activities as well as the morale of the humanitarian workers in the country. Hence, the hostility towards refugees starts with the political discourse that retains perennial crisis narrative, hits border management practices, ripples into reception policy, and has an adverse impact on the more general delivery of humanitarianism in the country.
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In: Gyollai , D & Korkut , U 2020 , Reception Policies, Practices and Responses: Hungary Country Report . RESPOND . https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3700959
This report shows how the inhuman border protection and protection policies of the Hungarian government have triggered an adverse refugee reception environment. This is despite very few numbers of refugees currently in the country and even minimal number of people in the current reception system. As we have raised in the previous WP2 Hungary Border Management country report,1 there are grave cases concerning the implementation of the EU directives affecting the delivery of refugee reception policies as well. Moreover, the hostile reception policies are not only affecting refugees, but also activities as well as the morale of the humanitarian workers in the country. Hence, the hostility towards refugees starts with the political discourse that retains perennial crisis narrative, hits border management practices, ripples into reception policy, and has an adverse impact on the more general delivery of humanitarianism in the country.
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This report shows how the inhuman border protection and protection policies of the Hungarian government have triggered an adverse refugee reception environment. This is despite very few numbers of refugees currently in the country and even minimal number of people in the current reception system. As we have raised in the previous WP2 Hungary Border Management country report,1 there are grave cases concerning the implementation of the EU directives affecting the delivery of refugee reception policies as well. Moreover, the hostile reception policies are not only affecting refugees, but also activities as well as the morale of the humanitarian workers in the country. Hence, the hostility towards refugees starts with the political discourse that retains perennial crisis narrative, hits border management practices, ripples into reception policy, and has an adverse impact on the more general delivery of humanitarianism in the country. To this extent, this report finds the following. • The Hungarian reception policy follows a centralised, top-down model regarding asylum and immigration policy. It involves both the Police and Armed Forces. • Transit zones have essentially become the only reception facility. They also function as de facto detention centres. • As of December 2018, there were only three people hosted at the existing reception facilities. There is only one designated facility for vulnerable asylum seekers, except the Children's Home in Fót. We cannot establish the number of asylum seekers in these facilities at the moment of writing. • Effectively, the transit zones operate as reception facilities. We have discussed the situation in the transit zones in detail in WP2 Border Management country report for Hungary. • The government is using the "crisis situation caused by mass migration" narrative in order to curb asylum seekers' rights. • Asylum-seekers have no access to labour market. • While there are food provisions in the reception centres, due to the "constant state of crisis caused by mass migration", travel allowances, reimbursement of educational expenses, financial support to facilitate potential return is now suspended. • Even food provisions are dire. The food provisions in the transit zones are limited to canned food, and the asylum seekers have no access to diverse or healthy diet unless social workers provide them. The Hungarian government used starvation as a tactic to force the asylum-seekers leave the transit zone back to Serbia from August 2018 to May 2019. • Sexual minorities have been verbally abused and/or threatened by security guards in one of the reception centres. • The activities of the humanitarian actors for service provision and intervene on behalf of the asylum-seekers are extremely limited. This also removes any possibility of an independent overview of the activities of the Hungarian officials. • The Hungarian government has institutionalised its own Charity Council at the expense of leaving independent humanitarian agencies out. However, it is not very clear what kind of services these agencies provide in the transit zones. • There is no "welcome culture" to talk about in the Hungarian case as the Hungarian government has successfully generated a supportive public audience for its reception policies.
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