Suchergebnisse

Given Myanmar's strategic location and the wider great power competition in Southeast Asia, how the country positions itself vis-a-vis the major powers in the reform era currently underway will have considerable bearing for the international politics of Southeast Asia. Historically, Myanmar's leaders have preferred an independent foreign policy that has also been couched in terms of neutralism and non-alignment. Following considerable tension between the stated principle of non-alignment and the practice of Myanmar's foreign policy under the SLORC/SPDC regime given U.S. pressure on Naypyitaw especially in the mid-2000s, Myanmar's threat perceptions vis-a-vis Washington have waned with the shift to the pragmatic, principled and calibrated engagement as favoured by President Obama. The Myanmar government under Thein Sein pursued a non-aligned foreign policy both in declaratory and practical terms.

This article aims to contribute to the evolving dialogue between foreign policy analysis and public policy with reference to John Kingdon's multiple streams approach. It problematizes how one of the key concepts of MSA—policy windows—has been used in applications to foreign policy and suggests that policy windows may be more difficult to exploit than illustrations of successful foreign policy entrepreneurship indicate. Indeed, the article argues that policy windows can be either small or large; their size will likely differ not least because policy windows are situated within numerous contexts. With reference to instances of foreign policy redirection, the article highlights four such contexts: the placement and access of foreign policy entrepreneurs; the level of contestation surrounding a problematic but prevailing policy; geopolitical pressures; and ideas guiding foreign policy. The article moreover suggests that by contextualizing policy windows and considering also how contingency may affect policy windows, it seems possible to integrate insights from foreign policy analysis into current theorizing about foreign policy entrepreneurship drawing on the multiple streams framework. The empirical illustration examines the policy window that opened up for policy entrepreneurs to recast longstanding US policy toward military-run Myanmar as the Obama administration took office.

This article aims to contribute to the evolving dialogue between foreign policy analysis and public policy with reference to John Kingdon's multiple streams approach. It problematizes how one of the key concepts of MSA—policy windows—has been used in applications to foreign policy and suggests that policy windows may be more difficult to exploit than illustrations of successful foreign policy entrepreneurship indicate. Indeed, the article argues that policy windows can be either small or large; their size will likely differ not least because policy windows are situated within numerous contexts. With reference to instances of foreign policy redirection, the article highlights four such contexts: the placement and access of foreign policy entrepreneurs; the level of contestation surrounding a problematic but prevailing policy; geopolitical pressures; and ideas guiding foreign policy. The article moreover suggests that by contextualizing policy windows and considering also how contingency may affect policy windows, it seems possible to integrate insights from foreign policy analysis into current theorizing about foreign policy entrepreneurship drawing on the multiple streams framework. The empirical illustration examines the policy window that opened up for policy entrepreneurs to recast longstanding US policy toward military-run Myanmar as the Obama administration took office.

This article provides an overview both of the considerable makeover that relations between the United States and Myanmar have undergone since Naypyidaw ushered in a programme of wide-ranging reforms, and of the main policy areas in relation to which Washington remains keen to induce further change. The article also aims to explain why, notwithstanding the significant improvement in bilateral relations and the Obama administration's interest in also pursuing military engagement, progress in this field has remained rather limited. Focusing on the politics of US policymaking on Burma, the article argues that while the Obama administration was able to take the initiative on recalibrating US Burma policy, congressional resistance in particular, amid wider concerns shared by non-governmental organisations, has so far constrained the administration vis-à-vis US–Myanmar military-to-military relations.

This article provides an overview both of the considerable makeover that relations between the United States and Myanmar have undergone since Naypyidaw ushered in a programme of wide-ranging reforms, and of the main policy areas in relation to which Washington remains keen to induce further change. The article also aims to explain why, notwithstanding the significant improvement in bilateral relations and the Obama administration's interest in also pursuing military engagement, progress in this field has remained rather limited. Focusing on the politics of US policymaking on Burma, the article argues that while the Obama administration was able to take the initiative on recalibrating US Burma policy, congressional resistance in particular, amid wider concerns shared by non-governmental organisations, has so far constrained the administration vis-à-vis US-Myanmar military-to-military relations. (JCSA/GIGA)

Recent research has focused increasingly on the strategies that Southeast Asian countries have adopted vis-à-vis a rising China. This article aims to contribute to the literature by discussing Myanmar's alignment posture towards China under the post-September 1988 military regime. In particular, the purpose is to specify and explain the nature and management of this alignment. The argument is as follows: first, during the two decades of SLORC/SPDC (State Law and Order Restoration Council/State Peace and Development Council) rule, Myanmar sought only limited alignment with China, focused primarily on diplomatic support and protection, with only a moderate record of bilateral defence and security cooperation. Second, Myanmar's alignment with China after 1988 was shaped by at least three important factors: the core principles of the country's previous foreign policy after colonial rule, a deeply embedded sense of nationalism among the military elite, and Burma's Cold War interaction with China. Third, in managing its alignment with China over the last decade, the SPDC avoided compromises perceived as unpalatable in return for the promise of diplomatic protection and instead 'rewarded' Beijing by consenting to economic and infrastructure projects that were considered to advance the regime's interest in either generating state revenue or contributing to the consolidation and expansion of control over state territory. The SPDC also pushed Beijing into reconsidering its position on the sensitive issue of armed ethnic groups in the Sino-Myanmar border region. The Myanmar case thus shows that lesser powers can obtain security benefits from a major power without this necessarily requiring more than limited alignment or entailing a serious erosion of political autonomy, particularly when the former possesses valuable natural resources and enjoys considerable geo-strategic significance for the latter.

Recent research has focused increasingly on the strategies that Southeast Asian countries have adopted vis-à-vis a rising China. This article aims to contribute to the literature by discussing Myanmar's alignment posture towards China under the post-September 1988 military regime. In particular, the purpose is to specify and explain the nature and management of this alignment. The argument is as follows: first, during the two decades of SLORC/SPDC (State Law and Order Restoration Council/State Peace and Development Council) rule, Myanmar sought only limited alignment with China, focused primarily on diplomatic support and protection, with only a moderate record of bilateral defence and security cooperation. Second, Myanmar's alignment with China after 1988 was shaped by at least three important factors: the core principles of the country's previous foreign policy after colonial rule, a deeply embedded sense of nationalism among the military elite, and Burma's Cold War interaction with China. Third, in managing its alignment with China over the last decade, the SPDC avoided compromises perceived as unpalatable in return for the promise of diplomatic protection and instead 'rewarded' Beijing by consenting to economic and infrastructure projects that were considered to advance the regime's interest in either generating state revenue or contributing to the consolidation and expansion of control over state territory. The SPDC also pushed Beijing into reconsidering its position on the sensitive issue of armed ethnic groups in the Sino-Myanmar border region. The Myanmar case thus shows that lesser powers can obtain security benefits from a major power without this necessarily requiring more than limited alignment or entailing a serious erosion of political autonomy, particularly when the former possesses valuable natural resources and enjoys considerable geo-strategic significance for the latter. (JCSA/GIGA)

Recent research has focused increasingly on the strategies that Southeast Asian countries have adopted vis-à-vis a rising China. This article aims to contribute to the literature by discussing Myanmar's alignment posture towards China under the post-September 1988 military regime. In particular, the purpose is to specify and explain the nature and management of this alignment. The argument is as follows: first, during the two decades of SLORC/SPDC (State Law and Order Restoration Council/State Peace and Development Council) rule, Myanmar sought only limited alignment with China, focused primarily on diplomatic support and protection, with only a moderate record of bilateral defence and security cooperation. Second, Myanmar's alignment with China after 1988 was shaped by at least three important factors: the core principles of the country's previous foreign policy after colonial rule, a deeply embedded sense of nationalism among the military elite, and Burma's Cold War interaction with China. Third, in managing its alignment with China over the last decade, the SPDC avoided compromises perceived as unpalatable in return for the promise of diplomatic protection and instead 'rewarded' Beijing by consenting to economic and infrastructure projects that were considered to advance the regime's interest in either generating state revenue or contributing to the consolidation and expansion of control over state territory. The SPDC also pushed Beijing into reconsidering its position on the sensitive issue of armed ethnic groups in the Sino-Myanmar border region. The Myanmar case thus shows that lesser powers can obtain security benefits from a major power without this necessarily requiring more than limited alignment or entailing a serious erosion of political autonomy, particularly when the former possesses valuable natural resources and enjoys considerable geo-strategic significance for the latter.

This article focuses on both the opportunities and challenges that the People's Republic of China (PRC) presents for Myanmar's State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in its quest for security. It does so in the context of significant external pressures on the military regime and its ongoing struggle to consolidate the state. The article argues that though Myanmar's military has successfully relied on Beijing for economic development as well as diplomatic protection against efforts to take the junta to task for its political intransigence in the face of Western demands for a more inclusive political process towards national reconciliation, Beijing's political support is actually more ambiguous than first meets the eye. It also suggests that China's links to the areas in which ethnic armed ceasefire groups formerly making up the Communist Party of Burma exercise significant if not complete authority have complicated efforts by Naypyidaw to impose its perspective on state and nation building along at least part of the Sino-Myanmar border. Rising frustration with perceived Chinese involvement and influence as well as strategic calculations about how to exploit potential opportunities have led the SPDC - in the run-up to the 2010 elections - to explore the possibility of improved relations with Washington and to use force in Kokang despite the risks such a move entails. (Pac Rev/GIGA)