Suchergebnisse

Frontmatter -- Table of Contents -- Social Ontology in the Making: An Introduction -- From Social Imitation to Teamwork -- We-Intentions -- Actions by Collectives -- We Will Do It -- Group Beliefs -- Collective Goals and Communicative Action -- Cooperation and Trust in Group Context -- Joint Action and Group Action Made Precise -- Norms and Agreement -- Collective Intentions and the Maintenance of Social Practices -- Two Kinds of We-Reasoning -- Group Agents and Their Responsibility -- List of Publications -- Subject index -- Index of names

Francesco Guala has written an important book proposing a new account of social institutions and criticizing existing ones. We focus on Guala's critique of collective acceptance theories of institutions, widely discussed in the literature of collective intentionality. Guala argues that at least some of the collective acceptance theories commit their proponents to antinaturalist methodology of social science. What is at stake here is what kind of philosophizing is relevant for the social sciences. We argue that a Searlean version of collective acceptance theory can be defended against Guala's critique and question the sufficiency of Guala's account of the ontology of the social world.