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"This chapter explains the four principal issues that are explored in this book. The four items on the Putative Contrasts List summarize these issues: (1) Both moral responsibility and moral obligation require freedom but whereas, seemingly, the former does not require freedom to do otherwise, the latter does. (2) Semicompatibilism regarding responsibility (or obligation) is the thesis that even if determinism is incompatible with freedom to do otherwise, it is compatible with responsibility (or obligation). Arguably, while responsibility semicompatibilism is plausible, obligation semicompatibilism is far less tenable. (3) Externalism about responsibility or obligation is the view that how you acquire apt antecedents of action, such as beliefs, desires, and values, may influence whether you are responsible for, or are morally obligated to do, something. It appears that whereas responsibility externalism is true, there is little or no reason to believe that obligation externalism is true. (4) While obligations can change with time's passage, blameworthiness cannot. The general conclusion argued for is that the only item on this list that captures a real difference is item (3). Obligation and responsibility are far more similar to each other than items (1), (2), and (4) suggest. A chapter-by-chapter synopsis concludes the discussion"--

'Obligation and Responsibility' challenges widely held perspectives on moral responsibility and moral obligation. Apart from one key distinction, author Ishtiyaque Haji argues that moral responsibility and moral obligation share analogous freedom requirements, are threatened by determinism based on these requirements, and are susceptible to change.

This work argues for the prima facie plausibility of the surprising and paradoxical conclusion that there are no moral obligations regardless of whether determinism is true. In the form of a dilemma, the primary argument for this skeptical conclusion presupposes that obligation requires freedom. A minimal number of credible principles entail that this is the freedom both to do, and to refrain from doing, what is obligatory. On the deterministic horn of the dilemma, since determinism eliminates freedom to do otherwise, it imperils moral obligation. On the indeterministic horn, pertinent actions are too luck-infected to qualify as obligations. Hence, there are no moral obligations. The text's principal goal is to develop the obligation dilemma as powerfully and clearly as possible to inspire sustained philosophical work to solve it (assuming that it can be solved).

Something is subject to luck if it is beyond our control. In Luck's Mischief, Haji argues that owing frequently to precluding our being able to otherwise, luck limits both the range of what is morally obligatory for us and things for which we are morally responsible.

Something is subject to luck if it is beyond our control. In this book, I show that luck detrimentally affects both moral obligation and moral responsibility. I argue that factors influencing the way we are, together with considerations that link motivation and ability to perform intentional actions, frequently preclude our being able to do otherwise. Since obligation requires that we can do otherwise, luck compromises the range of what is morally obligatory for us. This result, together with principles that conjoin responsibility and obligation, is then exploited to derive the further skeptical conclusion that behaviour for which we are morally responsible is limited as well

Explores a central question of moral philosophy, addressing whether we are morally responsible for certain kinds of actions, intentional omissions and the consequences deriving therefrom. Haji distinguishes between moral responsibility and a more restrictive category, moral appraisability