Suchergebnisse

Free to fight? Testing the democratic civil peace in the Middle East / Uriel Abulof -- 2. The end of military tutelage in Turkey and the re-making of Turkish foreign policy under the AKP / Oǧuzhan Göksel -- 3. Lebanon : the lack of a unified and independent foreign policy / Faten Ghosn-Halawi -- 4. The challenge of democratization in post-revolutionary Iran : beyond the democratic peace theory / Mojtaba Mahdavi -- 5. Building a federal state : defining democracy and the essence of the state in post-2003 Iraq / Gareth Stansfield -- 6. Democratization and Egyptian regional policy : Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose / Bassem Hassan -- 7. Democracy and democratic peace : the case of the Palestinian authority / Yakub Halabi -- 8. The consonance of the Islamist Shari'a-state with democratic peace in the context of the Arab Spring / Bassam Tibi -- Conclusion / Yakub Halabi

US foreign policy in the Middle East has for the most part been shaped by the eruption of major crises. Yakub Halabi analyzes the way ideas and conceptions have guided US foreign policy in the Middle East, the erection of institutions through which these ideas were brought into practice, and the manner in which these ideas became obsolete and were modified by new ideas.

AbstractThis article examines the behaviour of a minority as a political unit and its endeavours to construct an informal state‐like hierarchy. The article examines the history of the Druze minority during the major crises of 1830s and 1860 Lebanon, 1925 Syrian Great Uprising, 1936–1939 Palestinian Great Revolt and the 1948 Zionist–Arab War. The article explores how inter‐subjectivity among Druze individuals around principles such as 'preserving of brotherhood', their imagination of themselves of belonging to a large community and the inter‐subjectivity around the prominence of certain clans, notables and religious clergies allowed the minority to behave as a community and create its own informal hierarchy within the loose hierarchy of their own state. The hierarchy that was established was based upon elements of inter‐subjectivity that include communal solidarity, faith‐based binding foundations, the seniority of certain clan leaders and the prominence of certain clergies, where the clan leaders and clergies were authorized to settle daily disputes and in steering the foreign affairs of the minority.

Scholars of Israeli politics have overestimated the role of the Israeli military generals in shaping Israel's security policy and the peace process with the Palestinian Authority (PA). They also underestimated the role of the Knesset in the process. This article claims that not only the Knesset has a final say in ratifying any peace agreement with the PA but the Knesset has become a hindrance to peace. The structure of Israeli democratic system, that is, the proportional representation (PR) system, has boosted the power of small parties beyond their relative size, while the party primaries bestowed autonomy on the party candidates from their party leadership. Under these circumstances, the Israeli government has become a weak actor, where a small party could break down the governing coalition and topple the government. The article claims that the weak Israeli government operates within a strong State, both domestically vis-à-vis society and internationally. While the State security institutions are able to enforce the rule of law and dissolve settlements for the sake of peace, the government cannot guarantee that the legislative branch could approve such a decision.

The history of Zionism is composed of two narratives: One is the history of anti-Semitism that begot Zionism, and the other is the history of the Zionist–Palestinian conflict that begot the Palestinian refugee problem (the Nakba). So far, these two narratives have been investigated in parallel and, thus, they were kept artificially disconnected from each other. The history of the Palestinian catastrophe has been examined mainly in the light of the 1947–1949 events that culminated in the 1948 War and the birth of the Nakba. This narrative ignores the identity of the Zionists, especially the link between anti-Semitism and the Nakba. Many Israeli scholars claim that the territorial demands of the two groups had ushered in the 1948 War, the outcome of which was determined by the balance of power between the Zionist forces and the Arabs. Based on theories of social constructivism, this essay claims, however, that the Nakba and the establishment of the state of Israel are a socially constructed enterprise that reflected the shared ideas, the collective unhappy consciousness and the identity of Zionists and their protracted history in Europe. Anti-Semitism shaped the world views of Zionists and their desire to establish a Jewish state on the total area of mandatory Palestine—the area west of the Jordan River under British administration—in which the Jews aspired to live alone with themselves. Finally, in order to uproot the 'diaspora mentality' from the Jewish newcomers to Palestine and to construct a Jewish nationality, the Zionists had excluded the Palestinians from the Hebrew labour market.

This article argues that a protracted conflict, in general, has strengthened the state vis-à-vis the society in Egypt, Israel, South Korea, Syria and Taiwan. Yet, the existentially threatened states, namely, Israel, South Korea and Taiwan, have pursued economic development and industrialization as a strategic objective. While all three states have been strategically important for the hegemon, the United States, the latter has encouraged them to adopt an export-oriented strategy and opened its own market to their exports. Given the rise in state strength, an existentially threatened state becomes more capable of extracting taxes and mobilizing the society for industrialization. Both Egypt and Syria, in contrast, were merely engaged in a protracted conflict. Consequently, they were not under pressure to maximize their power through industrialization and/or export-led growth strategy, and each explored, in its own unique way, short-cut solutions for regaining its occupied territory.

The US policy towards the Islamic world since the beginning of the 1970s has experienced the challenge of responding to three major crises in the region: the Arab oil embargo of 1973 and the consequent accumulation of petrodollars in the hands of a few traditional, Arab monarchies; the Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran, coupled with the debt crisis of the 1980s; and the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Each one of these crises generated a new set of ideas to address the roots of the crisis and construct a new reality that would best serve US interests. In that sense each set became embedded within formal US institutions, influencing the way American policymakers comprehended foreign policy, assessed problems, and formulated strategies toward the region. Such embedded ideas, in turn, regulated American relations with the Middle East—a political region where power and interests shape outcomes by virtue of the ideas that channel them.