Daniel Halliday examines the moral grounding of the right to bequeath or transfer wealth. He engages with contemporary concerns about wealth inequality, class hierarchy, and taxation, while also drawing on the history of the egalitarian, utilitarian, and liberal traditions in political philosophy. He presents an egalitarian case for restricting inherited wealth, arguing that unrestricted inheritance is unjust to the extent that it enables and enhances the intergenerational replication of inequality. Here, inequality is understood in a group-based sense: the unjust effects of inheritance are principally in its tendency to concentrate certain opportunities into certain groups. This results in what Halliday describes as 'economic segregation'. He defends a specific proposal about how to tax inherited wealth: roughly, inheritance should be taxed more heavily when it comes from old money
Daniel Halliday examines the morality of the right to bequeath or transfer wealth, and argues that inheritance is unjust to the extent that it enhances the intergenerational replication of inequality, concentrating opportunities in certain groups. He presents an egalitarian case for imposition of a significant inheritance tax
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The emergence of so-called 'gig work', particularly that sold through digital platforms accessed through smartphone apps, has led to disputes about the proper classification of workers: Should platform workers be classified as independent contractors (as platforms typically insist), or as employees of the platforms through which they sell labor (as workers often claim)? Such disputes have urgency due to the way in which employee status is necessary to access certain benefits such as a minimum wage, sick pay, and so on. In addition, classification disputes have philosophical significance because their resolution requires some foundational account of why the law should make a distinction between employed and freelance workers in the first place. This paper aims to fill this foundational gap. Central to it is the idea that employment involves a worker ceding certain freedoms in return for a degree of security, at least with respect to income. Insofar as the misclassification objection has force against digital platforms, it is when a platform is attempting to have it both ways: Workers are giving up freedom but not being granted a proportionate increase in security. As I shall explain, this approach offers some flexibility as to how actual disputes might be resolved – justice may be indifferent between whether platforms offer greater security or permit workers greater freedom, provided they do at least one of these things.
This article defends the view that markets in education need to be restricted, in light of the problem posed by what I call the 'educational arms race'. Markets in education have a tendency to distort an important balance between education's role as a gatekeeper – its 'screening' function – and its role in helping children develop as part of a preparation for adult life. This tendency is not merely a contingent fact about markets: It can be traced to ways in which education is a partly positional good and how markets respond to (and stimulate) demand for positional goods over non-positional goods. The problem with arms races is that they allow markets to facilitate wider use of defection in a collective action problem. Using these claims, I argue that markets in education have a distinctive tendency to become objectionably exploitative. I conclude by applying some of my conclusions to illuminate various egalitarian claims about justice in education.
What does it mean to 'act charitably'? revisiting the purposes and activities distinction in charity law / Adam Parachin -- Purposes, activities, and the continued importance of charity modes of action / Ian Murray -- Too private to be charitable : difficulties in drawing the line in charity law / Debra Morris -- Too private to be charitable : commentary on Debra Morris's chapter / Jennifer Batrouney AM QC -- Public benefit and charitable class / Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer -- Comment on public benefit and charitable class / Matthew Harding -- Public benefit and public policy : keeping up with discrimination? / Myles McGregor-Lowndes -- Commentary on public benefit and public policy : keeping up with discrimination? / Matthew Turnour and Elizabeth Shalders -- A no-benefit benefit test : when, if ever, should benefit be presumed or assumed in charity law? / Mary Synge -- A no-benefit benefit test : Pauline Ridge weighing benefits and detriments in the law of charities / Jane Calderwood Norton -- Some further reflections on incommensurability, public benefit, and autonomy : commentary on weighing benefits and detriments in the law of charities / Daniel Halliday -- Public reason, public benefit, and 'political' charities / Patrick Emerton -- Comment on public reason, public benefit, and 'political' charities / Jennifer L Beard -- Issues and problems with the application of the public benefit test in New Zealand law / Sue Barker -- Purpose and public benefit / Rosemary Teele Langford.
"This book investigates and critically evaluates the concept of public benefit within charity law in the common law world. In the course of the study, the book provides a rich account of how the concept of public benefit has developed over time in charity law jurisprudence; deepens understanding of the aspects of public benefit that remain poorly understood even today; and suggests ways in which public benefit jurisprudence might develop in an orderly and principled way so as to better address some of the core concerns of charity law and the public policy objectives that lie behind it. The book includes contributions from world leading charity law experts and jurists. Each chapter reflects on a key aspect of public benefit jurisprudence in charity law. The topics have been chosen carefully to ensure coverage of most if not all of the large unresolved questions relating to public benefit in the common law world. Each chapter is accompanied by a comment, written by an academic expert or leading practitioner. The comments complement the chapters by critically engaging with those chapters and by offering different and thought-provoking perspectives on the subject matter of the chapters. The book will be of interest to academics working in law, philosophy, economics, sociology and political science. It will also provide a valuable resource for legal practitioners and judges, government officials, especially charity regulators, and in the not-for-profit sector itself"--
This is an undergraduate-level textbook that introduces classical political philosophy as a framework to evaluate the ethics of capitalism up to the present day. It is rooted in historical eighteenth- and nineteenth-century defenses of capitalism, as written by key proponents such as Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill, and applies these arguments to contemporary issues such as wage inequality, global trade, climate change, and the welfare state. The authors aim to engage students in debating the ethics of economic systems-specifically capitalism, socialism, and feudalism-and whether various contemporary economic injustices can be interpreted as legacy of each system. There are also study questions at the end of each chapter and an author-created companion website.
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This book acquaints the reader with arguments for the moral foundations of market society, as well as the applications of these arguments. Broadly, the book encourages a distinction between capitalism construed as an ideal rather than as a label for the economic status quo and its associated injustices. These foundational arguments are compared with arguments in favor of socialism. Special attention is paid to historically significant figures such as Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx, and F.A. Hayek.
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Recent decades have seen substantial increases in the average amount of money spent on wedding ceremonies in economically developed countries. This article develops an account of wedding expenditure as a form of positional competition where participation involves purchasing services in a market. The main emphasis is on the role that conspicuously expensive weddings can play in enabling certain kinds of signalling, most notably the signalling of commitment to a personal relationship and a distinct signalling of personal wealth. The analysis seeks to demonstrate how wedding expenditure is both similar to but distinct from the positional consumption associated with markets in other goods and services. While much of the work in this article is descriptive, it aims to complement more normatively engaged work on the moral status of marriage, and on the proper evaluation and response to excessive positional consumption.
Introduction / Thomas Gutmann, Daniel Halliday, Hans-Christoph Schmidt am Busch -- What, if anything, is wrong with bequest? / Stefan Gosepath -- The morality of charitable bequests / Miranda Perry Fleischer -- Is the right to bequeath a supernatural power? / Hillel Steiner -- The right to bequeath as a common legal power / Constantin Luft and Thomas Gutmann -- Property rights and the power to transfer / Daniel Halliday -- The double function of inheritance : rethinking conditional bequests / Shelly Keiczer-Levy -- Remembrance, esteem, and the right to bequeath / Hans-Christoph Schmidt am Busch -- Inheritance law and the challenge of securing care in old age / Daphna Hacker -- Natural right or convention? / David James -- Property in the tension between family and civil society / Christopher Yeomans -- Inheritance tax justice and family businesses / Christian Neuhäuser -- Taxing wealth and wealth transfers in the 21st century / Jennifer Bird-Pollan.
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"In every western democracy today, inheritances have a very profound influence on people's lives. This motivates renewed scholarship on inheritance law by philosophy and the legal sciences. The present volume aims to contribute to some ongoing areas of inquiry while also filling some gaps in research. It is organised in a highly interdisciplinary way. In the sixteen chapters of the book, written by outstanding philosophers and legal scholars, the following questions, among others, are discussed. What is the nature of the right to bequeath? What are the social functions of bequest and inheritance? What arguments concerning justice have philosophers and legal scholars advanced in favour or against practices of bequest and inheritance? How should we think about taxing the wealth transfers that occur in bequest and inheritance? In discussing these questions, the authors break new ground and offer much-needed insight into a number of related domains, such as the philosophy of law, legal theory, general and applied ethics, social and political philosophy, theories of justice and the history of legal, political and economic thought. Engaging the philosophy of law, legal theory, general and applied ethics, social and political philosophy, theories of justice and the history of legal, political and economic thought, this book will be of great interest to scholars in these areas as well as policy makers"--
COVID-19 vaccines are likely to be scarce for years to come. Many countries, from India to the U.K., have demonstrated vaccine nationalism. What are the ethical limits to this vaccine nationalism? Neither extreme nationalism nor extreme cosmopolitanism is ethically justifiable. Instead, we propose the fair priority for residents (FPR) framework, in which governments can retain COVID-19 vaccine doses for their residents only to the extent that they are needed to maintain a noncrisis level of mortality while they are implementing reasonable public health interventions. Practically, a noncrisis level of mortality is that experienced during a bad influenza season, which society considers an acceptable background risk. Governments take action to limit mortality from influenza, but there is no emergency that includes severe lockdowns. This "flu-risk standard" is a nonarbitrary and generally accepted heuristic. Mortality above the flu-risk standard justifies greater governmental interventions, including retaining vaccines for a country's own citizens over global need. The precise level of vaccination needed to meet the flu-risk standard will depend upon empirical factors related to the pandemic. This links the ethical principles to the scientific data emerging from the emergency. Thus, the FPR framework recognizes that governments should prioritize procuring vaccines for their country when doing so is necessary to reduce mortality to noncrisis flu-like levels. But after that, a government is obligated to do its part to share vaccines to reduce risks of mortality for people in other countries. We consider and reject objections to the FPR framework based on a country: (1) having developed a vaccine, (2) raising taxes to pay for vaccine research and purchase, (3) wanting to eliminate economic and social burdens, and (4) being ineffective in combating COVID-19 through public health interventions.
COVID-19 vaccines are likely to be scarce for years to come. Many countries, from India to the U.K., have demonstrated vaccine nationalism. What are the ethical limits to this vaccine nationalism? Neither extreme nationalism nor extreme cosmopolitanism is ethically justifiable. Instead, we propose the fair priority for residents (FPR) framework, in which governments can retain COVID-19 vaccine doses for their residents only to the extent that they are needed to maintain a noncrisis level of mortality while they are implementing reasonable public health interventions. Practically, a noncrisis level of mortality is that experienced during a bad influenza season, which society considers an acceptable background risk. Governments take action to limit mortality from influenza, but there is no emergency that includes severe lockdowns. This "flu-risk standard" is a nonarbitrary and generally accepted heuristic. Mortality above the flu-risk standard justifies greater governmental interventions, including retaining vaccines for a country's own citizens over global need. The precise level of vaccination needed to meet the flu-risk standard will depend upon empirical factors related to the pandemic. This links the ethical principles to the scientific data emerging from the emergency. Thus, the FPR framework recognizes that governments should prioritize procuring vaccines for their country when doing so is necessary to reduce mortality to noncrisis flu-like levels. But after that, a government is obligated to do its part to share vaccines to reduce risks of mortality for people in other countries. We consider and reject objections to the FPR framework based on a country: (1) having developed a vaccine, (2) raising taxes to pay for vaccine research and purchase, (3) wanting to eliminate economic and social burdens, and (4) being ineffective in combating COVID-19 through public health interventions.
Once effective coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) vaccines are developed, they will be scarce. This presents the question of how to distribute them fairly across countries. Vaccine allocation among countries raises complex and controversial issues involving public opinion, diplomacy, economics, public health, and other considerations. Nevertheless, many national leaders, international organizations, and vaccine producers recognize that one central factor in this decision-making is ethics (1, 2). Yet little progress has been made toward delineating what constitutes fair international distribution of vaccine. Many have endorsed ?equitable distribution of COVID-19?vaccine? without describing a framework or recommendations (3, 4). Two substantive proposals for the international allocation of a COVID-19 vaccine have been advanced, but are seriously flawed. We offer a more ethically defensible and practical proposal for the fair distribution of COVID-19 vaccine: the Fair Priority Model.The Fair Priority Model is primarily addressed to three groups. One is the COVAX facility?led by Gavi, the World Health Organization (WHO), and the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI)?which intends to purchase vaccines for fair distribution across countries (5). A second group is vaccine producers. Thankfully, many producers have publicly committed to a ?broad and equitable? international distribution of vaccine (2). The last group is national governments, some of whom have also publicly committed to a fair distribution (1).These groups need a clear framework for reconciling competing values, one that they and others will rightly accept as ethical and not just as an assertion of power. The Fair Priority Model specifies what a fair distribution of vaccines entails, giving content to their commitments. Moreover, acceptance of this common ethical framework will reduce duplication and waste, easing efforts at a fair distribution. That, in turn, will enhance producers' confidence that vaccines will be fairly allocated to benefit people, thereby motivating an increase in vaccine supply for international distribution. ; Fil: Emanuel, Ezekiel J. University of Pennsylvania; Estados Unidos ; Fil: Persad, Govind. University of Denver.; Estados Unidos ; Fil: Kern, Adam. University of Princeton; Estados Unidos ; Fil: Buchanan, Allen. University of Arizona; Estados Unidos ; Fil: Fabre, Cécile. All Souls College; Reino Unido ; Fil: Halliday, Daniel. University of Melbourne; Australia ; Fil: Heath, Joseph. University of Toronto; Canadá ; Fil: Herzog, Lisa. University of Groningen; Países Bajos ; Fil: Leland, R. J. University of Manitoba; Canadá ; Fil: Lemango, Ephrem T. No especifíca; ; Fil: Luna, Florencia. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales; Argentina ; Fil: McCoy, Matthew S. University of Pennsylvania; Estados Unidos ; Fil: Norheim, Ole F. University of Bergen; Noruega ; Fil: Ottersen, Trygve. Norwegian Institute Of Public Health; Noruega ; Fil: Schaefer, G. Owen. Yong Loo Lin School Of Medicine; Singapur ; Fil: Tan, Kok-Chor. University of Pennsylvania; Estados Unidos ; Fil: Wellman, Christopher Heath. Washington University in St. Louis; Estados Unidos ; Fil: Wolff, Jonathan. University of Oxford; Reino Unido ; Fil: Richardson, Henry S. Kennedy Institute Of Ethics; Estados Unidos