Can Non-point Phosphorus Emissions from Agriculture be Regulated Efficiently Using Input-Output Taxes?
In: Environmental and resource economics, Band 58, Heft 1, S. 109-125
ISSN: 1573-1502
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In: Environmental and resource economics, Band 58, Heft 1, S. 109-125
ISSN: 1573-1502
In: The journal of mathematical sociology, Band 36, Heft 2, S. 97-124
ISSN: 1545-5874
In: Environmental and resource economics, Band 58, Heft 4, S. 539-562
ISSN: 1573-1502
This paper shows that political attitudes are linked to cooperative behavior in an incentivized experiment with a large sample randomly drawn from the Danish population. However, this relationship depends on the way the experiment is framed. In the standard game in which subjects give to a public good, contributions are the same regardless of political attitudes. In an economically equivalent version, in which subjects take from a public good, left-wingers cooperate significantly more than subjects in the middle or to the right of the political spectrum. Through simulation techniques we find that this difference in the framing effect across political point of views is to some extent explained by differences in beliefs and basic cooperation preferences.
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This paper shows that political attitudes are linked to cooperative behavior in an incentivized experiment with a large sample randomly drawn from the Danish population. However, this relationship depends on the way the experiment is framed. In the standard game in which subjects give to a public good, contributions are the same regardless of political attitudes. In an economically equivalent version, in which subjects take from a public good, left-wingers cooperate significantly more than subjects in the middle or to the right of the political spectrum. Through simulation techniques we find that this difference in the framing effect across political point of views is to some extent explained by differences in beliefs and basic cooperation preferences.
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In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics: JITE, Band 170, Heft 2, S. 317-335
ISSN: 0932-4569
World Affairs Online
In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics: JITE, Band 170, Heft 2, S. 317
ISSN: 1614-0559
In: Fosgaard , T R , Hansen , L G & Wengström , E R 2017 ' Cooperation, framing and political attitudes ' Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen .
This paper shows that political attitudes are linked to cooperative behavior in an incentivized experiment with a large sample randomly drawn from the Danish population. However, this relationship depends on the way the experiment is framed. In the standard game in which subjects give to a public good, contributions are the same regardless of political attitudes. In an economically equivalent version, in which subjects take from a public good, left-wingers cooperate significantly more than subjects in the middle or to the right of the political spectrum. Through simulation techniques we find that this difference in the framing effect across political point of views is to some extent explained by differences in beliefs and basic cooperation preferences. ; This paper shows that political attitudes are linked to cooperative behavior in an incentivized experiment with a large sample randomly drawn from the Danish population. However, this relationship depends on the way the experiment is framed. In the standard game in which subjects give to a public good, contributions are the same regardless of political attitudes. In an economically equivalent version, in which subjects take from a public good, left-wingers cooperate significantly more than subjects in the middle or to the right of the political spectrum. Through simulation techniques we find that this difference in the framing effect across political point of views is to some extent explained by differences in beliefs and basic cooperation preferences.
BASE
In: Environmental and resource economics, Band 82, Heft 3, S. 507-528
ISSN: 1573-1502
AbstractEmission damages caused by small-scale polluters such as farms, vehicles, homes and small businesses are often location-specific and such polluters are often regulated through a combination of location-differentiated cleaner technology standards and uniform, ʻdirty' input regulation. We investigate how such regulations should be designed and combined under realistic assumptions. We find that if the available cleaner technologies are 'emission capturing' (e.g., end-of-pipe filters), they should be encouraged in both high and low damage areas, while if they are 'input displacing' (i.e., facilitating replacement of dirty input by cleaner input), they should be encouraged in high damage areas, but discouraged in low damage areas. Dirty input use should always be discouraged and the optimal regulation intensity may be substantial, particularly if the available cleaner technologies are input displacing.
In: NBER Working Paper No. w25615
SSRN
Working paper
In: CESifo Working Paper No. 7369
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Working paper
In: American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Band 88, Heft 4, S. 974-985
SSRN
Real life implies that public procurement contracting of renewable resources results in repeated interaction between a principal and the agents. The present paper analyses ratchet effects in contracting of renewable resources and how the presence of a resource constraint alters the "standard" ratchet effect result. We use a linear reward scheme to influence the incentives of the agents. It is shown that for some renewable resources we might end up both with more or with less pooling in the first-period compared to a situation without a resource constraint. The reason is that the resource constraint implies a smaller performance de-pendent bonus, which reduces the first-period cost from concealing information but at the same time the resource constraint may also imply that second-period benefits from this concealment for the efficient agent are reduced. In situations with high likelihood of first-period pooling, the appropriateness of applying lin-ear incentive schemes can be questioned.
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In: Land use policy: the international journal covering all aspects of land use, Band 112, S. 105798
ISSN: 0264-8377