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In this paper, the author raised the question of whether the separation of powers is a useless concept. It summarizes some critical arguments against the tripartite separation of powers. The paper deals with application issues related to the separation of powers and distinguishes several attitudes toward them, which it then analyses in more detail. Great attention is dedicated to formalism and functionalism. eventually, the author wonders whether it would be better to innovate the idea of separation of powers, or to dismiss and replace it with some other principle. He concludes that the separation of powers has problems, but we need to evaluate this idea in relation to its possible alternatives. In such a light it still sounds promising.

In this paper, the author raised the question of whether the separation of powers is a use - less concept. It points out to insufficient reflection of its theoretical and philosophical origins. The paper also distinguishes its components, which it then analyses in more detail. Great attention is dedicated to the tension between the system of checks and bal - ances and the institutional independence. It also examines the purpose of the separation of powers, warning that we can no longer seek it exclusively in the prevention of tyranny but rather in the optimization of government. At the end of the paper is emphasized the need to examine the question of how to solve tension between these components. ; In this paper, the author raised the question of whether the separation of powers is a use - less concept. It points out to insufficient reflection of its theoretical and philosophical origins. The paper also distinguishes its components, which it then analyses in more detail. Great attention is dedicated to the tension between the system of checks and bal - ances and the institutional independence. It also examines the purpose of the separation of powers, warning that we can no longer seek it exclusively in the prevention of tyranny but rather in the optimization of government. At the end of the paper is emphasized the need to examine the question of how to solve tension between these components.

This paper deals with the theory of needs as a possible justification of human rights. First, it defines the concept of need, which differs from the concept of want. It states that need is, by definition, objective in nature. The paper then analyses some concepts of need (especially those of David Miller and Massimo Renzo) and examines their advantages and disadvantages in relation to justification theories (for example James Griffin's approach which is based on the idea of normative agency). According to the author, these concepts have natural-law foundations and cannot deal, in particular, with the problem of transition from facts to norms. In addition, the requirements that we usually derive from needs retain too much uncertainty. In spite of these shortcomings, using them as arguments in law and even more in politics retains a great convincing power. Its sources are difficult to identify, however, it is an important concept we use in everyday life (though in a shifted meaning). Finally, the author concludes that although needs are not able to establish human rights in a satisfactory way – provided we renounce the universal nature of these rights – they can play a very useful and important role in justifying them in certain local contexts. ; This paper deals with the theory of needs as a possible justification of human rights. First, it defines the concept of need, which differs from the concept of want. It states that need is, by definition, objective in nature. The paper then analyses some concepts of need (especially those of David Miller and Massimo Renzo) and examines their advantages and disadvantages in relation to justification theories (for example James Griffin's approach which is based on the idea of normative agency). According to the author, these concepts have natural-law foundations and cannot deal, in particular, with the problem of transition from facts to norms. In addition, the requirements that we usually derive from needs retain too much uncertainty. In spite of these shortcomings, using them as arguments in law and even more in politics retains a great convincing power. Its sources are difficult to identify, however, it is an important concept we use in everyday life (though in a shifted meaning). Finally, the author concludes that although needs are not able to establish human rights in a satisfactory way – provided we renounce the universal nature of these rights – they can play a very useful and important role in justifying them in certain local contexts.

Článek reaguje na text Marka Káčera "Načo sa trápiť s otázkou existencie ľudských práv?", kterému vytýká, že dostatečně nerozlišuje mezi různými druhy práv (např. právy legálními a morálními, právy institucionálními a kritickými morálními), což následně vede k některým zmatením, a dále že se vymezuje vůči otázce, kterou si současní filosofové věnující se tématu lidských práv nekladou. Lidská práva totiž v současné filosofii nejsou chápána jako bizarní objekty existující v nějaké obdobě platónské říše idejí, ale jako normy, které platí na základě morálních důvodů. Právě tato pozice je v článku důkladněji představena a analyzována (včetně identifikace některých jejích výhod oproti pragmatickému myšlenkovému rámci, v němž doporučuje uvažovat o lidských právech Marek Káčer).

This paper analyzes Robert Alexy's explicative-existential justification of human rights. According to the author, there are two problems connected with this concept. It cannot establish human rights universally and explain why we should accept them. In the paper, these questions are addressed in the context of the Is-Ought problem. Alexy's approach is compared with other theories that strive for human rights justification (basic needs approach, capability approach, and the foundationalism of Alan Gewirth). The author finds that in this respect all other theories have similar disadvantages. The inability to adequately elucidate the transition from Is to Ought is a general problem in moral philosophy, and therefore cannot diminish the position of Alexy's justification in this context. Although his approach does not really meet certain absolute requirements for good justification, if we evaluate it in relation to other available alternatives, we have to acknowledge its significant place in the philosophy of human rights. Even with Alexy's theory, however, the problem persists that it establishes rights of human persons rather than rights of human beings. It is therefore not able to fulfill some of its universalist aspirations.

Článek se zabývá tím, zda je koncept lidských práv slučitelný s utilitaristickou etikou. Nejprve stručně charakterizuje utilitarismus a upozorňuje na některá zkreslení a dezinterpretace tohoto směru. Následně se věnuje i rozlišení různých způsobů, jak můžeme chápat lidská práva (zejména jejich pojetí coby legálních a morálních práv). V souvislosti s jejich utilitaristickým ospravedlněním si pak klade dvě stěžejní otázky: 1) Podle některých autorů je s tímto etickým směrem slučitelná pouze idea legálních práv. Dává v jeho kontextu vůbec smysl hovořit o lidských právech coby určitém specifickém druhu morálních práv? 2) Jak máme postupovat, když k maximalizaci užitku přispívá porušení nějakého lidského práva? Nenutí nás taková situace zvolit si mezi utilitarismem a lidskými právy? Tento text ukazuje, že pokud chápeme utilitarismus správným, a nikoliv zkresleným způsobem, poskytuje nám na obě otázky uspokojivé odpovědi. Lidská práva coby určitá morální práva lze v jeho kontextu chápat jako součást pozitivní morálky, která by nejvíce přispívala k maximalizaci užitku. Pokud do našich úvah zahrneme všechny relevantní faktory, nemusíme se nakonec ani obávat toho, že by nás utilitaristická etika ve skutečném světě nutila k přijetí problematických závěrů stran dodržování uvedených práv.

Objasnění přechodu od faktů k normám patří mezi klíčové problémy právní filosofie i etiky. Autor v článku zkoumá, jakým způsobem se jej pokouší vyřešit různé justifikační teorie lidských práv. Nejprve charakterizuje lidská práva jako kritická morální práva a objasňuje, v jakém smyslu o nich můžeme říci, že existují. Následně popisuje samotný is-ought problém a analyzuje, proč se s ním některé přístupy nedokáží adekvátně vypořádat. Nejdříve se soustředí na justifikaci lidských práv prostřednictvím konceptu základních potřeb a schopností, posléze na explikativně-existenciální zdůvodnění Roberta Alexyho. Největší pozornost však věnuje justifikační teorii, kterou zkonstruoval jeden z hlavních reprezentantů etického racionalismu Alan Gewirth. Podle autora se totiž jedná o zatím nejvíce promyšlený pokus, jak se s uvedeným problémem na poli lidských práv vyrovnat. V poslední části článku autor formuluje své vlastní stanovisko k němu. Východiskem podle něj je přestat klást na zdůvodnění těchto práv absolutní požadavky, ale začít posuzovat jeho silné a slabé stránky ve vztahu ke koncepcím, které mu konkurují.

In this paper, the author raised the question of whether the separation of powers is a useless concept. It summarizes some critical arguments against the tripartite separation of powers. The paper deals with application issues related to the separation of powers and distinguishes several attitudes toward them, which it then analyses in more detail. Great attention is dedicated to formalism and functionalism. Eventually, the author wonders whether it would be better to innovate the idea of separation of powers, or to dismiss and replace it with some other principle. He concludes that the separation of powers has problems, but we need to evaluate this idea in relation to its possible alternatives. In such a light it still sounds promising.

In this paper, the author raised the question of whether the separation of powers is a useless concept. It summarizes some critical arguments against the tripartite separation of powers. The paper deals with application issues related to the separation of powers and distinguishes several attitudes toward them, which it then analyses in more detail. Great attention is dedicated to formalism and functionalism. Eventually, the author wonders whether it would be better to innovate the idea of separation of powers, or to dismiss and replace it with some other principle. He concludes that the separation of powers has problems, but we need to evaluate this idea in relation to its possible alternatives. In such a light it still sounds promising. ; In this paper, the author raised the question of whether the separation of powers is a useless concept. It summarizes some critical arguments against the tripartite separation of powers. The paper deals with application issues related to the separation of powers and distinguishes several attitudes toward them, which it then analyses in more detail. Great attention is dedicated to formalism and functionalism. Eventually, the author wonders whether it would be better to innovate the idea of separation of powers, or to dismiss and replace it with some other principle. He concludes that the separation of powers has problems, but we need to evaluate this idea in relation to its possible alternatives. In such a light it still sounds promising.

Normy profesní etiky často stanoví advokátům při výkonu jejich profese odlišné standardy chování, než jaké by v totožné situaci platily pro obyčejného člověka. Článek se zabývá otázkou, jak můžeme tyto rozdíly ospravedlnit prostřednictvím různých etických teorií. Autor v něm nejprve charakterizuje profesní etiku advokátů jako soubor právních a morálních norem. Následně analyzuje samotný problém její justifikace. Pozornost je věnována nejprve různým deontologickým přístupům (např. Charles Fried, David Luban). Autor rozebírá jejich nedostatky a dospívá k závěru, že musí primárně zdůrazňovat význam morálního a racionálního aktérství, pokud mají být věrohodné. Vstřícně se pak staví k utilitaristickému ospravedlnění. Také to je podle něj v kombinaci s některými pragmatickými hledisky schopno profesní etiku advokátů věrohodně justifikovat. Obě skupiny přístupů lze tedy považovat za relevantní a není proto vhodné z debat o výše uvedené etice některý z nich vylučovat.

This paper deals with the theory of needs as a possible justification of human rights. First, it defines the concept of need, which differs from the concept of want. It states that need is, by definition, objective in nature. The paper then analyses some concepts of need (especially those of David Miller and Massimo Renzo) and examines their advantages and disadvantages in relation to justification theories (for example James Griffin's approach which is based on the idea of normative agency). According to the author, these concepts have natural-law foundations and cannot deal, in particular, with the problem of transition from facts to norms. In addition, the requirements that we usually derive from needs retain too much uncertainty. In spite of these shortcomings, using them as arguments in law and even more in politics retains a great convincing power. Its sources are difficult to identify, however, it is an important concept we use in everyday life (though in a shifted meaning). Finally, the author concludes that although needs are not able to establish human rights in a satisfactory way – provided we renounce the universal nature of these rights – they can play a very useful and important role in justifying them in certain local contexts.

In this paper, the author raised the question of whether the separation of powers is a use-less concept. It points out to insufficient reflection of its theoretical and philosophical origins. The paper also distinguishes its components, which it then analyses in more detail. Great attention is dedicated to the tension between the system of checks and bal-ances and the institutional independence. It also examines the purpose of the separation of powers, warning that we can no longer seek it exclusively in the prevention of tyranny but rather in the optimization of government. At the end of the paper is emphasized the need to examine the question of how to solve tension between these components.