Machine generated contents note: Introduction; 1. Lord Barham's Admiralty: 1805; 2. Admiralty reform, 1806-1835; 3. Decision-making at the Admiralty, c.1806-1830; 4. Admiralty administration and decision-making, c.1830-1868. The Graham Admiralty; 5. The Admiralty reformed again: context and problems, 1869-1885; 6. Administrative and policy-making responses, c.1882 onwards; 7. Fisher and Churchill, and their successors, 1902-1917; 8. The Naval Staff, planning and policy; 9. Lord Beatty's Admiralty; Conclusion
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In the early nineteenth-century Admiralty there was little policy-making, policy-makers were few and the word 'policy' was scarcely ever used. At least in peacetime, economy was the default principle of action. Only by a century later had something approximating the modern pattern emerged. The growth from the 1880s of better internal Admiralty financial control was an important causal factor. It sponsored the development of a bureaucratic organization concerned with financial policy-making, anticipating here the similar development in the planning of naval strategy and construction. Moreover, it encouraged Admiralty civil servants to involve themselves in wider matters of policy. Also relevant are attempts made by the Treasury, principally between the two world wars, to enforce more external financial controls, though these were against the background of fundamental defence problems that themselves greatly aided the concentration of minds.
The private secretaries, eventually private offices, of the lords of Admiralty and under-secretaries grew in importance, undertaking one function in particular that proved of value during total war - liaison. A basic division grew between the civilian and the military. By 1939-45, the sea lords' offices are more properly described as personal military staffs. The private office of the first lord, on the other hand, had developed from a purely personal instrument of the minister's into a crucial adjunct to the machinery under the permanent secretary, and was even part of a network that spread over Whitehall and beyond.
By early 1943 the OIC was almost fully developed, and had long been a vital part of the naval war effort. The staff processed a mass of intelligence, including decrypts from Bletchley Park, and passed it on as necessary for operational exploitation, often accompanied by good advice. The work was hectic and highly demanding, made more difficult by the cramped conditions of the offices, in the Admiralty `Citadel'. The OIC had been set up in 1937, but only the sinking of Glorious in 1940 finally consolidated its position. It depended increasingly on pay officers, the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, and civilian graduates, including women, and also in other ways was anomalous from the prewar naval staff point of view, even if it never became as `long hair' as Bletchley Park. The war forced the OIC to adapt, but it did not expand greatly after 1940. The chief personnel followed a cherished naval tradition, and strove to do their job with the resources at hand. They were encouraged to do this by restrictions on recruitment and space, but there was also the brief that the best results were gained by depending on a comparatively small number of first-class people, and overloading them with work.
