This is a study of agency in the field of criminal liability through an examination of three types of organisation: corporate actors in the field of business activity, states and governments, and delinquent or criminal organisations. It considers both the respective roles of individuals and organisations, and the allocation of criminal responsibility to these different kinds of actor.
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Introduction -- The meaning of uplift in Punjab -- British Evangelicals vs Belgian Catholics -- The communication of Christianity -- Living in new traditions -- Visions of the future -- Conclusion -- Appendix: Capuchin missionaries arriving in and leaving Punjab, 1889-1930
In: Legal issues of economic integration: law journal of the Europa Instituut and the Amsterdam Center for International Law, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Band 46, Heft 4, S. 363-386
Enforcement of the EU competition rules, especially in relation to cartels and cartelists, involves a complex jurisdictional patchwork, characterise by inconsistency but also a strong public rhetoric which masks policy and practical differences, Application of the rules to different legal categories of actor, geographical and jurisdictional diversity, and the uneven use of enforcement measures and sanctions give rise to a number of rule of law issues in the form of inconsistent treatment, uncertainty and lack of proportionality. The discussion here maps out and illustrates these problems and suggests that these should be addressed through a more critical consideration of the claims made for deterrence as an enforcement imperative in this context.
Discussion and argument concerning the deterrent impact of anticartel enforcement measures have gained in significance and controversy as the whole regulatory enterprise and rhetoric of cartel regulation has expanded and developed. Regulators have become ever more emphatic in the denunciation of business cartels, and deterrence has therefore assumed a significant role in the justification of a stronger and more determined effort of legal control. In particular, cartelists need to be deterred into whistle blowing for leniency programs to work, and businesses need to be deterred into compliance to achieve the ultimate regulatory goal. Deterrence (rather than, for instance, economic redistribution or retributive justice) then becomes a leading, perhaps the leading objective within the legal control of cartels. Yet claims of deterrent effect are notoriously difficult to measure and assess. The discussion here examines the underlying problems of penetrating and measuring the deterrent impact of anticartel policies and sanctions and considers the possible methodologies for assessing deterrence in this context.
Cover -- Title Page -- Contents -- List of Contributors -- Introduction: Criminal versus Quasi-criminal Enforcement - Setting the Scene -- PART I: THE ORIGINS OF QUASI-CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS: A COMPARATIVE JOURNEY THROUGH EUROPE -- 1. The Origin and Development of Quasi-criminal Enforcement Mechanisms in Europe: Nordic Perspective -- 2. Swiss Peculiarities of the Enforcement Mechanisms in Core, Secondary and Administrative Criminal Law -- 3. Quasi-criminal Enforcement Mechanisms in Germany: Past and Present -- 4. Quasi-criminal Sanctions in Central Europe - Their Origins and Evolution -- 5. The Interplay between Criminal and Quasi-criminal Enforcement Mechanisms in the UK Context Explored through the Prism of 'Market Abuse': Current Approaches and Historical Perspectives -- PART II: CRIMINAL, CIVIL, ADMINISTRATIVE … WHAT'S IN A NAME? DISENTANGLING CONCEPTS, SELECTED TOPICS -- A. General Part of Criminal Law -- 6. Quasi-criminal Enforcement in Criminal Law and Penal Theory: What Would Herbert Packer Say? -- 7. Four Dimensions of Nulla Poena Sine Culpa: The Principle of Individual Culpability in Contexts of Criminal and Quasi-criminal Law Enforcement in Europe -- 8. Non-conviction Based Confiscation: Moving the Confiscation of Criminal Proceeds from the Criminal to the 'Civil' Sphere: Benefits, Issues and Two Procedural Aspects -- B. Special Part of Criminal Law -- 9. 'Crimmigration' and Human Rights: Immigration Detention at the European Court of Human Rights -- 10. Cartel Offences: Quasi-criminal Enforcement for Criminal Behaviour? -- 11. Protection of Procedural Rights in Administrative and Criminal Proceedings: The Case of the Privilege against Self-incrimination in Belgian Customs Law -- PART III: TOWARD A MORE COHERENT TERMINOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK IN EUROPE.
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This article addresses supranational governance of EU criminal justice agencies from the perspective of the various agencies of policy and rulemaking who have contributed to the impressive developments in the field of EU criminal law. Taking as a working hypothesis the happenstance and haphazard character of this field of policy and law, it suggests that there is an absence of design. In the discussion the article proposes the Platonic analogy of the 'ship of fools' (Plato, Republic, Book VI) as an explanatory tool. The ship's captain is the guiding spirit of criminal law, but the crew of the ship, who have the power to take control, have diverse interests and ideas about how the ship should be taken to sea and navigated. The article addresses thematically and chronologically the development of EU criminal policy by means of this framework. Subsequently it discusses the extent to which the 'ship of fools' analogy is relevant to the development of EU criminal justice agencies, and to the emergence of a European Public Prosecutor. Underlying all this discussion is the uneasy sense that the true pilot of EU criminal law and policy has been displaced, in particular by 'instrumental' pilots of securitisation and effectiveness.