Suchergebnisse

We analyse the determination of taxes on harmful goods when consumers have self-control problems. We show that under mild conditions, the socially optimal tax rate exceeds the average distortion caused by self-control problems. Further, we show that in most cases the tax rate chosen in political equilibrium is below the socially optimal level.

We analyse the determination of taxes on harmful goods when consumers have self-control problems. We show that under reasonable assumptions, the socially optimal corrective tax exceeds the average distortion caused by self-control problems. Further, we analyse how individuals with self-control problems would vote on taxes on the consumption of harmful goods, and show that the equilibrium tax is typically below the socially optimal level. When the redistributive effects of sin taxes are taken into account, the difference between the social optimum and equilibrium is small at low levels of harm, but becomes more pronounced when consumption is more harmful.

We build a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, where the balance sheets of both banks and non-financial firms play a role in macro-financial linkages. We show that in equilibrium bank capital tends to be scarce, compared with firm capital. We study public funding of banks and firms in times of crisis. Government capital injections can be useful as a shock cushion, but they distort incentives. Small capital injections benefit banks more than firms but the relative benefit is declining in the injection size. Government should first recapitalize banks, and if resources are large enough, lend to firms too.