Suchergebnisse

Exchange rate fluctuations have been particularly large since mid-2014, displaying divergent developments across the period. The nominal effective exchange rate of the dollar has appreciated by 15 per cent since June 2014, masking a 25 per cent appreciation to December 2016 followed by a depreciation of 8 per cent. Changes in the euro have turned positive after being negative. This article attempts to measure the impact of currency changes on domestic activity, accounting for the source of fluctuations. More specifically, by using the multi-country structural model NiGEM, we show that different types of exchange rate shocks can have different macroeconomic outcomes. Focusing on the period from January 2017 to February 2018, we show that the depreciation of the dollar, stemming mostly from changes in sentiment in foreign exchange markets, would in fact have been detrimental to US growth. A weaker currency, in this particular case, turned out to be no recipe for stronger growth. Similarly, the appreciation of the euro, triggered by a fall in the risk premium of the currency, may have been positive for growth. There are caveats to the exercise, but the results are nonetheless consistent with previous research pointing to the importance of the nature of the exchange rate shocks in estimating their impact on prices and growth.

Este trabajo conjunto de Bundesbank, Banque de France y Banco de España analiza en detalle algunos de los numerosos canales a través de los cuales el brexit afectará a la economía del Reino Unido y a la de sus socios comerciales. En particular, se centra en los canales comercial y migratorio, haciendo una evaluación más general de los costes de la salida de la UE utilizando un modelo de gravedad. El canal comercial por sí solo puede reducir el PIB del Reino Unido un 2 % a medio plazo si el Reino Unido vuelve a las reglas de la OMC, mientras que un modelo de gravedad más general apuntaría a que el PIB del Reino Unido se reduciría casi un 6 % en comparación con el escenario de no salida. Por lo tanto, de acuerdo con nuestro análisis, el «coste de estar fuera de Europa» (como se estableció originalmente en el trabajo seminal de Cecchini en 1988) se encuentra entre el 2 % y el 6 % en términos de pérdidas del PIB real para el Reino Unido. Este impacto es en gran medida asimétrico, ya que el PIB de la zona del euro no se ve prácticamente afectado por este evento, al situarse menos de un 1 % por debajo del escenario de no salida en 2023. El estudio también pone de manifiesto cómo los resultados son sensibles a la reacción de las políticas económicas. En general, las políticas monetarias y fiscales pueden actuar para amortiguar el shock del brexit ; sin embargo, su efectividad depende de la fuente subyacente de la perturbación ; This joint work by the Bundesbank, the Banque de France and the Banco de España highlights some of the numerous channels through which Brexit will affect the UK economy and its economic partners. In particular, it focuses on trade and migration channels, adding a more general assessment of exiting the EU through the use of a gravity model. The trade channel alone may cut UK GDP by 2% over the medium term if the UK reverts to WTO rules, while a more general gravity model would point to UK GDP falling by almost 6% compared to baseline. According to our analysis, the 'cost of non-Europe' (such as originally stated by Cecchini's seminal work in 1988) lies therefore between 2% and 6% in terms of real GDP losses for the UK. With the shock being largely asymmetric, the EA remains relatively unscathed by the UK's exit, with GDP less than 1% lower than baseline by 2023. The study also shows that results are sensitive to the envisaged policy response. In general, monetary and fiscal policies may act to cushion a Brexit-related shock ; however, the potency of the policy response depends on the underlying source of the shock

This paper summarises the economic analyses of the potential impact of Brexit on the United Kingdom, European Union (EU) and euro area performed by members of and contributors to the Brexit Task Force, a group reporting to the International Relations Committee of the European System of Central Banks. The studies were carried out between 2017 and the initial months of 2019 and have been independently published by the authors. The aim of this Occasional Paper is to present the studies in an organic manner, highlighting common features and results.