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TikTok and its parent company ByteDance this week sued to block a new law banning the social media app, claiming it is unconstitutional because it infringes upon Americans' right to free speech and prevents access to lawful information. The law, passed in April, would ban TikTok in the U.S. if ByteDance does not liquidate its American assets within nine to 12 months — citing national security concerns about the app. National security has been at the forefront of U.S. bans on Chinese tech, such as the ban on selling telecom equipment and services from Huawei, ZTE, and other Chinese providers. Another concern about TikTok — data privacy and security — is not entirely unfounded, as about 150 million Americans use it. However, China does not need apps like TikTok to collect that data. U.S. consumer data can be bought on the open market from data brokers, including precise location and financial transaction data. Even the U.S. National Security Agency has leveraged data brokers to collect Americans' data. Anonymized data is also not the fail-safe measure that it is touted to be, as it can be de-anonymized using data that is not considered personally identifiable, like sex, ZIP code, and birthdate. In some ways, TikTok even collects less private information than Meta. In short, TikTok is no more a unique threat to data privacy and security than are data brokers and other American social media sites.Banning TikTok or any other Chinese business in the U.S. won't protect U.S. citizens' data from exploitation. The sheer profitability of U.S. citizens' data for businesses — both buyers and sellers – is undergirded by the lack of protections for collecting data or compensating individuals for their data. Solving this problem eventually would require federal-level, comprehensive data privacy and protection regulations. Without such regulation, there is little incentive for social media companies — Chinese or not — to responsibly buy, sell, collect, or otherwise exploit user data. If the U.S. government's goal is to protect private American citizens' data to enhance national security, then it must legislate acceptable limits on the exploitation of Americans' data, perhaps even following a framework like the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation. Some believe that banning TikTok and other Chinese apps in the United States could force China to provide more equitable access to the Chinese market and put pressure on China to change unfair business practices towards foreign firms, like intellectual property theft, opaque subsidization and preferential treatment, raids, and fines. These inequities have long been a major concern and subject of high-level conversations between U.S. and Chinese officials. However, the U.S. bans on Chinese businesses so far appear to have neither compelled Chinese businesses nor the Chinese government to change their behaviors, instead spurring them to reduce reliance on the U.S. market and focus on exploring alternative markets. Bringing China and the U.S. to a common point of view or set of rules on business practices is a challenge that is rooted fundamentally in a lack of trust. American businesses have been able to thrive in non-sensitive industries in China and vice versa. But selling Coca-Cola and unbranded consumer goods are not particularly high-trust or strategic endeavors. The U.S. understands what economic dominance in strategic sectors can do for power projection. U.S. power has often extended its grasp into strategic private businesses without those businesses having any mandate to do so. They achieved their unintended importance via the free market in pursuit of higher profits. Washington is likely concerned that Beijing will weaponize its burgeoning economic might in technology, much like the U.S. has in the past. For example, in the case of spy Xu Yanjun, the FBI was able to issue a warrant to collect information from his Gmail and iCloud accounts, which provided key information necessary to convict him. The SWIFT messaging system and dollar hegemony have also played major roles in enforcing U.S. sanctions, often used by the U.S. in pursuit of greater national security.Washington's penchant to pull these levers in the name of national security makes the U.S. harder to trust, as does the possibility of China pulling similar levers via apps and telecommunications equipment. Using "national security" as a sufficient reason to target Chinese businesses is unlikely to prompt China to see the U.S. as a responsible partner in high-trust industries like tech.History demonstrates that the Chinese government won't be pressured into changing its unfair business practices or initiating widespread pro-market economy reforms. However, economic reforms may be on the horizon in China, so the U.S. should try to maintain a base level of trust or understanding so that American businesses might benefit from those reforms.The U.S. and China should still seek to expand collaboration in less sensitive sectors of their economies like entertainment (movies, television, gaming), education, and tourism. A joint-venture public television channel in both countries, for example, like the Franco-German Arte channel could be mutually beneficial for stimulating tourism, fostering understanding between both cultures, and familiarizing both sides with the business practices and needs of the other.Ultimately, the willingness to use national security as a reason to ban Chinese apps like TikTok will neither improve American national security nor Chinese business practices. While data privacy and security are legitimate concerns, there are regulations the United States can enact that would avoid escalating tensions between the two countries. To foster trust and encourage more equitable economic relations, Washington should consider alternative approaches to build trust and pave the way for constructive dialogue and cooperation.

Last month the Justice Department published a press release announcing that seven Chinese nationals have been charged with "conspiracy to commit computer intrusions and conspiracy to commit wire fraud." This announcement came on the heels of warnings from Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) Director Jen Easterly and National Cyber Director Harry Coker that Chinese hackers are making a strategic shift to target critical infrastructure, are likely able to launch cyberattacks that could cripple that infrastructure, and are increasingly exploiting Americans' private information. It's apparent then that a conflict between China and the United States would include disruptive, dangerous cyberwarfare. Indeed, as U.S.-China military-to-military communications restart, cyber needs to become a key part of these conversations to develop bilateral crisis management mechanisms.Unfortunately, cyber crisis management is still in its infancy. The United States and China have engaged in multiple bilateral and multilateral dialogues on cyber-related issues in the past. For example, the 2015 summit between President Obama and Xi Jinping created a series of agreements — tacit and explicit — on cyber espionage, the joint investigation of cybercrimes, and a process that eventually produced the U.S.-China High-Level Joint Dialogue on Cybercrime and Related Issues.However, direct U.S.-China official dialogues have not led to substantial cooperation. President Biden warned Xi during a recent call against China using cyberattacks to target sensitive infrastructure, but no solutions nor potential dialogues appear to have been brought up. There is no dearth of unofficial dialogues, and some have proposed discrete steps that would enhance U.S.-China cyber relations and crisis management mechanisms, such as coming to mutual definitions of cyber terms, strengthening bilateral communications, and promoting restraint in cyber usage. Unfortunately, despite the many attempts at facilitating U.S.-China cyber dialogues and improved relations, no concrete standards or guidelines on cyber usage in a potential conflict have been adopted, nor have U.S.-China cyber relations appeared to improve. Both Washington and Beijing are familiar with the potential harm cyber can do when expertly implemented. Stuxnet, a malicious computer worm known to be created and implemented by the United States and Israel, damaged the centrifuges Iran used for its nuclear-enrichment program. China's cyberespionage campaigns to steal sensitive technologies and designs from American businesses have led to strategic vulnerabilities — like with the theft of designs for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter's self-diagnostic system in 2009. Concerns about cyber espionage have been a defining feature of U.S.-China technology and business relations since the early 2000s, extending into the rhetoric to ban TikTok. Cyber exploits could cut off power grids, like in Ukraine in 2015 and 2016, cripple wastewater treatment facilities, or render sources of vital information useless — as witnessed in the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine.If a conflict were to break out between the United States and China, wherever and however it might, the reality is that cyber will be a key weapon in a well-rounded arsenal of traditional and emerging weaponry. Fortunately, there may be some space for negotiation. A RAND study — built upon "insights from interviews with leading Chinese and American cyberspace policy experts across [their] governments, militaries, think tanks, and academic communities" — found that China may be more likely to come to a bilateral agreement wherein both the United States and China agree not to cyberattack each other and limit the targeting of critical infrastructure. There is also some precedent which would suggest that the Chinese government thinks that cyberattacking critical infrastructure should be off-the-table. In 2015, China participated in the drafting of and signed a note by the Secretary General as a member of a United Nations group of governmental experts, in which the participants recommended that states not target critical infrastructure with cyber. Further emblematic of this willingness to find common ground on cyberthreats is China's 2015 agreement with Russia to not cyberattack one another. However, the RAND study also found that trust was one of the main impediments to creating such an agreement with the U.S. Neither the U.S. nor Chinese interviewees knew if they could fully trust the other side to adhere to any agreements against this kind of cyberespionage and exploitation. Thus, any agreement like the China-Russia cyber "non-aggression pact" would need to foster transparency and trust between the relevant Chinese and U.S. parties. The agreement would need to be paired with bilateral channels designed to communicate information on cyber events, both mundane and arising from a crisis. Transparent forums between the U.S. and Chinese military, with a focus on cyber elements, is an absolutely vital step to navigate crises effectively and promote a restraint-based foreign policy and defense strategy, especially given the pervasive nature of cyber threats.Luckily, in recent months, Washington and Beijing have re-established military-to-military communications, expressed continued interest in establishing dialogues on the use of artificial intelligence (AI), and have otherwise collaborated in the United Nations on a resolution establishing principles for AI development. While it is not cyber-specific, AI and cyber are conjoined issues. It shows that there may be space for U.S.-China collaboration on emerging technologies, which could lead to more robust dialogues and crisis management mechanisms. These could be vital trust-building exercises that lead to further cooperation on issues related to cybersecurity.Ultimately, there is a path forward for the United States and China to come to an understanding on cyberwarfare in at least some domains. To this end, both sides need to create new bilateral forums to discuss and advance crisis management coordination on these issues of common concern about cyberwarfare.