Suchergebnisse

Reducing prejudice through intergroup contact interventions / Rebecca Littman, Alexandra Scacco, and Chagai Weiss -- Redrawing the boundaries : creating positive intergroup relations interventions through shared values, memberships, and identities / Danielle Blaylock, Rhiannon N. Turner, and Richard J. Crisp -- Empathy and perspective-taking interventions in intergroup contexts : catalysts, caveats, and contraindications / Jacquie D. Vorauer and Corey Petsnik -- Using social norms to promote positive relations between social groups / Sohad Murrar and Markus Brauer -- Diversity training is just teaching / Calvin K. Lai, R. Grace Drake, and Jennifer F. Beatty -- Self-affirmation and intergroup biases : changing the narrative and the potential for conflict reduction / David K. Sherman, W. Connor Gibbs, and Kevin R. Binning -- Malleability interventions in intergroup relations / Smadar Cohen-Chen, Amit Goldenberg, James J. Gross, and Eran Halperin -- Using intergroup emotion regulation interventions to reduce intergroup conflict / Tamar Avichail, Maya Tamir, James Gross, and Eran Halperin -- Paradoxical thinking interventions in intergroup conflicts : a promising method to affect cognitions and behavior among people with strongly held attitudes / Shira Hebel-Sela, Nadine Knab, and Boaz Hameiri -- Interventions based on moral exemplars / Marta Witkowska, Michal Bilewicz, and Sabina Čehajić-Clancy -- The power of correcting meta-perceptions for improving intergroup relationships / Samantha L. Moore-Berg -- School-based interventions to improve intergroup relations from early childhood to adolescence / Dearbháile Counihan and Laura K. Taylor -- Promoting peace through mass media interventions / Rebecca Littman, Rezarta Bilali, and Boaz Hameiri -- Improving intergroup relations through interactive media / Béatrice S. Hasler, Yiftach Ron, and Patrice L. (Tamar) Weiss.

AbstractSocial problems such as intergroup conflicts, prejudice, and discrimination have a significant effect on the world's population. Often, to facilitate constructive solutions to these problems, fundamental attitude change is needed. However, changing the beliefs and attitudes to which people strongly adhere has proven to be difficult, as these individuals resist change. In this article, we offer a new and unconventional approach, termed paradoxical thinking, to promote the change of attitudes relevant to social realities. Paradoxical thinking refers to a process of exposing individuals to amplified, exaggerated, or even absurd messages that are still congruent with their held societal beliefs. In our research program, we focused on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and found that paradoxical thinking interventions led to attitude moderation among those who were the most adamant in their held attitudes and beliefs, even in the challenging context of a harsh and prolonged intergroup conflict. We then discuss how paradoxical thinking can be utilized to facilitate attitude change in this context and provide two brief examples as preliminary evidence that this approach might work in other important societal contexts, (i.e., attitudes toward refugees and asylum seekers, and gender‐based discrimination), and conclude with policy recommendations.

Dehumanization continues to be prevalent today and predicts detrimental intergroup consequences. Thus, it is important to identify novel interventions that reduce dehumanization and explore the mechanism(s)—both established (e.g., empathy induction, intergroup contact) and relatively understudied (e.g., humor)—driving the effects. To address this issue, in Study 1 (N = 2,349), we conducted an "intervention tournament" and found that a video (i.e., "Mean Tweets") of a relatable and diverse group of young Muslims ridiculing Islamophobic comments posted on an online video of a Muslim preschool burning down effectively reduces hostility towards Muslims. Specifically, the Mean Tweets intervention significantly reduced dehumanization of Muslims and, although the effects were weaker, anti‐Muslim policy support. However, a follow‐up study conducted 1 month later revealed that these effects subsided. Next, in a preregistered study (i.e., Study 2) (N = 677), we find that our intervention reliably reduced dehumanization of Muslims, but the reduction of anti‐Muslim policy support was not replicated. While investigating our intervention's effect on anti‐Muslim policy support, we find that our intervention led participants to discount the intervention's intended message, which could have short‐circuited the intervention's effectiveness on policy support. Considering these results, we discuss the potential psychological processes (e.g., humor, message discounting, tone) underlying our dehumanization‐reducing intervention.

Self-censorship is of great importance in societies involved in intractable conflict. In this context, it blocks information that may contradict the dominant conflict-supporting narratives. Thus, self-censorship often serves as an effective societal mechanism that prevents free flow and transparency of information regarding the conflict and therefore can be seen as a barrier for a peacemaking process. In an attempt to understand the potential effect of different factors on participants' willingness to self-censor (WSC) conflict-related information, we conducted three experimental studies in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Study 1 revealed that perception of distance from potential information recipients and their disseminating capabilities lead to higher WSC. Study 2 replicated these results and also showed that fulfilling different social roles has an effect on the WSC. Finally, study 3 revealed that the type of information has a major effect on WSC.

Self-censorship is of great importance in societies involved in intractable conflict. In this context, it blocks information that may contradict the dominant conflict-supporting narratives. Thus, self-censorship often serves as an effective societal mechanism that prevents free flow and transparency of information regarding the conflict and therefore can be seen as a barrier for a peacemaking process. In an attempt to understand the potential effect of different factors on participants' willingness to self-censor (WSC) conflict-related information, we conducted three experimental studies in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Study 1 revealed that perception of distance from potential information recipients and their disseminating capabilities lead to higher WSC. Study 2 replicated these results and also showed that fulfilling different social roles has an effect on the WSC. Finally, study 3 revealed that the type of information has a major effect on WSC.

People's actions toward a competitive outgroup can be motivated not only by their perceptions of the outgroup, but also by how they think the outgroup perceives the ingroup (i.e., meta-perceptions). Here, we examine the prevalence, accuracy, and consequences of meta-perceptions among American political partisans. Using a representative sample (n = 1,056) and a longitudinal convenience sample (n = 2,707), we find that Democrats and Republicans equally dislike and dehumanize each other but think that the levels of prejudice and dehumanization held by the outgroup party are approximately twice as strong as actually reported by a representative sample of Democrats and Republicans. Overestimations of negative meta-perceptions were consistent across samples over time and between demographic subgroups but were modulated by political ideology: More strongly liberal Democrats and more strongly conservative Republicans were particularly prone to exaggerate meta-perceptions. Finally, we show that meta-prejudice and meta-dehumanization are independently associated with the desire for social distance from members of the outgroup party and support for policies that harm the country and flout democratic norms to favor the ingroup political party. This research demonstrates that partisan meta-perceptions are subject to a strong negativity bias with Democrats and Republicans agreeing that the shadow of partisanship is much larger than it actually is, which fosters mutual intergroup hostility.

Self‐censorship, defined as an "act of intentionally and voluntarily withholding information from others in the absence of formal obstacles" often serves as a barrier to resolving intractable conflicts. Specifically, in order to protect the group, and in absence of objective constraints such as institutionalized censorship, individuals practice self‐censorship and support its practice by other society members. This prevents free flow and transparency of information, within a society, regarding the conflict and the adversary. In an attempt to investigate the factors that contribute to the functioning of self‐censorship as a sociopsychological barrier to conflict resolution, a longitudinal study was conducted among a large sample of Jews in Israel. The survey was administered in three waves: a few months before, during, and a few months after Israel's Operation Pillar of Defense in the Gaza Strip. The findings showed that armed confrontation can increase support for self‐censorship. In addition, the findings revealed that personal characteristics (e.g., authoritarianism, ethnocentrism, siege mentality) predicted support for self‐censorship, which, in turn, mediated the effect of personal characteristics on support for negotiations and for providing humanitarian aid. The theoretical as well as the applied implications of the findings are discussed.

Members of societies involved in an intractable conflict usually consider costs that stem from the continuation of the conflict as unavoidable and even justify for their collective existence. This perception is well-anchored in widely shared conflict-supporting narratives that motivate them to avoid information that challenges their views about the conflict. However, since providing information about such major costs as a method for moderating conflict-related views has not been receiving much attention, in this research, we explore this venue. We examine what kind of costs, and under what conditions, exposure to major costs of a conflict affects openness to information and conciliatory attitudes among Israeli Jews in the context of the intractable Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Study 1 (N = 255) revealed that interventions based on messages providing information on mental health cost, economic cost, and cost of the conflict to Israeli democracy had (almost) no significant effect on perceptions of the participants of these prices, openness to new information about the conflict, or support for conciliatory policies. However, the existing perceptions that participants had about the cost of the conflict to Israeli democracy were positively associated with openness to alternative information about the conflict and support for conciliatory policies. Therefore, in Study 2 (N = 255), we tested whether providing information about future potential costs to the two fundamental characteristics of Israel, a democracy or a Jewish state, created by the continuation of the conflict, will induce attitude change regarding the conflict. The results indicate that information on the future cost to the democratic identity of Israel significantly affected the attitude of the participants regarding the conflict, while the effect was moderated by the level of religiosity. For secular participants, this manipulation created more openness to alternative information about the conflict and increased support for conciliatory policies, but ...