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AbstractThis piece offers an introduction to US foreign policy toward the Iraqi Kurds since the First World War by dividing that policy into seven discernible stages—from Wilson's Fourteen Points to the actions of the Trump administration. In doing so, I query whether the existence of US foreign policy toward the Kurds has been more active and supportive during Democratic Party administrations or Republican Party administrations. Are there any clear indications as to which party has been better for the Iraqi Kurds? Or is US foreign policy toward the Iraqi Kurds unequivocally dependent on regional dynamics and US interests, not on which political party is governing or the values they espouse? The central argument is that American policy toward the Iraqi Kurds has mostly been dependent on changing regional dynamics, particularly on the changing nature of the United States relationships with Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Syria, and this does not seem to be affected strongly by which US party holds the presidency. Perhaps counter‐intuitively, there is no evidence to suggest the Democrats have been better for the Iraqi Kurds than the Republicans. While some of the most significant setbacks for the Kurds occurred during Republican administrations, their two most essential political achievements were also during Republican administrations.

This article analyzes the Kurdish question in the Middle East from the English School perspective in international relations. The central argument is that the international community consistently deals with the Kurdish question through the principle of order rather than justice. It has respected the sovereignty of those nation‐states hosting the Kurds rather than protecting the Kurdish population from grave human rights violations. Consequently, the Kurds have failed to achieve a semblance of autonomy, let alone independence. However, I argue that while the implementation of the no‐fly‐zone over northern Iraq in 1991 by the international community is a case for justice, it is not necessarily a case against the principle of order. In other words, the international community only dealt with the Kurdish issue using the principle of justice when implementing the 1991 no‐fly‐zone—but, notably, this was not against the principle of order.

AbstractMoral hazard theory assumes that the responsibility to protect (R2P) raises expectations of third‐party intervention, thus creating a perverse motivation for vulnerable groups to act aggressively and incite a situation where foreign intervention becomes necessary to preserve their own safety. The promise of external intervention encourages vulnerable groups to rebel against their parent states under the assumption that intervention increases the likelihood of success and lowers the expected cost. Alan Kuperman describes moral hazard theory as the taking of risks that may inadvertently derive from trying to protect from risk, with unwanted results. This paper asks, if there are divisions, conflicts, or a security dilemma arising between factional leaders within a vulnerable group, how does that affect the decisions of the group with regard to taking risks? Taking the case of the PUK's decision not to fight Iraqi armed forces and thereby prevent conflict escalation following the 2017 independence referendum, this paper argues that divisions between factional leaders affect a group's choice to take risks, reducing its likelihood. Consequently, conditions are less likely to reach the point of existential danger where outside intervention becomes necessary.

The four countries hosting Kurdish populations in the Middle East have mainly been politically centralized in character and sought to follow a homogeneous nation-state model through the assimilation of their Kurdish communities. Drawing on the concepts of societal security, securitization, and de-securitization derived from the theories of the Copenhagen School, this article examines Kurdish (in)security in the Middle East and argues that the Kurds have experienced significant societal insecurity due to the adoption of assimilation strategies by their host states. I posit that federalism and power sharing are the two obvious de-securitization strategies that may address the securitization of Kurdish identity in the states with significant Kurdish populations. I further argue that, while the federal model has appeared to manage securitized Kurdish identity in Iraq since 2003, this solution may not be applicable to Turkey, Iran, and Syria. Alternatively, consociational power sharing as a form of institutional de-securitization carries the potential to address Kurdish identity in these countries.

The Change Movement, also known in Kurdish as Gorran, was founded in 2009 to address the political demands of some parts of the public in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) for political and economic reform. Corruption, lack of transparency in government and financial affairs revenue and expenditure, the lack of legitimate and effective institutions, the existence of political party interference in all sectors of society, and the power-sharing agreement between the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) had all contributed to widespread feelings of discontent among members of the public. Gorran took advantage of these feelings of disenfranchisement to demand a complete change in the political structure that had been built by the KDP and the PUK in the Region. Using this message, Gorran's first election as an organized party in 2009 saw it become the second biggest political force in the Kurdistan Region and the biggest political party in the PUK's traditional stronghold in Sulaymaniyah and the Garmian area. This research divides the Gorran Movement's performance and effectiveness into three primary stages: (1) the opposition stage, which can be described as Gorran's golden period; (2) the government participation stage after 2013, which can be described as the Movement's period of weakness; and (3) the post-Nawshirwan Mustafa stage, which can be described as the Gorran Movement's period of political exhaustion. The central argument of this research is that the Gorran Movement's fundamental problem is that it became a part of the very structure that it had for many years campaigned against and is no longer a catalyst for reform.

The purpose of this article is to compare and contrast Orthodox Marxist theory and Islamic State's Salafi ideology. The article's examination of these two schools of thought reveals that they share some commonalities and many differences. The most obvious similarities include: both doctrines are pre-determined history, both divide society into different classes or blocs, both are revolutionary in ambition, both reject the notion of international borders and the nation-state model of world order, both need a minority to start their revolutions, and both do not believe in negotiation or compromise to reach their goals. However, both thoughts differ in many ways, including: the motivation for revolution, the status of religion post-revolution, the role of the state in their utopia communities, and finally the aim of the revolution. Both thoughts are seen historically as violent, totalitarian political theories. By comparing them, this article seeks to bring out what exactly gives them this reputation and to assess whether one is more deserving of it than the other.

The Iraqi state and the Kurds have always been at the odds over the territory around Kirkuk, particularly following the discovery of oil in the province in 1927. Both sides have claimed ownership of the province since that time and have sought to gain advantage over the other through various means. The region was subjected to a forced demographic change under the Arabisation policy during the reign of Ba'ath Party between 1968 and 2003. Following the overthrow of Saddam's regime in 2003, the status of Kirkuk was to be constitutionally and peacefully resolved according to Article 58 of the 2004 interim constitution and then Article 140 of the 2005 permanent constitutions, which called for normalisation, a census, and a referendum in Kirkuk and other disputed areas to determine the will of their residents. Practically, however, various Iraqi governments and the two dominant Kurdish parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party, were able to politicise implementation of Article 140. Although each blame the other, all share responsibility for the lack of implementation. This research investigates that experience and argues that the joint administration is the optimal scenario in the short run and independent region within the Iraqi state would be the best-case scenario in the long term.

Institutional conflicts within the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) have existed ever since the party's founding in 1975 as a result of a merger of three different factions. The conflicts were successfully managed in a way that did not hurt the party's overall functioning until the Gorran movement, led by Nawshirwan Mustafa, split off in 2009. However, it was the withdrawal of party leader Jalal Talabani from political and public life due to a stroke suffered in 2012 that most damaged the party's ability to function, and widened factional cracks within the organization. The absence of Talabani led to the emergence of intense competition between various groups within the PUK for influence and positions. Consequently, PUK policies on a number of important issues in Iraqi Kurdistan have been indecisive and weak since approximately 2013. This research will discuss the PUK's inconsistent policies and their negative implications for the Kurdistan Region. Furthermore, it will argue that the PUK's internal conflicts emboldened its rival, the Kurdistan Democratic Party, between the years 2014 and 2018.

Generally speaking, the traditional approach of security mainly regards states as a sole referent object of security and refutes any attempt to broaden the concept of security. This understanding is known as a realist approach. This approach, however, has been recently challenged by the Copenhagen School, the Welsh School, and the human security approach. The Copenhagen School assumes that there is now a duality of security: state security and societal security. However, both the Welsh School and the human security school look at individuals as a sole referent object of security. This article critically reviews the traditional approaches of security, the Copenhagen School, the Welsh School, and the human security approach. This article finally argues that the Copenhagen School could successfully broaden the concept of security, and therefore, it is more convincing when compared to other schools.

This article focuses on Kurdish security question in Iraq from 2003 to the present. Its central argument is that the security of the Kurdish region of Iraq has only constitutionally de-securitised since 2003. However, the Kurdish security demands in Iraq have been politicized by the different Iraqi governments since 2005, and therefore, security relations between the Iraqi state and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) have been fraught with distrust, tensions, and chaos since that time. The concepts derived from the Copenhagen School (CS) provide the framework for discussing security relations and the inherent security struggles between the Iraqi state and the KRG.