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This article outlines some of the major EU security and defence policy initiatives and the role of the European Commission within these. The article focuses especially on those initiatives outlined in the draft document for the EU Strategic Compass that have a bearing both on the Commission's role and on other defence-related initiatives in 2022. The article also discusses the role of technological development and geo-economics in this new era of great-power competition. It concludes by discussing some of the implications of these developments for the political role of the European Commission and for the democratic and political accountability of the Union.

This article outlines some of the major EU security and defence policy initiatives and the role of the European Commission within these. The article focuses especially on those initiatives outlined in the draft document for the EU Strategic Compass that have a bearing both on the Commission's role and on other defence-related initiatives in 2022. The article also discusses the role of technological development and geo-economics in this new era of great-power competition. It concludes by discussing some of the implications of these developments for the political role of the European Commission and for the democratic and political accountability of the Union.

In 2021, the European Union presented its new Indo-Pacific strategy, which outlines the Union's ambition to increase its interactions with the Indo-Pacific region in order to create partnerships to strengthen the so-called 'rules-based international order'. However, the Union's strategy also emphasises the intensifying competition that has been occurring in the Indo-Pacific in recent years due to geopolitical dynamics. This paper hence seeks to analyse the role of the European Union in the Indo-Pacific region through the lens of the Union's ambition to achieve the goal of European strategic autonomy. In the past few years, the European Union's ambition for strategic autonomy has become the foremost leitmotif for the Union. Consequently, this paper discusses and outlines the ambition of the European Union and analyses how it has fed into the work of building partnerships and greater connectivity with Asian states while responding to the increasingly Sino-US geopolitical competition in the region.

This article addresses Sweden's more ambitious and forward-looking approach to EU security and defence cooperation. This approach represents, in part, an adaptation by Sweden to the post-Brexit political landscape. However, Stockholm is also reacting to the more ambitious policy initiatives coming out of Brussels. This article will look at some of the major developments and initiatives on the EU level and discuss how Sweden has reacted and tried to influence them. It argues that 2021 could be another watershed year for EU security and defence cooperation as the process of developing the Union's new Strategic Compass is in a formative phase. It concludes that it is welcome news that Stockholm is raising its level of ambition and actively attempting to influence this process.

European Defence is in a new and formative phase in which the European Union's long list of defence acronyms has steadily grown. One of the most noticeable new policy initiatives is the European Commission's European Defence Fund (EDF). This article consequently investigates and outlines the establishment of the European Defence Fund and the European Commission's new role within the field of security and defence through the lens of revised neofunctionalism. This article thus asks how and through what steps did the EDF come about; and secondly how can neofunctionalism explain the dynamics involved in the establishment of the European Defence Fund. The analysis uses a process-tracing method and draws on interviews with relevant policymakers and officials in Brussels as well as official EU documents. The conclusions argue that the ever-increasing involvement of the European Commission in a policy field close to national sovereignty is starting to blur the traditional dichotomy between intergovernmental and supranational decision-making. In this way, this study contributes to the growing literature on the weakening of intergovernmentalism within the EU security and defence policy field.

This article addresses Sweden's more ambitious and forward-looking approach to EU security and defence cooperation. This approach represents, in part, an adaptation by Sweden to the post-Brexit political landscape. However, Stockholm is also reacting to the more ambitious policy initiatives coming out of Brussels. This article will look at some of the major developments and initiatives on the EU level and discuss how Sweden has reacted and tried to influence them. It argues that 2021 could be another watershed year for EU security and defence cooperation as the process of developing the Union's new Strategic Compass is in a formative phase. It concludes that it is welcome news that Stockholm is raising its level of ambition and actively attempting to influence this process.

Sweden's approach and discussions towards the concept and ideas of European strategic autonomy could often be seen as vague and negative. The concept has traditionally been met with scepticism and suspicion within the Swedish political discourse, which have voiced concerns about the risks of a weakened transatlantic link within the security and defence policy domain. However, as the concept has expanded to other policy fields – especially as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and the state of global affairs – and the concept has been firmly anchored in the EU's political rhetoric, Sweden has started to more proactively engage with the notion of European strategic autonomy. Sweden hence sees the importance of strengthening both the resilience of the EU as well as the Union's role in the world. However, Sweden is adamant in defending global free-trade rules, the workings of the internal market as well as the transatlantic link in security and defence. Consequently, Sweden has now started to publicly engage in the discussions on European strategic autonomy to try to steer the policy direction ; EU:s förmåga att hantera interna kriser och hävda sina intressen globalt har varit ett centralt samtalsämne under det senaste decenniet. Strategisk autonomi har blivit ett samlingsbegrepp för en diskussion om hur EU ska kunna säkra grundvalarna i europeisk integration, samt bli en mer effektiv aktör på den internationella arenan. Diskussionen inleddes inom utrikes- och säkerhetspolitiken, men har vuxit in i allt fler policyområden såsom näringspolitik, grön omställning, teknologi, handel, hälsa och euron. Utvecklingen accelererade under Coronapandemin då EU lanserade ett gemensamt räddningspaket av historiska mått som kopplades till flera av dessa områden. För de nordiska EU-länderna har diskussionen och visionen om europeisk strategisk autonomi varit komplicerad. Danmark, Finland och Sverige är alla hängivna vänner av frihandel och strikt konkurrenslagstiftning samtidigt som man av olika skäl tvekar till ökad samordning och fördjupning av europeiska försvarsstrukturer. Detta går inte sällan på tvärs med kommissionens höga ambitioner på exempelvis på industriområdet. I denna antologi redogör författare från Danmark, Finland och Sverige för hur regeringarna i de respektive länderna ställer sig till de centrala beståndsdelarna i strategisk autonomi och dess policyinnehåll. Baserat på intervjuer med centralt placerade tjänstepersoner och officiella dokument beskriver författarna hur de olika länderna uppfattar omvärldsförändringarna och hur dessa påverkar EU-samarbetet. Dessutom beskrivs hur man uppfattar att det egna landets intressen är kompatibla med de förslag som lanseras för att stärka europeisk strategisk autonomi. Analysen är på engelska och är en del av Sieps forskningsprojekt EU och omvärlden.

The European Union (EU) has for a long time had ambitions to achieve some form of 'Strategic Autonomy', often understood as a capability to conduct security pol- icy independent of the United States. With the EU's Global Strategy (EUGS) from 2016, this objective, albeit without a clear definition, is part of the public EU strat- egy. This new level of ambition places high demands on the independent intelli- gence capacities for the member states as well as for the EU at the collective level. at national level as well as for the EU at the collective level. As the world moves towards multipolarity and the geopolitization of the economic sphere, the ambi- tion for strategic autonomy has a broader meaning, such as the ability to conduct an independent trade policy or to choose a supplier of 5G infrastructure. In light of this, this article aims to analyse strategic autonomy as a security policy objective and the various intelligence needs it raises. We analyse autonomy in three different functions, or areas of application: political autonomy, operational autonomy and industrial and digital autonomy. We will then make an overview of how these needs currently are meet and how additional intelligence capacity could be created.