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Climate change – among its many other challenges – also impacts on conditions of competition along the whole food value chain. This article posits that many mitigation and adaptation policies imply a differentiation between otherwise identical products with different climate footprints. Where imports are affected, there is a potential for trade frictions. The main issue appears to be a climate-smart treatment of so-called 'non-product-related like products.' Now that national governments start implementing their commitments under the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, they have to closely look at the trade and investment impact of their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC). The NDC presently available remain silent on concrete measures involving product differentiation according to footprint differences, by way of border adjustment measures, subsidies, prohibitions, or restrictions. The non-discrimination principle enshrined in the multilateral trading system can be a problem for such differentiations. No climate-smart agricultural measures have as yet been notified to the WTO. But several renewable energy programmes have been found to violate WTO rules. Potential problems could arise, for instance, from differentiating tariffs, import restrictions or taxes according to climate footprint. Conditions of competition might even be affected by labels signalling products with a bigger footprint, or through subsidies and incentives compensating domestic producers subject to emissions reductions, prohibitions, and input restrictions. A second major problem lies in the way the Paris Agreement and the WTO address the Development Dimension. In the Paris Agreement the Development Dimension is addressed by the notion of Common but Differentiated Responsibility (CBDR), leaving basically all Parties free on how to take development into account in their NDC. On the other side, the so-called 'Special and Differentiated Treatment' (SDT) foreseen in all WTO agreements for developing country products and services appears incapable to deal with the global impact of all emissions, regardless of their origin, or with the negative impact on developing country exports to climate-smart markets in developed countries. In conclusion we suggest that a review of the climate-relevant trade and investment rules is necessary at the international level, involving climate, agriculture and trade regulators, supported by scientific, economic and legal expertise. The purpose of this review is to avoid litigation jeopardising the implementation of the Paris Agreement. At the same time, such a review must be wide-ranging, because the objective is to ensure maximum policy space for climate mitigation and adaptation without negatively impacting on other countries, or unduly restricting trade and investment, especially in poor developing countries. Last but not least, this intergovernmental and inter-institutional review is urgent, because the results should provide as quickly as possible the legal security necessary for regulators, NDC developments and reviews, and international standard-setting processes.

The UK's agriculture sector faces challenges and opportunities as a result of Brexit. It will need to overcome challenges posed by leaving the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), not least because CAP funding currently supports many farms across the UK. Repatriating agricultural policy-making to the UK will also require careful consideration of the needs of the industry, future trade agreements and the devolution settlements. These changes will affect an industry which by its very nature must make long-term business decisions. A transitional period is needed to allow farmers to survive and prosper post-Brexit.

So the damage is done: both emperors go naked, and this at a particularly sensitive stage of the negotiations. Worse, the hegemons sit on an applecart already so full that only a "TTIP light" seems to save it from toppling, albeit at a price of losing its most precious apple: regulatory coherence, no wand forever!But wait! We may already have given up hope for transatlantic agreements on financial cooperation and data protection. Hormone beef and biotech seeds, if not feed, also look rather far away from good and risk–free regulatory solutions. And carmakers in Asia and South America may have chuckled with relief when the efforts of US and EU manufacturers of automobiles failed to define a fully harmonised, standardised and mutually recognised "TTIP Car" – after which they would have had little if any leeway for their own motors, emission limits, windscreens and safety standards.This is where the leaks may have opened a welcome window of opportunity for third countries, blinded as they apparently all are by the prospects of trade liberalisation racing ahead with megaregional steps too big for them to buy in with any hope for negotiating power.

Viele Länder verankern die Versorgungs- oder Ernährungssicherheit als staatspolitisches Ziel in ihrem Grundgesetz. Neuerdings wird auch das Recht auf Nahrung und auf die Erfüllung weiterer Grundbedürfnisse aufgeführt. Das Schweizer Parlament hat darüber hinaus sogar den Grundsatz der Ernährungssouveränität im Landwirtschaftsgesetz verankert. Die zur Förderung dieser Ziele genannten Aufgaben und Eingriffsrechte des Staates sind jeweils unterschiedlich und unterschiedlich präzise formuliert. Dabei gibt es für jedes Land eigentlich nur zwei Möglichkeiten zur Ernährung: Inlandproduktion und Einfuhr. Eine zusätzliche Option ist die Bildung von Nahrungsmittelreserven zur Überbrückung von Versorgungsengpässen. Die Schweiz benützt und fördert alle drei Möglichkeiten zu ihrer Ernährungssicherheit, im Wesentlichen mit vier Politiken: Versorgungs-, Aussenwirtschafts-, Agrar- und Entwicklungspolitik. Bei Störungen sollen die durch Grenzabgaben finanzierten Pflichtlager während rund sechs Monaten die Inlandnachfrage sichern. Die Optimierung und die Abstimmung unter den verschiedenen Sektorpolitiken, welche unter Berücksichtigung der internationalen Rahmenbedingungen eine grösstmögliche Ernährungssicherheit herbeiführen, gehört zu den Kernaufgaben jedes Staates. Die Umsetzung der genannten Sektorpolitiken ist jedoch in der Praxis nicht immer kohärent, geschweige denn konfliktfrei. Dieser Artikel beschreibt zunächst die internationalen rechtlichen und ökonomischen Parameter für die Schweizer Versorgungspolitik und ihre Beziehung zur Wirtschaftsfreiheit im Allgemeinen, und speziell auf ihre Zweckmässigkeit hinsichtlich der Ernährungssicherheit. Die Analyse der Wechselwirkungen und der Konflikte bei der Umsetzung zeigt, dass die Schweizer Ernährungssicherheitspolitik (food security) in Wirklichkeit eine Politik zur einheimischen Produzentensicherheit ist (farm security). Den Abschluss bilden einige Vorschläge zur Minderung der sektorpolitischen Inkohärenzen und der festgestellten negativen Auswirkungen der Agrarpolitik auf die Schweizer und globale Ernährungssicherheit. ; Food security is the first of three objectives enshrined in Article 104 of the Swiss Federal Constitution to which agricultural policy is expected to make a substantial contribution. A review of the instruments – high border protection, large domestic and a few export subsidies – shows, however, that the real objective of the present agricultural policy is in fact (Swiss) farm security. By the same token it impairs the contribution to Swiss food security of three related instruments i.e. trade, supply and development policies. The focus on family farm structures and landscape management even reduces the food production potential of Swiss farmers. The findings suggest (i) optimisation of food stockpile management by taxpayer contributions (instead of by consumers), (ii) a participation in virtual food security schemes (in analogy to the International Energy Agency), and (iii) efficiency improvements of Swiss farms through gradually increasing international competition. However, in the long run the WTO Green Box has the only legal, unlimited and effective tools to genuinely promote both Swiss agriculture and food security without a deleterious impact on food security in developing countries.