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This paper shows how property rights security improves over time as a result of increasing legal quality and political democratization in a political economy context, where political and legal institutions adapt to evolving factor composition of land and capital in the dynamic economic development process. There seems to exist a clear sequence of di⁄erent forms of protection in that it is unlikely to have a strong rule of law with an exploitative political regime, or to have a democratic political system when the distribution of potential coercive power is too skewed. The routine form of protection thus shifts from coercion to politics and then to law. The predictions of the model are consistent with general historical patterns in England.

In an effort to understand why the relative usage of relational and legal contracts differs across societies, this article builds a political economy model of legal development where legal quality of contract enforcement is a costly public good. It finds that legal investment tends to be too small under elite rule but too large under majority rule in comparison with the socially optimal level. Furthermore, elite rule, low legal quality, and high-income inequality may form a self-perpetuating circle that hinders economic development. In contrast to the conventional view, this article suggests that the often-observed association between heavy reliance on relational contracts and under development is most likely caused by the presence of elite rule rather than by a more collective-oriented culture per se because it is optimal for societies better at using relational contracts to start legal investment relatively late and to have lower quality of legal enforcement.

This paper establishes a simple model of long run economic and political development, which is driven by the inherent technical features of different factors in production, and political conflicts among factor owners on how to divide the outputs. The main capital form in economy evolves from land to physical capital and then to human capital, which enables the respective factor owners (landlords, capitalists, and workers) to gain political powers in the same sequence, shaping the political development path from monarchy to elite ruling and finally to full suffrage. When it is too costly for any group of factor owners to repress others, political compromise is reached and economic progress is not blocked; otherwise, the political conflicts may lead to economic stagnation.

Universities were first established in Europe around the twelfth century, although primary schools did not appear until the nineteenth. This paper accounts for this phenomenon using a political economy model of educational change on who are educated (the elite or the masses) and what is taught (general or specific/vocational education). A key assumption is that general education is more effective than specific education in enhancing one's skills in a broad range of tasks, including political rent-seeking. Its findings suggest that specific education for the masses is compatible with the elite rule, whereas mass general education is not, which refines the conventional association between education and democracy.

Universities were first established in Europe around the twelfth century, while primary schools did not appear until the nineteenth. This paper accounts for this phenomenon using a political economy model of educational change on who are educated (the elite or the masses) and what is taught (general or specific/vocational education). A key assumption is that general education is more effective than specific education in enhancing one's skills in a broad range of tasks, including political rent-seeking. Its findings suggest that specific education for the masses is compatible with the elite rule, while mass general education is not, which refines the conventional association between education and democracy.

This paper establishes a simple model of long run economic and political development, which is driven by the inherent technical features of di¤erent production factors and the political con‡icts among factor owners on how to divide the outputs. The main production factor in economy evolves from land to physical capital and then to human capital, which enables their respective owners (landlords, capitalists, and workers) to gain political power in the same sequence, shaping the political development path from monarchy to oligarchy and …nally to democracy with full su¤rage. When it is too costly for any group of factor owners to repress others, political compromise is reached and economic progress is not blocked; otherwise, the political con‡icts may lead to economic stagnation.

This paper establishes a simple model of long run economic and political development, which is driven by the inherent technical features of different production factors, and political conflicts among factor owners on how to divide the outputs. The main capital form in economy evolves from land to physical capital and then to human capital, which enables their respective owners (landlords, capitalists, and workers) to gain political powers in the same sequence, shaping the political development path from monarchy to elite ruling and finally to full suffrage. When it is too costly for any group of factor owners to repress others, political compromise is reached and economic progress is not blocked; otherwise, the political conflicts may lead to economic stagnation.

The paper investigates the dynamic relationship between social trust and economic governance using a principal-agent model with stochastic returns. To mitigate the inherent moral hazard problem both intrinsic and extrinsic incentives are useful. The cooperative tendency of an agent measures his intrinsic discipline against shirking, the distribution of which characterizes social trust in society. The economic governance methods include direct monitoring and efficiency wage. The main results are the following. An agent with a higher cooperative tendency needs less monitoring and a lower wage to make effort, which brings higher profit for the principal. But competition among principals for more cooperative agents drains away the extra profit and passes it on to the agent as a sign-in bonus. So an agent with a higher cooperative tendency ends up earning a higher total income. In the short run when cooperative tendencies are fixed, the distribution of economic governance intensity in the economy is determined by social trust. In the long run when cooperative tendencies are endogenously formed to maximize an agent's lifetime utility, both social trust and economic governance are determined by fundamentals such as the costs of monitoring, screening, and investing in cooperative tendency. In the steady state, social trust increases in monitoring cost and decreases in screening and investing costs. An important insight the paper delivers is that principals always benefit from a lower monitoring cost but not necessarily from a higher social trust. Both downward and upward movement of social trust and economic governance, once started, would continue monotonically. Their relative strength across societies is preserved or reinforced over time.

The dynamic treatment effect literature considers multiple treatments administered over time, with some treatments affected by interim outcomes. But the literature overlooks the possibility of individuals acting in anticipation of future treatments. This lack of anticipation aspect may not matter in the drug–response relationships which motivated the literature. But human beings (or animals with some intelligence) do not just respond to current and past treatments, but also 'reflect and anticipate' future treatments. For example, a punishment or reward is likely to prompt forward looking. Even if no personal punishment or reward is involved, people may take action in anticipation of a future government policy, which would be an important concern for policy makers. The paper explores how to find dynamic treatment effects allowing for forward looking or anticipation by extending available dynamic treatment effect approaches in the literature. Then the methods proposed are applied to the effects of spanking on a child's bad behaviour where a child may act better in anticipation of future spanking, which is analogous to the relationship between punishment and crime.

AbstractUsing three‐period panel data drawn from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979, we investigate whether television (TV) viewing at ages 6–7 and 8–9 years affects children's social and behavioural development at ages 8–9 years. Dynamic panel data models are estimated to handle the unobserved child‐specific factor, endogeneity of TV viewing, and the dynamic nature of the causal relation. Special emphasis is placed on this last aspect, focusing on how early TV viewing affects interim child behavioural problems and in turn affects future TV viewing. Overall, we find that TV viewing during ages 6–7 and 8–9 years increases child behavioural problems at ages 8–9 years, and that the effect is economically sizable.