Suchergebnisse

This book is concerned with the problems of whether a utility concept that is cardinal -- insofar as ratios between utility differences are significant -- exists or not, whether it is useful -- e.g. in creating testable models of behaviour -- or whether a merely ordinal preference function will do for all purposes. Some selected highlights from the debate between cardinalists and ordinalists are analyzed, but essentially this is a presentation of fresh elements in the case for cardinalism. Special themes analyzed include the distinction between utility and risk attitude, motivating decisions in case of uncertainty, multiperiod allocations and complementarity. Empirical evidence is presented and it seems that attempts at measuring utility give amazing results. The book will interest researchers, teachers and advanced students in economics, economic psychology, welfare theory and themes concerned with human behaviour

I / Foundations of Utility and Probability -- The Foundations of the Theory of Utility and Risk. Some Central Points of the Discussions at the Oslo Conference -- II / One Utility Function or Two? -- Utility and Risk Preference Functions -- Neo-Cardinalism -- Prediction, Measurement, and Error of Utility: A Reply to Allais -- III / Prescriptive Versus Descriptive Decision Models -- Remarks to Professor Allais' Contributions to the Theory of Expected Utility and Related Subjects -- Decision-Aid and Expected Utility Theory: A Critical Survey -- IV / Aspects of Process Utility -- The Importance of What Might Have Been -- Relativity in Decision Theory -- The Utility of Gambling and of Outcomes: Inconsistent First Approximations -- Name Index.