The Politics of Post-Truth
In: Critical review: a journal of politics and society, Volume 35, Issue 1-2, p. 40-62
ISSN: 1933-8007
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In: Critical review: a journal of politics and society, Volume 35, Issue 1-2, p. 40-62
ISSN: 1933-8007
In: Inquiry: an interdisciplinary journal of philosophy and the social sciences, Volume 67, Issue 2, p. 709-726
ISSN: 1502-3923
In: Inquiry: an interdisciplinary journal of philosophy and the social sciences, Volume 67, Issue 2, p. 704-708
ISSN: 1502-3923
In: Politics, philosophy & economics: ppe, Volume 22, Issue 3, p. 336-356
ISSN: 1741-3060
It is widely believed that open and public speech is at the heart of the democratic ideal. Public discourse is instrumentally epistemically valuable for identifying good policies, as well as necessary for resisting domination (e.g. by vocally challenging decision-makers, demanding public justifications, and using democratic speech to hold leaders accountable). But in our highly polarized and socially fragmented political environment, an increasingly pressing question is: Do actual democratic societies live up to the ideal of inclusive public speech? In this essay, I explore Maxime Lepoutre's defense of discursive democracy from the challenge of defective public discourse. I argue that political ignorance, dogmatism, and social fragmentation present more formidable challenges to discursive democracy than Lepoutre acknowledges.
In: Social epistemology: a journal of knowledge, culture and policy, Volume 38, Issue 3, p. 274-289
ISSN: 1464-5297
In: Politics, philosophy & economics: ppe, Volume 21, Issue 1, p. 29-54
ISSN: 1741-3060
It is widely believed that democracies require knowledgeable citizens to function well. But the most politically knowledgeable individuals tend to be the most partisan and the strength of partisan identity tends to corrupt political thinking. This creates a conundrum. On the one hand, an informed citizenry is allegedly necessary for a democracy to flourish. On the other hand, the most knowledgeable and passionate voters are also the most likely to think in corrupted, biased ways. What to do? This paper examines this tension and draws out several lessons. First, it is not obvious that more knowledgeable voters will make better political decisions. Second, attempts to remedy voter ignorance are problematic because partisans tend to become more polarized when they acquire more information. Third, solutions to citizen incompetence must focus on the intellectual virtue of objectivity. Fourth, some forms of epistocracy are troubling, in part, because they would increase the political power of the most dogmatic and biased individuals. Fifth, a highly restrictive form of epistocracy may escape the problem of political dogmatism, but epistocrats may face a steeper tradeoff between inclusivity and epistemic virtue than they would like.
Epistemic democracy is standardly characterized in terms of "aiming at truth". This presupposes a veritistic conception of epistemic value, according to which truth is the fundamental epistemic goal. I will raise an objection to the standard (veritistic) account of epistemic democracy, focusing specifically on deliberative democracy. I then propose a version of deliberative democracy that is grounded in non‐veritistic epistemic goals. In particular, I argue that deliberation is valuable because it facilitates empathetic understanding. I claim that empathetic understanding is an epistemic good that doesn't have truth as its primary goal.
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In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Volume 195, Issue 9, p. 4147-4168
ISSN: 1573-0964
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Volume 192, Issue 3, p. 769-786
ISSN: 1573-0964
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Volume 191, Issue 6, p. 1119-1146
ISSN: 1573-0964
"This edited volume is the first work purposefully designed to amplify the voices of Black men in communicating their mental health needs and challenges while fathering in their families and communities. Dr. Michael Hannon has convened a group of Black fathers and aspiring fathers, who are also professional counselors, and they offer unique and untapped perspectives about the needs, challenges, and victories of Black fathering across the family life cycle in the context of an anti-Black world. In each chapter, the contributors offer counselors and other mental health professionals a resource to assist them in providing culturally relevant and responsive support to Black fathers at various points across the family life cycle and more comprehensively understand the circumstances that might prompt - and prevent -Black fathers to seek counseling support"--
In: Mind Association Occasional Ser.
The first edited collection to explore one of the most rapidly growing area of philosophy: political epistemology. The volume brings together leading philosophers to explore ways in which the analytic and conceptual tools of epistemology bear on political philosophy--and vice versa.
In: Mind Association occasional series
In: Oxford scholarship online
Epistemological issues are at the center of our political lives. It has become increasingly difficult to discern legitimate sources of evidence, misinformation spreads faster than ever, and the role of truth in politics has allegedly decayed in recent years. It is therefore no coincidence that political discourse is currently saturated with epistemic notions like 'post-truth', 'fake news', 'truth decay', 'echo chambers', and 'alternative facts'. 'Political Epistemology' brings together leading philosophers to explore ways in which the analytic and conceptual tools of epistemology bear on political philosophy, and vice versa. It is organized around three broad themes: truth and knowledge in politics; epistemic problems for democracy; and disagreement and polarization.
In: Inquiry: an interdisciplinary journal of philosophy and the social sciences, p. 1-37
ISSN: 1502-3923
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Volume 199, Issue 1-2, p. 731-743
ISSN: 1573-0964
AbstractA common objection to both contextualism and relativism about knowledge ascriptions is that they threaten knowledge norms of assertion and action. Consequently, if there is good reason to accept knowledge norms of assertion or action, there is good reason to reject both contextualism and relativism. In this paper we argue that neither contextualism nor relativism threaten knowledge norms of assertion or action.