Suchergebnisse

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, several
Punjab Settlement Officers attempted to estimate food consumption rates.
These estimates, based on direct observation and ad hoc guesses, were
made partly out of academic curiosity, but more urgently, as an aid in
establishing the land revenue (i.e., tax) rates. The pre-1926 estimates
are summarized in Table I, expressed in pounds of wheat and other
foodgrain consumption per person per year1. Broadly speaking, the later,
more systemtic observers (e.g., Sir Ganga Ram and C. B. Barry), found
lower consumption levels than the earlier observers. It was generally
accepted that the rural populace ate better than urban dwellers. Despite
the ingenuity of the early Settlement Officers, their compiled estimates
suffer from all the difficulties of haphazard small sample observation.
Given the revenue purpose of the estimates, they may be biased towards
the able-bodied, economically active, population. Further, the very
early estimates may have confused dry weight with cooked weight,
including water.

Everyone who has heard of Harrod-Domar realises that growth
targets imply something about savings rates. But growth targets also
imply something about the availability of capital goods. The business of
economic planning, as Winston points out [1], is to ensure compatibility
between the Harrod-Domar and the Mahalanobis constraints. If domestic
savings exceed the availability of domestic plus foreign capital goods,
two "despised alternatives" confront the economy: inventory accumulation
or slower growth. To avoid this unhappy predicament, Winston outlines
three remedial policies. Our purpose is to suggest that the Harrod-Domar
and Mahalanobis constraints may not be independent. Remedial policies
aimed at that larger capital goods supply may affect the private and
public savings rates and the growth of income. These suggestions are
hardly novel [2]. They turn on re¬placing the proportional savings
function with a classical savings function (i.e., one which specifies
private savings rates by economic sector), on distinguishing tax rates
by type of domestic production and imports, and on stipulating a
connection between consumer-goods production and import of raw materials
for the consumer industries.

MUCH HAS BEEN MADE OF A TRANSATLANTIC FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (TAFTA) AS A POSSIBLE FRAMEWORK FOR POST-COLD WAR RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO ATLANTIC POWERS. A POSITIVE ROLE FOR THE DIALOGUE IS TO EMPHASIZE SHARED NORTH AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN ECONOMIC GOALS. A TRANSATLANTIC FRAMEWORK COULD REDRESS THE MOOD OF MUTUAL ECONOMIC NEGLECT THAT IS AN INEVITABLE BYPRODUCT OF OTHER AGENDAS. THIS ARTICLE NOTES THAT AT THE SAME TIME THE PARTIES COULD SET THE PRIORITIES FOR FUTURE GLOBAL NEGOTIATORS.

A DOSE OF ECONOMIC STATISTICS SHOULD PROVIDE AN ANTIDOTE, IF NOT A CURE TO THE PRESENT "FEAR OF TRADE" IN RELATION TO NAFTA. THE OBJECTIVE IS TWOFOLD: TO DEBUNK THE MYTHS MOST PROMINENTLY PROPOUNDED BY ROSS PEROT AND HIS CONGRESSIONAL AND LABOR ALLIES, AND TO DEMONSTRATE THAT NAFTA PROVIDES SMALL BUT POSITIVE BENEFITS TO AMERICA IN ECONOMICS AND FOREIGN POLICY. THIS ARTICLE EXPLORES MAQUILADORA MARKETS, AND THE "BETTER NAFTA" DODGE. THE CONCLUSION THAT IS REACHES IS THAT NAFTA WILL HELP SPUR THE CREATION OF AMERICAN JOBS AND INCOME, NOT DESTROY THEM.