Suchergebnisse

Over the past three years, as the euro area has struggled with high levels of sovereign debt, it has been gradually developing into a debt union. However, this is not a sustainable arrangement. This article proposes two alternatives to a debt union: a fiscal union and a monetary union with fiscal freedom and evaluates the pros and cons of each approach.

The financial crisis of 2007-2009 led to a renewed increase in government deficits and debts in many EU countries, causing a full-fledged fiscal crisis in Greece and severe fiscal pressures in other euro-area countries. This has prompted a series of proposals for improving the fiscal framework of the European Monetary Union, the Excessive Deficit Procedure and the Stability and Growth Pact. The first part of this paper reviews the main properties and developments of that framework until 2007. On that basis, it discusses the recent proposals for reform, which range from marginal improvements of the existing framework to the introduction of an explicit framework for managing fiscal crises in the member states, and the expansion of the scope of policy coordination to address macro economic imbalances and the competitiveness of the member states. We find the proposal of a mechanism for dealing with government default most useful. Attempts to suppress current account imbalances and to target national competitiveness positions would most likely result in serious economic losses and do damage to the internal market of the EU. This would increase the wedge between members and non-members of the euro area.

In response to the financial and economic crisis, central banks, unlike in the 1930s, have created enormous amounts of money. There are fears that this will lead to inflation, but it is base money (the central bank's liabilities) that has expanded; total monetary aggregates have not. By contrast, in the 1930s, base money remained stable and monetary aggregates dropped. The reason for this is that in a crisis the relationship between the base money and monetary aggregates is altered. The money multiplier drops. It is therefore necessary to create more base money so that monetary aggregates remain stable. This is what central banks have done in the current crisis and rightly so. They have learned the lessons of the Great Depression. This framework helps understand differences across countries. The crisis affected the euro area money and credit supply process much less than the US and the UK. Therefore, the European Central Bank was right to respond to the crisis with a less expansionary monetary policy than the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve. However, stabilising the money supply may not have been enough to stabilise the supply of credit.

Senior Non-Resident Fellow Jürgen von Hagen offers his recommendations for the proper monetary policy to lead the eurozone out of the crisis. He argues that the tentative recovery in the euro area indicates that both monetary and fiscal policy can be normalised soon. However, because delaying fiscal consolidation would result in greater debt burdens whereas monetary policy can be quickly adjusted to respond to unforeseen developments, there is less risk involved if a fiscal exit comes first. In any case, the two strategies must be coordinated and the European Central Bank must be very clear on its interest rate policies. This paper was prepared as part of testimony for the European Parliament's Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee.

Fiscal rules specify quantitative targets for key budgetary aggregates. In this paper, we review the experience with such rules in Japan and in the EU. Comparing the performance of fiscal policy in the 1980s and 1990s until 2003, we find that the fiscal rule of the 1980s exerted some but not much disciplinary influence on Japanese fiscal policy. The fiscal rule of the Maastricht Treaty had a significant impact on political budget cycles in the EU, but did little to constrain fiscal policy in the large member states. Since the start of the European Monetary Union, the disciplinary effect of the fiscal rule in the EU has vanished. Next, we discuss the importance of budgetary institutions for the effectiveness of fiscal rules. In Europe, a number of countries adopted strong fiscal rules, i.e., a fiscal rule combined with a design of the budget process enabling governments to commit to the rule. We find that strong fiscal rules have been effective. We conclude with some suggestions for the design of a strong fiscal rule in Japan.

We discuss two essential problems of the political economy of public finances: The principal agent problem between voters and elected politicians and the common pool problem arising from the fact that money drawn from a general tax fund is used to pay for policies targeting more or less narrow groups in society. Three institutional mechanisms exist to deal with these problems, ex-ante rules controlling the behavior of elected policy makers, electoral rules creating accountability of and competition among policy makers, and budgeting processes internalizing the common pool externality. We review recent theoretical and empirical research and discuss its implications for research and institutional design.

"Im Februar 2000 fand in Lyon das Deutsch-Französch-Italienische Seminar über die sozialen Auswirkungen des Euro statt. Veranstalter war das französische Ar- beitsministerium. An der Veranstaltung nahmen Vertreter der Sozialpartner und der arbeitsmarktpolitischen Institutionen der drei Länder teil. Der breiten The- menvorgabe zum Trotz waren die Aussichten der Beschäftigungsentwicklung und die arbeitsmarkt- und tarifpolitischen Konsequenzen des Euro thematische Schwerpunkte des Seminars. Sie wurden sowohl unter makro-ökonomischen Ge- sichtspunkten als auch unter Gesichtspunkten der Arbeitsmarktstrukturen disku- tiert. Die Auswertung gibt zunächst einen Überblick über den Stand der Literatur zum Thema. Es folgt eine Zusammenfassung des Seminars. Abschlie- ßend präsentiert der Autor eine Reihe von Schlussfolgerungen für die Arbeitsmarktpo- litik." (Autorenreferat, IAB-Doku)

The recent debate over monetary policy strategies concludes that monetary targeting and inflation targeting in practice lead to very similar patterns of central bank behavior. This raises the question why central banks insist on the strategies they use. In this paper, we develop an answer from political economy. After showing that closed-loop monetary strategies using similar information sets imply similar monetary policy performance, we argue that monetary strategies are helpful in solving internal and external coordination problems for the central bank. We illustrate the point by reviewing the Bundesbank's introduction of monetary targeting in the mid- 1970s. Monetary targeting was important for the Bank as a signal that the previous monetary regime had been overcome, as a means to define the role of monetary policy vis-a-vis other players in the macro economic policy game, and to structure the internal monetary policy debate. The last section discusses the implications of this view for the new European Central Bank.