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One of the current controversies within international relations deals with the "stability" of bipolar as opposed to multipolar stratifications of world power. Morton Kaplan, in codifying the views of classical balance of power theorists, advances the view that multipolar systems are more stable than bipolar systems. Kenneth Waltz, sagely pointing to the relatively peaceful international arena since World War II, argues that a bipolar distribution of power can guarantee world stability. Many a priori arguments have been presented to buttress the Kaplan and Waltz hypotheses. In one of the most elaborate such formulations, the "interaction opportunity" hypothesis of Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer, the presence of stabilizing crosscutting alliances is postulated to be most likely within multipolar systems, which in turn are a function of the number of major powers and members of a system. In an attempt to bring the two opposing strands of theory into a larger framework, Richard Rosecrance more recently has suggested that bipolarity and multipolarity may each have their peculiar costs and benefits. Bipolarity, according to Rosecrance, is distinguished by (1) an absence of "peripheries," such as areas for colonial expansion or neutral powers to woo; (2) all international behavior is highly politicized; (3) there are many crises; (4) changes in power confrontations are either significant or trivial, with no intervening shades of gray; (5) each pole is dominated by major powers highly motivated to expand their domains, willing even to incur brinksmanlike situations and hostility spirals; (6) no detente is possible. Multipolarity, on the other hand, is hypothesized to have (1) more interaction opportunities and thus less preoccupation (or obsession) with any one set of states; (2) fewer arms races; (3) more international conflicts; (4) the outcomes of international conflicts are harder to predict in advance; (5) changes in power confrontations have ambiguous consequences for the overall distribution of power. Rosecrance, therefore, urges a "bi-multipolar" arrangement that would combine the best features of both alternatives. The empirical questions and intriguing hypotheses so eloquently raised by Kaplan, Waltz, Deutsch, Singer, and Rosecrance have remained largely unexamined, however.

Hollywood applauds Glendon Schubert's script for a possible soap opera in his pre-view ofApproaches to the Study of Political Science. Stereotypic characters, miscasting of actors, words put in the mouths of fictitious persons, and maudlin grief are all present in his poignantad hominenremarks, while a task which I regard as important — the development of a science of politics — is curiously overlooked by Mr. Schubert as the main purpose of the volume. And, in a manner similar to David Easton's eloquent 1969 presidential address, it is important to tune out Mr. Schubert's solipsisticOne Man's Familyand to discuss instead the real reasons for all the current fuss about postbehavioral options.My own view is that political science has achieved considerable maturity as a discipline in recognizing a fundamental symbiosis between three facets of science as the 1970's begin. At one level, a scientist may seek to describe an individual case, to calibrate measuring Instruments, and to engineer specific changes in the real world. At a second level a scientist can search for relationships between two or more variables across several cases in order to state generalizations that will serve as guides to the future and to cases as yet unexamined. Yet myriad generalizations do not cumulatively add up to higher and higher levels of scientific achievement until we consider a third facet of science, wherein one seeks analytical explanations for empirical findings and smooths out the idiosyncracies of particular research investigations into analytically parsimonious paradigms, models, and theories concerning how the world is put together. These three levels or types of science may be calledclinical, empirical, andtheoretical, respectively.

Hollywood applauds Glendon Schubert's script for a possible soap opera in his pre-view of Approaches to the Study of Political Science. Stereotypic characters, miscasting of actors, words put in the mouths of fictitious persons, and maudlin grief are all present in his poignant ad hominen remarks, while a task which I regard as important — the development of a science of politics — is curiously overlooked by Mr. Schubert as the main purpose of the volume. And, in a manner similar to David Easton's eloquent 1969 presidential address, it is important to tune out Mr. Schubert's solipsistic One Man's Family and to discuss instead the real reasons for all the current fuss about postbehavioral options.My own view is that political science has achieved considerable maturity as a discipline in recognizing a fundamental symbiosis between three facets of science as the 1970's begin. At one level, a scientist may seek to describe an individual case, to calibrate measuring Instruments, and to engineer specific changes in the real world. At a second level a scientist can search for relationships between two or more variables across several cases in order to state generalizations that will serve as guides to the future and to cases as yet unexamined. Yet myriad generalizations do not cumulatively add up to higher and higher levels of scientific achievement until we consider a third facet of science, wherein one seeks analytical explanations for empirical findings and smooths out the idiosyncracies of particular research investigations into analytically parsimonious paradigms, models, and theories concerning how the world is put together. These three levels or types of science may be called clinical, empirical, and theoretical, respectively.