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Despite broad public support, investment in US infrastructure has not kept pace with growth, population shifts, and rising exposure to climate change risks. One explanation lies in politicians' electoral incentives: because, in the short term, voters see only the costs of investment and not its benefits, politicians have incentive to pander and spend less than what they or their fully informed constituents would prefer. Local newspapers could help reduce this constraint by increasing politicians' confidence that voters will receive information that justifies higher spending. In a survey experiment, we found that informing US city and county elected officials about news coverage of infrastructure failures increased support for a costly investment for those in competitive electoral settings. When motivated by reelection, politicians need the benefits of investment to be visible in order to justify its costs. Our results demonstrate the political importance of the nonpolitical news covered in local newspapers.

Do voters punish incumbent legislators for raising service costs? Concern about electoral punishment is considered a leading obstacle to increasing taxes and fees to fund service provision, but empirical evidence of such backlash is surprisingly sparse. This paper examines whether voters hold local elected officials accountable for raising water service costs. Using 10 years of panel data on municipal elections and water rates in North Carolina, we find rate increases do not reduce incumbent city council members' vote shares. Local politicians may overestimate their electoral risk from raising taxes and fees to fund public services.

Collaboration among local governments occurs through a range of mechanisms, which vary in degree of formality from contracts and ad hoc agreements to full consolidation. Prior work indicates that local decision makers favor formal mechanisms when expected gains from less formal collaboration may not be realized. This article explicates the concept of collaboration risk, treating it as a product of the likelihood that collaboration fails and the severity of consequences should failure occur. We examine how characteristics of a local service contribute to collaboration risk and thereby influence the choice to consolidate service delivery. Focusing on the case of drinking water provision, we identify physical and financial features of service delivery that contribute to the likelihood and severity of collaboration failure. Drawing on seven case studies of water system consolidation, we then analyze the importance of these service characteristics in the choice to enter into consolidation agreements.