Suchergebnisse

The experience of Asian countries is used as a model exemplifying development strategies & economic growth in Third World countries. These governments focused on macroeconomic policies & fundamental growth adjustments. Proponents of the Asian model contend that it has broad appeal to all Third World countries, but critics argue that it has basic flaws pertaining to the nature of state-market relations. A general, quantitative analysis based on 1965-1992 statistical data from 84 developing countries indicates that (1) domestic capital formation mitigates political repression & has a negative effect on social inequality & economic growth; & (2) foreign direct investment reduces the impact of primary goods. 2 Tables, 2 Figures, 2 Appendixes. D. Bajo

In a study of competing political & economic explanations for differences in levels of development assistance offered by the European nations to Third World countries, it is suggested that countries with strong right-wing political parties behave consistently with respect to level or change of development assistance. Explanations of the level of development aid -- the economic capability or political orientation of the donor country, or compensation for falling export demand -- are tested cross-sectionally using data on 12 European countries, 1965-1985. Results of bivariate correlation & multiple regression analyses, provide no support for the demand compensation hypothesis; the other explanations are only partially supported. 2 Tables, 1 Appendix, 32 References. J. Sadler

This chapter discusses modernisation and dependency theory as the two central, classical approaches to international development. Modernisation theory distinguishes between 'traditional' and 'modern' forms of society, politics and the economy and studies the circumstances and policies that are supposed to contribute to higher levels of development. Dependency theory focuses on the limits that historical relationships, often deriving from colonialism, place on the development of poor countries. Modernisation theory was criticised severely for its perceived emphasis on the Western experience as a guide for countries in the South. Dependency theory was criticised because it overemphasised the barriers for development in developing countries. Many contemporary scholars are still inspired by ideas derived from modernisation and dependency theory. The chapter discusses studies on democratisation and long-term socio-economic transformation as examples of the influence of modernisation theory, and studies on international commodity chains and the nature of the current crisis in relation to the lasting impact of dependency theory.

Political economy analysis has been a favourite instrument among donors of development aid since roughly the turn of the century. Donors have emphasised the usefulness of such forms of analysis because they realised that their focus on the formal aspects of the social and political organisation of countries had caused them to overlook important elements of the "political economy" of these countries. As a result, political and governance reform programmes, which had become part and parcel of the agenda of development under the post-Washington consensus, turned out to be much less effective than anticipated.The call for donor agencies to "look behind the façade" of formal institutions in developing countries has thus come as part of the aid effectiveness agenda. It was argued that the effectiveness of development assistance policies would be enhanced if the realities of social and political power structures in developing countries were mapped and fed into the design of governance reforms targeting those countries. A more or less tacit assumption was that political economy analysis would enable donors to identify potential pockets of resistance to the reforms that they were advocating – hence improving the chances of getting reforms accepted.

__Abstract__ This chapter analyses the conditions under which the Surinamese State Oil Company (Staatsolie) has been consolidated, not only as a firm oriented at the production of oil, but also as a development agent. Staatsolie's chances to success seemed rather slim at its creation in the beginning of the 1980s, mainly because of the non-developmental, patrimonial character of Surinamese politics and the nature of Suriname's state, which has traditionally been oriented toward patronage and clientelism. The chapter documents the origins of Staatsolie and focuses on its commitment to the acquisition and further development of technological and managerial expertise. It is argued that Staatsolie has become a true pocket of effectiveness: it ranks among the most successful companies in Suriname and its contributions to the economy of this small middle-income country are considerable. The success of Staatsolie's attempt to become a development agent is attributed, in particular, to the company's double strategy. The internal part of this strategy, deriv

__Abstract__ This paper focuses on the notion of 'pockets of effectiveness' in the light of the theorisation of regulated neopatrimonialism. The attention to pockets of effectiveness – understood as public organisations which deliver public goods and services relatively effectively in contexts of largely ineffective government – adds to the understanding of regulated neopatrimonialism by focusing on the conditions under which conditions public sector organisations may contribute to development. The literature emphasises that two sets of factors contribute to the creation of pockets of effectiveness. Contextual political-economic factors relate to: political processes, political institutions and material interests and power positions of social groups. Internal factors concern organisational leadership and management, and the functions and attributes of organisations. The paper analyses the operations of several oil and gas companies in Russia and Kazakhstan in order to see how these firms are influenced by their political-economic envir

This paper focuses on the 'governance turn' in the development policies of the European Union, represented in particular by the adoption of the 'European Consensus on Development' in 2005. The main assumption inherent in the EU approach to development is that the quality of governance in developing countries is a crucial (co-) determinant of development outcomes. The paper sets up an analysis of the allocation of funds (over €50 billion during the 2007-13 period) through the EU's main policy instruments: the European Development Fund, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, and the Development Cooperation Instrument. The paper attempts to establish whether any dominant explanation, or combination of explanations, given in the literature on development assistance, is able to account for the allocation of those parts of the funds that are meant to be spent on governance reform. Three sets of hypotheses are tested, each derived from one of the dominant explanatory models of development assistance: donor interest, recipient need and constructivist models. The findings of the empirical analyses emphasise the role of donor-interest variables, but show that recipient needs play a (seemingly subordinate) role in decisions on EU aid allocation.

__Abstract__ This paper focuses on the 'governance turn' in the development policies of the European Union, represented in particular by the adoption of the 'European Consensus on Development' in 2005. The main assumption inherent in the EU approach to development is that the quality of governance in developing countries is a crucial (co-) determinant of development outcomes. The analysis concerns the allocation of funds (over €50 billion during the 2007-13 period) through the EU's main policy instruments: the European Development Fund, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, and the Development Cooperation Instrument. The paper attempts to establish whether any dominant explanation, or combination of explanations, given in the literature on development assistance, is able to account for the allocation of those parts of the funds that are meant to be spent on governance reform. Three explanatory models of development assistance are tested, revolving around notions of normative power Europe, donor interest and recipient need. The findings of t

Abstract This article discusses the attempt undertaken by several development aid agencies since the turn of the century to integrate political economy assessments into their decision making on development assistance. The article discusses three such attempts: the Drivers of Change adopted by the UK's Department for International Development, the Strategic Governance and Corruption Analysis (SGACA) developed by the Dutch Directorate General for International Cooperation and the new thinking on political economy analysis, policy reform and political risk advanced by the World Bank. On the basis of a political-economic interpretation of development agencies, two main factors are found to hinder the successful application of political economy assessment. In the first place, the agencies' professional outlook leads them to see development in primarily technical terms. In the second place, the nature of incentives for development professionals leads them to resist the implementation of

Abstract This introductory article to the special issue on European Union, development policies and governance discusses how notions of ('good') governance have come to dominate development discourses and policies since the mid-1990s. The article argues that governance was part of the so-called Post-Washington Consensus, which understands governance reform as part of the creation of market societies. Although academics have commonly emphasised the fact that governance concerns the rules that regulate the public sphere, the dominant understanding of (good) governance in policy circles revolves around technical and managerial connotations. The second part of the article introduces some important features of EU development policy, and argues that this is essen

This article focuses on the recent attention in the European Union for fragile states, as expressed, among others, in the European Security Strategy of 2003 and the European Consensus on Development of 2006. It is demonstrated that most understandings of the notion of state fragility concern limited state capacity, the inability of institutions to deal with social and political tensions or problems of state legitimacy. The European Union is no exception to this general trend of seeing state fragility in terms of governance deficit

This article focuses on the recent attention in the European Union for fragile states, as expressed, among others, in the European Security Strategy of 2003 and the European Consensus on Development of 2006. It is demonstrated that most understandings of the notion of state fragility concern limited state capacity, the inability of institutions to deal with social and political tensions or problems of state legitimacy. The European Union is no exception to this general trend of seeing state fragility in terms of governance deficits. The EU's approach of preventing and responding to state fragility, which was adopted by the European Council in 2007, is being test

This paper presents an analysis of recently adopted EU policies on fragile states. While the European Union has incorporated governance issues into its strategies for fragile states, its approach to governance has a highly technocratic character, with a strong emphasis on public sector reform and public finance. This approach, the paper will argue, is in stark contrast with the increasing awareness in the donor community of the political-economic dimensions of governance reforms. In particular, the EU's failure to take cognisance of the lessons formulated by the World Bank on the application of political-economy and conflict analysis is highly surprising

Over the past five to seven years, most international aid donors have started to pay attention to so-called 'fragile states'. Generally, the interest in state fragility was spurred by security considerations in the wake of the terrorist attacks of '9/11'. Fragile states came to be seen as a potential incubator of state collapse, which would result in the creation of 'ungoverned spaces', where crime and terrorism would develop (François and Sud 2006: 145). Overall, the focus on fragility is part of a more general trend o