Suchergebnisse

"This paper sets out a political economy model where median voters who benefit from local income redistribution are affected by the fiscal burden of welfare payments to immigrants. The median voters also have cultural preferences. Immigrants are influenced in their relocation decision by welfare benefits in host countries. Uncoordinated, coordinated and leader-follower domestic welfare policies are compared. In the last case, the median voter in the follower country is better off than the median voter in the leader country because of a less generous welfare system and hence fewer immigrants." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

AbstractThe European Central Bank redistributes each year seigniorage from issuing euro notes to the National Central Banks of the euro countries. The key for this redistribution is, from 2008, based on the respective GDP and population proportions of the euro countries. Applying the distribution formula to the new EU countries from central and eastern Europe seems to give these countries a large net benefit compared with the seigniorage they bring in, i.e. their share of currency in circulation. However, as argued in this article, currency demand in the new EU member countries is expected to increase relative to the present group of euro countries – especially after gaining membership in the EMU because of integration of the financial markets and, in the longer term, catching‐up growth. Hence, it is doubtful whether a large unintended redistribution of seigniorage to the benefit of acceding EMU countries will materialize in the future.