Suchergebnisse

Cover -- Half Title -- Dedication -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- Part I Theoretical and Historical Considerations -- 1 National Identity and the Secularization Debate -- 2 The Origins and Consolidation of 'Cultural Defence' in Greece and the Republic of Ireland -- Part II Church, State and Nation -- 3 Church and State: Nationalist Legitimation versus 'Moral Monopoly' -- 4 Church and Nation: External Threat Perceptions, National Identity and Religion -- Part III Portrayals of the Nation in State and Church Discourse -- 5 State Discourse and the Redefinition of National Identity in the Greek and Irish Education Systems -- 6 Church Discourse and Nationalist Mobilization -- Conclusion: Patterns of Secularization -- Appendix -- Bibliography -- Index

Why has the extreme right Greek Golden Dawn, a party with clear links to fascism, experienced a rise defying all theories that claim that such a party is unlikely to win in post-Second World War Europe? And, if we accept that economic crisis is an explanation for this, why has such a phenomenon not occurred in other countries that have similar conducive conditions, such as Portugal and Spain? This article addresses this puzzle by: (1) carrying out a controlled comparison of Greece, Portugal and Spain; and (2) showing that the rise of the extreme right is not a question of intensity of economic crisis. Rather it is the nature of the crisis – that is, economic versus overall crisis of democratic representation – that facilitates the rise of the extreme right. We argue that extreme right parties are more likely to experience an increase in their support when economic crisis culminates into an overall crisis of democratic representation. Economic crisis is likely to become a political crisis when severe issues of governability impact upon the ability of the state to fulfil its social contract obligations. This breach of the social contract is accompanied by declining levels of trust in state institutions, resulting in party system collapse.

"Does the economy affect patterns of far-right party support across countries? This article reconceptualizes micro-level analyses that focus on the effect of unemployment through a framework of costs, risks and the mediating role of labour market institutions. It then derives several hypotheses and tests them on the results of the previous three EP elections in all EU Member States. Findings from multiple regression analyses indicate that unemployment, real GDP growth, debt and deficits have no statistically significant effect on far-right party support at the national level. By contrast, labour market institutions influence costs and risks: where unemployment benefits and dismissal regulations are high, unemployment has no effect, but where either one of them is low, unemployment leads to higher far-right party support. This explains why unemployment has not led to far-right party support in some European countries that experienced the severity of the 2008 eurozone crisis." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))