Suchergebnisse

Alors qu'on craint, ou qu'on agite pour mieux inquiéter l'opinion, un risque de « communautarisation », cette étude des différents mouvements s'adressant à la population musulmane montre une tendance inverse. L'essoufflement des organisations de jeunes et la notabilisation des représentants de l'islam, en l'absence de relais politiques laïques, orientent la revendication de reconnaissance vers le terrain de la violence.

Über ein Viertel Jahrhundert ist das Kopftuch zum Maßstab der Islamisierung in Ägypten geworden. Danach müsste die ägyptische Gesellschaft heute islamischer sein als noch vor Jahren. Der Autor weist einen solchen "quantitativen Ansatz" zurück, vielmehr müsse die Position der Akteure im Hinblick auf Normen einer Reislamisierung betrachtet werden. Auch wenn sich eine Norm (hier: weibliche Zurückhaltung und Scham) durchsetzte, bedeute dies nicht die Uniformierung des Bewusstseins, Aufgabe des Individuums oder Unterordnung unter göttliche Vorgaben. Ägyptische Frauen seien sehr erfindungsreich, so der Autor, bei der Schaffung eigener Moralsysteme, die nur wenig mit Religion zu tun hätten. (DÜI-Sbd)

The territories ruled by the Syrian opposition are being reorganised. The leaderless revolution has given way to a seizure of power by vanguardist and ideological organisations, be it the PYD in the northeast or HTS, the former local branch of AQ, in Idlib. However, these organisations cannot resist the regime's military threat to reconquer the territories or the Turkish intervention by themselves. They need to manage the internationalisation of the conflict to protect themselves and find space in the broader strategic game around Syria. This is the strategy of HTS. After emerging from the matrix of AQ's global jihad, since 2017 HTS has sought to 'institutionalise' the revolution by imposing its military hegemony and full control of the institutions of local governance. The group has thus marginalised the revolutionary milieu, other Islamists and the threat posed by AQ supporters and IS cells in Idlib. HTS's domination was followed by a policy of gradual opening and mainstreamisation. The group has had to open up to local communities and make concessions, especially in the religious sphere. HTS is seeking international acceptance with the development of a strategic partnership with Turkey and desires to open dialogue with Western countries. Overall, HTS has transformed from formerly being a salafi jihadi organisation into having a new mainstream approach to political Islam.

En octobre 2019, le repli des Etats-Unis sur l'extrême Est de la Syrie et l'offensive turque ont incité les Forces démocratiques syriennes, le bras armé du mouvement ocalanien en Syrie, à appeler à un déploiement de l'armée syrienne et de la police militaire russe dans le nord-est syrien. Ceci a permis de limiter la confrontation armée entre la Turquie et les forces kurdes. Cette situation reste pourtant précaire, car aucun des acteurs étatiques (Ankara, Damas et Moscou) n'a atteint ses objectifs. Pour sa part, le mouvement kurde conserve ses forces militaires, ses structures de gouvernance et la mainmise sur les champs pétroliers. Il fait preuve à ce stade d'une forte résilience, interdisant tout retour du régime syrien. Néanmoins, l'absence de négociations politiques sur l'avenir du Nord-est ouvre le risque d'une reprise des hostilités.

In November 2019, Operation Peace Spring launched by Turkey in the north-east of Syria concluded with no clear winner or loser. In the short term, Turkey's military operation has resulted in a paradox in which the non-state actor targeted thought to be the weaker party – the leadership of the Autonomous Administration – has attained the greater gains, while the more powerful state actors (Ankara, Moscow and Damascus) are either embarrassed or stuck in a wait-and-see situation. Despite its loss of part of the territory it controlled, the Syrian Kurdish movement has retained its military capability and governance structures and its access to oil resources. The resilience of its governance model allows the Syrian Democratic Forces to avert the three main security threats that the Turkish offensive helped amplify: risks inherent in the deployment of the Syrian army; a resurgence of Islamic State; and the situation in camps and detention centres. However, the Kurdish movement will likely not be able to survive in the long term without a "political initiative," whether in the form of rapprochement with Damascus or de-escalation with Turkey. In the absence of such an alternative, a resumption of direct military hostilities or an increase in various security pressures risk putting the northeast political model under great strain.