Constitutionalising secession? --Associative constitutionalism --Primary right theory --Remedial right or just-cause theory --Remedial succession and disassociation --Nationalist theory of succession --Nationalism and association --Constitutional text and context --Negotiating secession : of voice and veto --Legislating rules for secession? --Conclusions.
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The more international law, taken as a global answer to global problems, intrudes into domestic legal systems, the more it takes on the role and function of domestic law. This raises a separation of powers question regarding law-making powers. In this book the author considers that specific issue. In contrast to other studies on domestic courts applying international law, the author's constitutional orientation focusses on the presumptions concerning the distribution of state power. He collects and examines relevant decisions regarding treaties and customary international law from four leading legal systems, the US, the UK, France, and the Netherlands. Those decisions reveal that institutional and conceptual allegiances to constitutional structures render it difficult for courts to see their mandates and powers in terms other than exclusively national. What follows is a constitutional asymmetry between international law and national law generating an inevitable dualism which cannot necessarily be overcome by express constitutional provisions accommodating international law. The separation of powers thus frames the two principal horizons for any future, practicable attempts at integrating of the two legal orders. Either established concepts of constitutional law and constitutionalism will have to be revised, or what international law may do within a municipal legal system will have to be recalculated. This book offers new insight and new approaches in dealing with international law questions before domestic courts. It is an interesting work of reference and a basis for further debate on this topic among academics and practitioners in the fields of international and constitutional law. David Haljan is a Senior Research Fellow with the Institute of Constitutional Law, University of Leuven
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In the aftermath of the 1995 referendum on Quebec unilateral secession,1the then Minister of Justice, Allan Rock, proposed that the legality of a province's attempting to secede unilaterally be referred to the Supreme Court of Canada for a judicial opinion, pursuant to that Court's special advisory jurisdiction.2Accordingly, on 30 September 1996, the Governor General in Council submitted three questions of law, discussed in detail below, concerning the legal authority of Quebec, under both Canadian and international law, to secede from the Canadian federation. In addition to the government of Canada, two provinces, the two territories, and a number of special interest groups and individuals (all given leave to intervene) submitted written arguments and rejoinders over the course of 1997.3The government of Quebec did not participate in the hearing and submitted no argument. Accordingly, the Court appointed an (from Quebec) to represent the secessionist interest. The Court heard argument from 16 to 19 February 1998. On 20 August 1998 the Court released its unanimous opinion, rather earlier than expected.4The Court rejected the legal right of Quebec to separate unilaterally under Canadian constitutional law, and the right to do so under international law as recognised in Canada. Given the latter holding, the Court did not consider further the third question relating to reconciling a possible conflict between the two legal orders. The following extended case comment proposes to outline and discuss briefly the reasoning of the Court, in what is a significant exercise of judicial power in the service of constitutional affairs. The structure of this comment will follow that of the Court's resaoning, dealing first with a preliminary objection, then turninh to question 1(introduction and discussion) and then to Question 2 and 3.5
Zusammenfassung: La 4ème de couv. indique :"Derived from the renowned multi-volume 'International Encyclopaedia of Laws', this very useful analysis of constitutional law in Germany provides essential information on the country's sources of constitutional law, its form of government, and its administrative structure. Lawyers who handle transnational matters will appreciate the clarifications of particular terminology and its application. Throughout the book, the treatment emphasizes the specific points at which constitutional law affects the interpretation of legal rules and procedure.00Thorough coverage by a local expert fully describes the political system, the historical background, the role of treaties, legislation, jurisprudence, and administrative regulations. The discussion of the form and structure of government outlines its legal status, the jurisdiction and workings of the central state organs, the subdivisions of the state, its decentralized authorities, and concepts of citizenship. Special issues include the legal position of aliens, foreign relations, taxing and spending powers, emergency laws, the power of the military, and the constitutional relationship between church and state. Details are presented in such a way that readers who are unfamiliar with specific terms and concepts in varying contexts will fully grasp their meaning and significance. Its succinct yet scholarly nature, as well as the pratical quality of the information it provides, make this book a valuable time-saving tool for both practising and academic jurists. Lawyers representing parties with interests in Germany will welcome this guide, and academics and researchers will appreciate its value in the study of comparative constitutional law."