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Contents -- Acknowledgments -- About the Authors -- Chapter 1. Diversity and Collective Action -- Chapter 2. Public Goods Provision in Kampala -- Chapter 3. Ethnicity and Ethnic Identifiability -- Chapter 4. Testing the Mechanisms -- Chapter 5. A Closer Look at Reciprocity -- Chapter 6. Beyond the Lab -- Chapter 7. Conclusions -- Appendix A: Sampling Procedure -- Appendix B: Main Statistical Results -- Appendix C: Images of the Field Site, Experimental Games, and Research Team -- Notes -- References -- Index

"Ethnically homogeneous communities often do a better job than diverse communities of producing public goods such as satisfactory schools and health care, adequate sanitation, and low levels of crime. Coethnicity reports the results of a landmark study that aimed to find out why diversity has this cooperation-undermining effect. The study, conducted in a neighborhood of Kampala. Uganda, notable for both its high levels of diversity and low levels of public goods provision, hones in on the mechanisms that might account for the difficulties diverse societies often face in trying to act collectively."--Jacket

AbstractBureaucratic effectiveness has come to the fore in research as necessary for economic growth and development. This paper contributes empirical evidence to understand the building blocks of bureaucracy by gathering rich survey data in a typical institutional environment of the developing world. The data reveal a robust correlation between the selection of local politicians and bureaucratic effectiveness. In districts in Uganda where locally elected politicians have higher survey‐based measures of integrity (or honesty), the bureaucracy is more effective in delivering public heath services. This evidence supports current research, and encourages future research on how the selection of political agents into government is an important determinant of bureaucratic effectiveness.

Economic theory of public bureaucracies as complex organizations predicts that bureaucratic productivity can be shaped by the selection of different types of agents, beyond their incentives. This theory applies to the institutions of local government in the developing world, where nationally appointed bureaucrats and locally elected politicians together manage the implementation of public policies and the delivery of services. Yet, there is no evidence on whether (which) selection traits of these bureaucrats and politicians matter for the productivity of local bureaucracies. This paper addresses the empirical gap by gathering rich data in an institutional context of district governments in Uganda, which is typical of the local state in poor countries. The paper measures traits such as the integrity, altruism, personality, and public service motivation of bureaucrats and politicians. It finds robust evidence that higher integrity among locally elected politicians is associated with substantively better delivery of public health services by district bureaucracies. Together with the theory, this evidence suggests that policy makers seeking to build local state capacity in poor countries should take political selection seriously.

AbstractThe investment levels in South Africa have remained relatively low despite an overall picture of economic stability and good governance. This analysis looks at South Africa's investment climate, using data from an Investment Climate Survey (ICS) of over 800 firms conducted by the Department of Trade and Industry and the World Bank. It suggests that exchange rate instability and the cost of crime may be deterrents to investment. But more importantly, labour regulations may be discouraging firms from entering labour‐intensive areas. Labour costs are also high, especially for skilled workers. Efforts to improve worker skills are crucial for raising human capital levels and reducing the cost of skilled labour. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

This paper estimates the short-term, partial-equilibrium impacts of a public-private partnership program for low-cost private secondary schools in Uganda. The public-private partnership program is part of a broader strategy to absorb large increases in secondary enrollment following the introduction of universal secondary education. Under the program, the government offers a per-student subsidy to participating private schools. Program implementation allowed for a randomized phase-in study design to estimate the causal impacts of the program on private school performance. The study finds that the public-private partnership program helped absorb large numbers of eligible students in secondary schools. Student performance in participating private schools was significantly better than in nonparticipating private schools. The study finds that improved student performance is potentially linked to increased input availability, as well as positive selection of government aided students in private schools. Suggestive evidence indicates that this selection most likely occurs on the part of households rather than schools.