Suchergebnisse

Abstract
With emergency powers, President Rodrigo Duterte mobilized and deployed military and police to enforce lockdown measures in Metro Manila and Cebu City. For several months in 2020, the deployed forces ran quarantine control points in borders and city wards, and enforced curfew and liquor bans. This article examines how said deployment affected civilian control by the President and local civil-military dynamics. The heightened visibility of uniformed personnel in these urban spaces, and subsequent arrests and detention of quarantine violators came under heavy criticism. Against the backdrop of ex-military dominated national Inter Agency Task Force for Infectious Diseases (IATF), the militarized lockdown failed to stem the virus' spread and expanded the military's reach into civilian domain. Its involvement in law enforcement operations alongside the police poses dangers to local civil-military balance and to democracy. President Duterte's reliance on the state's coercive apparatus to carry out the pandemic response enabled him to assert control over local governments and to repress dissent.

The responses of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), Petron, government line agencies, local government authorities and non-government organizations to the 2006 Solar I oil spill were moderated by their relative positions within overlapping and competing disaster-specific frameworks at the agency (PCG), local and regional levels. The regional Task Force Solar I Oil Spill (RTFSOS), once convened, overshadowed the other frameworks owing largely to national calamity funds channeled through its member line agencies. While the task force design allowed for better job delineation and horizontal coordination between a limited number of stakeholders, the framework nevertheless marginalized the PCG, local government authorities and NGOs while endowing Petron a legitimate basis for its involvement in response operations. The absence of a widely-accepted protocol for ameliorating the spill's environmental and human health impact created tension between line government agencies and academic/research communities. Unlike other disasters, the prospect of financial largesse from the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund, either as reimbursements for response activities and compensation for livelihood losses, animated stakeholder and local reactions.

This article examines the interaction of local army units and town/village leaders in several communist frontline communities in Southern Iloilo, in the light of changes in the national government's policy response after 1986. Civil-military engagement in the frontline is asymmetrical and premised on different understandings of the nature and assessment of the communist threat. For soldiers, the communists are embedded in the community, and pose a serious threat. Local leaders downplay the rebel threat and view the communists as outsiders, but express a nuanced view of the different roles locals play in the communist movement and factional affiliation of rebels in their area. Except for paramilitary formation, the military devises all counterinsurgency programs while civilian leaders and the police are confined to implementation. The Municipal Peace and Order Councils do not serve as institutional means for local civilian leaders to oversee military operations, but rather as venues for local commands to obtain logistical support. Civil-military interface on human rights concerns has become less confrontational and oriented towards soldiers carrying firearms in public, abuse of local generosity particularly in quartering and food provision, and complaints procedure for minor infractions.

The Philippine military performs on array of traditional (internal security and external defense) and non-traditional (development, disaster relief and rehabilitation, and environmental protection) functions. Historically, it was preoccupied with counterinsurgency operations, which included civic action and development component. After 7 986, the military's role in internal security operations has been streamlined and circumscribed by statutes which criminalize human rights violations. Plans for the military to shift to on external defense mode in 7 995 was scuttled after renewed insurgency threat. There was also a parallel expansion in the military's non-traditional functions after the transition owing to pragmatic considerations by civilian authorities to put the military's resources to use.

Force of last resort the Canadian Armed Forces and domestic military operations / Tyler Wentzell -- The legal regulation of missions in Latin America / David Pion-Berlin and Rafa Martínez -- To execute the laws of the union domestic use of federal military force in the United States / Lindsay P. Cohn -- Extremis malis, extrema remedia the deployment of the Belgian Armed Forces in case of a domestic emergency / Jens Claerman -- Military engagement in the domestic jurisdiction of the Czech Republic / Veronika Bílková and Petra Ditrichová -- Regulatory developments related to the role of the Armed Forces in Spain (1975-2020) / Enriqueta Expósito -- Military call-out powers and civil-military relations the case of Turkey / Ayfer Genç Yılmaz and Onur Ağkaya -- Britain's army at home / Marc de Vore and Patrick Finnegan -- Calling out defence personnel in civilian security matters in Australia / Pauline Collins -- The law and politics of military callouts in Indonesia's counterterrorism / Jun Honna -- Is it really our job? Reassessing the domestic mobilisation of Japan's self-defense forces (JSDF) / Saya Kiba -- Pandemic and beyond domestic deployment of the Philippines military for call-out operations / Rosalie Arcala-Hall -- Military supremacy over domestic security laws and operations the case of Thailand / Paul Chambers.

An exploration of the roles that pro- and anti-government militias, private armed groups, vigilantes, and gangs play in local communities in the new democracies of Southeast Asia. Scholars have typically characterized irregular forces as spoilers and infiltrators in post-conflict peacebuilding processes. The contributors to this book challenge this conventional understanding of irregular forces in Southeast Asia, demonstrating that they often attract solid support from civilians and can be major contributors to the building of local security — a process by which local residents, in the absence of an effective police force, develop, partner or are at least included in the management of community crimes and other violence. They analyze irregular forces' dealings with political actors at the community level, explaining why and how forces are incorporated in and collaborate with legitimate institutions without using violence against them. Offering a new approach to dealing with irregular forces in Southeast Asia, contributors explore new theoretical frameworks that are better suited for evaluating irregular forces' relationship to different security providers and the political environments in the region. Specifically, they examine case studies from Indonesia, Timor-Leste, the Philippines, and Thailand. A valuable resource for researchers, students and practitioners in the areas of conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and security governance, especially those with a focus on Southeast Asia. This book will also be of great interest to scholars of the sociology and anthropology of the region.