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In this paper, we show that a policy that forbids cartels may benefit dominant firms, and hurt consumers. When cartels are prohibited, an incumbent monopolist can commit not to form a cartel should a new entrant enter the market. This reduces the entry threat, which implies that entry occurs less often, and the incumbent monopolist is less likely to set a limit price.

We extend the citizen candidate framework by allowing for endogenous party formation. When a party is formed, any member of that party that wants to be a candidate in the election, first has to run in the primary election of her party. We show that in equilibrium one left-wing and one right-wing party will be formed. Also, there may be a range of tiny centrist parties. At most one group of extreme citizens may not be a member of any party. For each party, at most one candidate runs in its primary election. There is a range of equilibria in which one candidate runs in the general election, but we find a unique two-candidate equilibrium. We thus show that allowing for parties to form severely restricts the range of possible equilibria in the citizen candidate model.

We show that the principle of minimum differentiation holds in two-round elections, for any number of candidates, regardless of the presence of entrants, or the distribution of voters' preferences. 15 References. Adapted from the source document.

Proposes a model which shows that Stackelberg competition is not necessarily welfare‐ enhancing compared with Cournot competition. Shows that, although in a simple duopoly model prices in a Stackelberg equilibrium are lower than in a Cournot equilibrium, this is not necessarily true in an entry‐deterrence framework, where post‐entry competition is Stackelberg rather than Cournot. Derives conditions under which in this framework Stackelberg competition leads to lower expected welfare, in the case where demand is linear.

This paper is concerned with investigating the role of accounting practices in radical change processes. The institutional framework has been taken as a starting point in investigating these processes. The research has been carried out at the Dutch Railways. This company was forced by the Dutch government to change from a public company into a private company. This decision by the Dutch Government has had radical consequences for Dutch Railways' position in the (rail) transport market and for the way of managing the company. The research focuses on the processes in which the company has changed its template as a public company into a profit-oriented template. This paper examines the interaction of accounting practices with the environmental and organisational context. Emphasis is placed on how these mutual processes of interaction change internal and external positioning, create new visibilities, transform perspectives on organisational activities and performance and modify conditions for organisational change. Existing institutional concepts regarding change processes are evaluated in the light of the case findings and building blocks are developed for a comprehensive change framework.

Where markets are insufficiently competitive, governments can intervene by auctioninglicenses to operate or by forcing divestitures. The Dutch government has doneexactly that, organizing auctions to redistribute tenancy rights for highway gasolinestations and forcing the divestiture of outlets of four majors. We evaluate this policyexperiment using panel data containing detailed price information. We find that anobligation to divest lowers prices by over 2% while the auctioning of licenses withoutsuch an obligation has no discernible effect. We find weak evidence for price effects onnearby competitors.