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In the aftermath of series of catalytic events which pitted the West against the Muslim world as we enter the new millennium, Western-based strategists and policy makers have rekindled arguments postulating political Islam to be threat to Western hegemony in an increasingly divided world. Long regarded as embodiments of tolerant Islam which peacefully co-existed with modernisation and trappings of multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies, Southeast Asian states unexpectedly aroused much attention as potential breeding grounds for Muslim radicals. Rising occurrences of Islamist-related terrorist violence in Southeast Asia have been cited as evidence of surging radicalism among Southeast Asian Muslims. Acknowledging the challenge of radical Islam to the generally moderate approach of Southeast Asian Muslims, analysts have been inclined to locate the origins of such an obtrusive phenomenon to transnational contacts and networks formed in an increasingly globalised world. Such an attitude is reflected in the overblown military crusade against Al Qaeda and fervent campaign to root out its affiliates in Southeast Asia. Without discounting the significance of such transnational connections in politicising Islam in Southeast Asia in direction away from moderation, this paper, citing examples mostly from Malaysia and Indonesia as Muslim-majority states of the region, seeks to deconstruct the phenomenon in way that gives due recognition to local factors in re-igniting political Islam. The local factors, however, were not insular in the sense of being disconnected from the globalising process. Social and economic changes at grass roots levels are more important in the long term than catalytic events in ensuring whether or not responses to rapid political mutations could be maintained. These changes interacted with government policies vis-à-vis Islam and Muslims policies which were themselves influenced by globalisation, with multiple understandings attached to the notion.

Islam was officially installed as the religion of the Federation of Malaya upon independence on 31 August 1957, and retained as such after the formation of Malaysia on 16 September 1963. Since then, political stakeholders have not shied away from making the most of Islamic symbols, practices and institutions towards achieving national economic development or regime maintenance. Driven by hegemonic considerations, they largely ignored intra-Muslim religious variations. The religious uniformity of Malays, all of whom were Muslims by law, were literally taken for granted and served as a politically expedient vehicle for Islamic-based political mobilization by the Malay-dominated regime. Pluralist conceptions of Malaysian society were accepted only insofar as they pertain to Muslim-non-Muslim distinctions. At the core of the government's efforts to infuse the Malaysian polity with Islamic alternatives for socio-political arrangements is a gradual process of syariahization. However, owing to arbitrary interpretations of the syariah (Islamic law) by Malaysia's official Islamic gatekeepers, syariahization resulted in state-manufactured denial of freedom of religious expression to non-conformist Malay-Muslims. Until today, Muslim non-conformists are not allowed to adopt, let alone to propagate, different forms of Islam that run afoul of the version upheld by an officially sanctioned version of the syariah. As reflected by the case of the Sufi-inspired Darul Arqam movement, government-imposed syariahization has resulted in the violation of fundamental human rights of Malay-Muslims, regardless of the fact that the syariah itself may not have been clear-cut in determining the boundaries between religious orthodoxy and unorthodoxy in prescribing punishments for dissent.

Long regarded as an embodiment of tolerant Islam and peacefully co-existing with modernisation within a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society, Malaysia unexpectedly aroused much attention as a potential breeding ground for Muslim radicals in the aftermath of catalytic events which pitted the West against the Muslim world. Malaysian Muslims are said to be susceptible to Middle Eastern-originated radicalism, as exemplified in interlocking transnational contacts and agendas sowed between increasingly globalised Muslim networks adept in exploiting latest trappings of modernity. This article urges readers to engage in deeper reflection on the local dynamics of Malaysia's Islamisation process, in order to arrive at a more nuanced understanding of challenges posed by politically engaged Muslims in Malaysia. It is argued that, belying the regime's profession of a progressive Islam known as Islam Hadhari, Malaysia under Abdullah Ahmad Badawi's Premiership witnessed an abrupt escalation of inter-religious tension which not only threatened to disrupt communal harmony and nation-building, but also posed a security risk. The origins of such instability could arguably be located to the peculiar manner in which politically-laden Islam is applied by the regime, in particular by its home-nurtured Islamic bureaucracy. Adapted from the source document.

Without discounting the relevance of such a framework, this article seeks to look at the phenomenon of Islamism in Malaysia from the angle of Islamist civil society movements that are not directly involved in the domain of electoral politics, but that have nonetheless significantly in fenced political behavior of especially the majority Malay-Muslim population of Malaysia. The provisional impact of these new groupings form the main thread in our discussion, which narrows down to an investigation into the metamorphoses that have a?ected and transpired in two of the most influential civil society movements in contemporary Islamism in Malaysia, viz. ABIM and Darul Arqam.DOI:10.15408/sdi.v16i3.475

This paper traces changing patterns of Islamism in Malaysia, focusing on developments during Dr Mahathir Mohamad's final administration (1999-2003) and since Abdullah Ahmad Badawi assumed the premiership of the country on 31 October 2003. This period witnessed the making of a nascent Islamist civil society whose alliances have capriciously undergone realignments and reconfigurations in its endeavour to reach a stable equilibrium with non-Islamist forces. The emergence of a vibrant and burgeoning civil society in Malaysia has been characterized by lively vicissitudes in the relationship between its Islamist and non-Islamist elements. Having experienced a colourful and chequered relationship with the state and other Islamic movements since its official founding in 1971, the Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM: Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia) has, since its leadership rejuvenation in 2005, attempted to reassert its dominant place as an influential and legitimate voice of the Malay-Muslim masses, but with mixed ramifications. Adapted from the source document.

The economic success of Darul Arqam is cited to challenge the Weberist contention that Islamic models of economic development are fundamentally flawed. An overview of the Weberist understanding of the relationship between spirituality & economic growth is presented, emphasizing the perspective's reasons for disregarding Islamic societies' capacity to achieve economic development. The birth, evolution, & eventual decline of Darul Arqam is then reviewed; it is asserted that Darul Arqam's rejection of the corruption & favoritism characteristic of the Malaysian state made it a primary target upon the nation's religious & political elites. The central precepts of Darul Arqam's approach for realizing economic development are highlighted; specifically, it is claimed that the movement perceived economic growth as a means of achieving spiritual objectives & believed that the economic elite possessed an obligation to distribute its wealth to the poor. It is concluded that Darul Arqam's disassociation of economic development from the attainment of material objectives has significant implications for both Islamic societies & Weberist thought. J. W. Parker

This article examines the dynamics of radicalism and terrorism in Indonesia and Malaysia and how government from both countries responded to the rise of radicalism and terrorism. It discusses the development of terrorism in Southeast Asia from the period of Darul Islam in 1950s to Jama'ah Islamiyah in 2000s. In addition, it argues that Indonesia and Malaysia have become barometer of terrorism networks in Southeast Asia. Radicalism and terrorism networks also have transformed the character of Islam in Southeast Asia, and this certainly challenges the future of mainstream Muslims in the region who are recognized as maintaining moderate and peaceful Islam. This is based on interviews to terrorist and former terrorist detainees and government officials in Indonesia and Malaysia. It also comes from analysis of books and documents from radical-jihadist organizations and government. It recommends state and civil society policy to unite in preventing and countering radicalism and terrorism in Southeast Asia, especially in Indonesia and Malaysia.