Suchergebnisse

On sait peu de choses sur l'action municipale du Hezbollah, bien que près de 15 % des conseils municipaux libanais soient élus sur ses listes. Un premier examen de la question révèle comment les maires du parti doivent conjuguer dans leur travail de gestion locale plusieurs cadres institutionnels : partisan, légal et territorial. Trois conseils municipaux dirigés par des cadres partisans sont étudiés ici afin de montrer les priorités et les valeurs de gestion municipale en relation notamment avec la place qu'y occupe la pensée islamique. Les communes du Hezbollah sont pleinement investies par leurs conseils municipaux qui impulsent une action de développement dynamique, soutenue par des réseaux publics et privés ainsi que par des donateurs régionaux et internationaux. Les valeurs guidant le développement local – le professionnalisme et la rationalité – sont ancrées dans les soucis d'efficacité et de savoir scientifique ; elles se veulent aussi inclusives, avantageant la proximité sociale et l'apport des femmes et des jeunes. L'islamisme, quand il existe, se décline dans les discours de légitimation en amont du travail municipal et s'apparente plus à une moralité justifiant la nécessité de l'action sociale. La spécificité de la gestion locale par le Hezbollah n'est donc pas associée à des valeurs islamiques mais à des stratégies de mobilisation politique propres à la consolidation de « la société de la Résistance » du parti.

We know very little of Hezbollah's municipal action, although 15% of Lebanese Municipal Councils are elected from their ranks. A preliminary examination of the question reveals how the mayors of the party must cooperate in their work of local management with numerous institutional frameworks: partisan, legal, and territorial. Three municipal councils directed by partisan cadres are presented here in order to demonstrate the priorities and values of municipal management in relation to the place it occupies in Islamic thought. The Hezbollah townships are fully invested with municipal councils that push a dynamic development action, supported by public and private networks as well as by regional and international donors. The values guiding local development -- professionalism and rationality -- are anchored in the preoccupation with efficacy and scientific knowledge; wishing to be inclusive, they prioritize social proximity and the input of women and the young. Islamism, when it exists, declines in the discourse of legitimation in favor of municipal labor and appears more as a morality justifying social action. The specificity of local management by Hezbollah is thus not associated with Islamic values but with strategies of mobilization that are proper to the consolidation of "the society of Resistance" of the party. Adapted from the source document.

South Beirut has recently become a vibrant leisure destination with a plethora of cafés and restaurants that cater to the young, fashionable, and pious. What effects have these establishments had on the moral norms, spatial practices, and urban experiences of this Lebanese community? From the diverse voices of young Shi'i Muslims searching for places to hang out, to the Hezbollah officials who want this media-savvy generation to be more politically involved, to the religious leaders worried that Lebanese youth are losing their moral compasses, Leisurely Islam provides a sophisticated and orig

Introduction Mobilisations sociales et politiques chiites : du Jabal Amel à la Dahiye Les organisations du Hezbollah : une action holistique et rationalisée La production et le maintien d'une "societe" Hezbollah Le Hezbollah et l'Etat : logiques de l'échange politique Conclusion : Le Hezbollah : de la Dahiye à Beyrouth

Many non-scholarly and scholarly accounts on the societies, culture, and political economy of the Middle East post-"Arab Uprisings/Spring" still deal with cities and regions as mere repositories of social, cultural, political, and economic action—despite the spatial turn that has informed social sciences and humanities for more than three decades.[1] Indeed, they often overlook the shaping roles of the built and natural environments in the production of events unraveling in cities and regions of the Middle East. We thus need to understand cities and regions not only as backgrounds and contexts for processes and practices, but rather as environments that have determining impacts on these, and that human interactions also shape. Since its launch in September 2013, Jadaliyya's Cities Page has been committed to producing such informed, empirical, and integrated knowledge, where the spatial engages and intersects with historical, political, economic, technological, legal, social, and cultural analysis. These are some of the questions we committed to address five years ago: How and why does urban space contribute to public action and social movements? What is the relationship between power, space, and resistance? How do different groups utilize space to mobilize and facilitate collective action? Which forces that shape space (physical and technological, as well as social, historical, political, and economic) are combined to guide this action? More broadly, how do specific historical, national policies, and global forces shape cities? How are different inequalities constituted by urban life and how do they reconstitute the city? How do the ordinary practitioners of the city negotiate, navigate, appropriate, resist, and transform urban forms?

Many non-scholarly and scholarly accounts on the societies, culture, and political economy of the Middle East post-"Arab Uprisings/Spring" still deal with cities and regions as mere repositories of social, cultural, political, and economic action—despite the spatial turn that has informed social sciences and humanities for more than three decades.[1] Indeed, they often overlook the shaping roles of the built and natural environments in the production of events unraveling in cities and regions of the Middle East. We thus need to understand cities and regions not only as backgrounds and contexts for processes and practices, but rather as environments that have determining impacts on these, and that human interactions also shape. Since its launch in September 2013, Jadaliyya's Cities Page has been committed to producing such informed, empirical, and integrated knowledge, where the spatial engages and intersects with historical, political, economic, technological, legal, social, and cultural analysis. These are some of the questions we committed to address five years ago: How and why does urban space contribute to public action and social movements? What is the relationship between power, space, and resistance? How do different groups utilize space to mobilize and facilitate collective action? Which forces that shape space (physical and technological, as well as social, historical, political, and economic) are combined to guide this action? More broadly, how do specific historical, national policies, and global forces shape cities? How are different inequalities constituted by urban life and how do they reconstitute the city? How do the ordinary practitioners of the city negotiate, navigate, appropriate, resist, and transform urban forms?

What might the wreckage of a former prison in south Lebanon that was destroyed during Israeli bombardment in 2006 have in common with a series of "family-oriented" amusement parks built by a corporate investment group? How might these sites be related to an ecotourism facility high in the mountains above Saida and the 70-some cafés and restaurants that have opened in the southern suburbs of Beirut since 2000? Aside from being fieldsites in our ongoing research on Islam and leisure in Lebanon, these places are significant to the political party Hizbullah. They tell us something about the relationship of culture to politics in the Hizbullah community, and they can be considered part of a recently emergent "Islamic milieu" in Lebanon.

The labelling career of the Lebanese armed group and political party Hizbullah is an interesting case with which to investigate the epistemological consequences of the politics of naming. Having found itself since its inception in the mid-1980s on the receiving end of mainly US and Israeli policy makers' and analysts' scorn for being an archetypical terrorist organisation, Hizbullah has been surprisingly successful in achieving its stated aims and in enduring the verbal and military onslaught against it. Although it is not the intention here to reduce explanations for Hizbullah's durability to discursive politics, this article suggests that both the labelling of Hizbullah as terrorist and, conversely, its identification as a "lebanonised" political force that is about to make its conversion into an unarmed political party are misleading and incapable of grasping this organisation's complexities. (InWent/GIGA)