Suchergebnisse

The Politics of Social Cohesion examines the impact of immigration on social cohesion and egalitarian redistribution. Holtug argues that immigration can have a positive impact on the social values and ideals that tend to promote cohesion and equality.

"Prioritarianism" published on by Oxford University Press.

Abstract
In his classic paper "Equality of What? Part 1: Equality of Welfare", Ronald Dworkin argued that we should reject the notion that welfare is the currency of egalitarian justice. One reason is that this notion implies we should compensate individuals for expensive tastes they have deliberately cultivated. However, several egalitarians have objected that Dworkin conflates the resource/welfare and the luck/choice distinction. In particular, welfare luck egalitarianism implies that expensive tastes that are deliberately cultivated may not be compensable. In response to this criticism, Dworkin has more recently argued that welfare luck egalitarianism in fact collapses into ordinary welfare egalitarianism, or relies on an account of luck that is either incoherent or at least cannot provide a basis for egalitarian redistribution. Therefore, according to Dworkin, welfare luck egalitarianism does not solve the problem of expensive tastes. In the current article, I critically assess these recent arguments of Dworkin's about the inadequacy of welfare luck egalitarianism. I argue that Dworkin has not shown that this notion collapses into ordinary welfare egalitarianism, or that it harbours a problematic account of luck.

This article concerns the normative basis for immigration policy. In particular, I consider the implications of three fundamental liberal values, namely democracy, liberty and equality. First, I argue that democratic theory seriously questions the right to national self-determination when it comes to immigration. This is because potential immigrants may be coercively affected by immigration policy and, on a standard account of democratic legitimacy, this implies that potential immigrants should have democratic influence on such policies. In particular, I defend these claims against David Miller's defence of national self-determination. Second, I consider the importance of the right to freedom of movement and argue, again against Miller, that this right constitutes a weighty consideration in favour of allowing immigration in many cases. Third, I consider the importance of equality. In particular, I consider an argument for restrictive immigration policies, according to which immigration threatens to undermine social cohesion and so the basis for the welfare state. I challenge this argument in two respects. First, I point out that the empirical evidence for the claim that ethnic diversity undermines the welfare state is not as clear as some have assumed. Second, I point out that this argument for restrictive policies assumes that equality has domestic rather than global scope. Finally, I suggest that even if we are global egalitarians, we should aim for something less than (completely) open borders.

According to David Miller, we have stronger obligations towards our co-nationals than we have towards non-nationals. While a principle of equality governs our obligations of justice within the nation-state, our obligations towards non-nationals are governed by a weaker principle of sufficiency. In this paper, I critically assess Miller's objection to a traditional argument for global egalitarianism, according to which nationalist and other deviations from equality rely on factors that are arbitrary from a moral point of view. Then I critically discuss Miller's claim that there is no culturally neutral currency with respect to which we may reasonably claim that people should be equally well off on a global scale. Furthermore, I critically discuss Miller's claim that cosmopolitanism undermines national responsibility. And finally, I turn to Miller's own sufficientarian account of global justice and argue that it exhibits too little concern for the plight of the globally worse off. Adapted from the source document.