Human Choice in International Law. By Anna Spain Bradley. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2021. Pp. x, 160. Index
In: American journal of international law: AJIL, Band 116, Heft 2, S. 459-463
ISSN: 2161-7953
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In: American journal of international law: AJIL, Band 116, Heft 2, S. 459-463
ISSN: 2161-7953
In: Political science quarterly: a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study and analysis of government, politics and international affairs ; PSQ, Band 133, Heft 1, S. 151-152
ISSN: 1538-165X
In: Journal of peace research, Band 51, Heft 2, S. 273-286
ISSN: 0022-3433
World Affairs Online
In: Journal of peace research, Band 51, Heft 2, S. 273-286
ISSN: 1460-3578
Why do governments abuse human rights, and what can be done to deter and reverse abusive practices? This article examines the emerging social science on these two questions. Over the last few decades, scholars have made considerable progress in answering the first one. Abuse stems, centrally, from conflict and institutions. Answers to the second question are more elusive because data are scarce and the relationships between cause and effect are hard to pin down. Lively debates concern the effectiveness of tools such as military intervention, economic policy, international law, and information strategies for protecting human rights. The evidence suggests that despite the explosion of international legal instruments, this strategy has had impact only in special circumstances. Powerful states play central roles in protecting human rights through sanctions, impartial military intervention, and other tools – often applied unilaterally, which suggests that there is an ongoing tension between the legitimacy of broad multilateral legal institutions and narrower strategies that actually work. The best approaches to managing human rights depend on the political organization of the abuser. Where strong centralized organizations are the problem, the best strategies alter the incentives of leaders at the top; where abuse arises from disarray, such as during civil war or fragile democratic transition, the key tasks include reducing agency slack and making organizations stronger and more accountable.
In: Annual review of political science, Band 15, S. 265-286
ISSN: 1545-1577
This article provides a roadmap for understanding the points of agreement and contention that characterize contemporary empirical scholarship on international human rights legal regimes. It explores what the statistical research teaches us about why states participate in these regimes; knowledge of how these regimes operate; and their relationship to actual human rights behavior. It also describes the central shortcomings of this research tradition and suggests a few areas especially promising for future research. Adapted from the source document.
In: Annual review of political science, Band 15, S. 265-287
ISSN: 1094-2939
In: American journal of international law: AJIL, Band 104, Heft 3, S. 538-543
ISSN: 2161-7953
In: American journal of international law, Band 104, Heft 3, S. 538-543
ISSN: 0002-9300
In: Perspectives on politics: a political science public sphere, Band 9, Heft 4, S. 974-976
ISSN: 1537-5927
International organizations (IOs) have moved increasingly in recent years to adopt cross-cutting mandates that require the "mainstreaming" of particular issues, such as gender equality or environmental protection, across all IO policies. Successful IO performance with respect to such mandates, we hypothesize, is determined in large part by the use of hard or soft institutional measures to shape the incentives of sectoral officials whose cooperation is required for successful implementation. We test this hypothesis with respect to two such mandates—gender mainstreaming and environmental policy integration—in a single international organization, the European Union, demonstrating a strong causal link between the use of hard incentives and IO performance in these and related mandates.
BASE
In: The review of international organizations, Band 5, Heft 3, S. 285-313
ISSN: 1559-7431
World Affairs Online
In: The review of international organizations, Band 5, Heft 3, S. 285-313
ISSN: 1559-744X
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 63, Heft 4, S. 1108-1121
ISSN: 1468-2478
Political corruption is rampant in—and destructive to—many parts of the world. A growing number of international organizations (IOs) claim to address the problem by encouraging good governance norms and rules, such as anti-corruption standards and practices. Whether membership in IOs dampens corruption, however, is unclear. Our central argument is that the characteristics of IO membership determine both whether corruption is tolerated and the extent to which formal anti-corruption rules effectively combat the problem. First, groups of corrupt states are reticent to enforce good governance norms or rules against other IO members, rendering punishment for corruption incredible. Second, leaders may witness the value of corruption to their IO peers and learn to act the same way. Using a variety of data sources and estimation strategies, including new data on IO anti-corruption mandates, we demonstrate that: (1) countries that participate in member-corrupted IOs are significantly more likely to engage in corruption themselves—and experience an increase in corruption over time—than are countries that participate in less corrupt IOs; and (2) this tolerance for corruption occurs even within IOs that have adopted formal anti-corruption mandates, rendering good governance rules largely cheap talk among organizations governed by corrupt principles.
World Affairs Online
In: Human rights quarterly, Band 41, Heft 1, S. A-1-A-11
ISSN: 1085-794X
In: American journal of international law: AJIL, Band 108, Heft 3, S. 597-601
ISSN: 2161-7953