Suchergebnisse

Potato ranks second staple food crop in Kenya. The Government seeks rapid yield growth in the potato subsector, however with only 2% of potato seed planted currently certified there is a persistent shortage of quality seed. There is no consensus on an appropriate model for quality seed assurance which can ensure increased availability and access to quality seed by smallholder farmers, while minimizing risk of spread of plant diseases. This study addressed the question of whether the current seed regulatory framework in Kenya and its implementation meets the need for increased availability and access to quality seed potato, for who, and with what consequences? Secondary data and policy analysis were complemented by semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions involving 72 stakeholders from public, private and civil society conducted in the major potato production areas, and at national level. Our findings show a range of different actors have different and sometimes conflicting interests. Seed potato needs to be produced on a large-scale with enough land and resources to meet rotation and isolation standards and inspection costs. However, this has implications for equitable participation in the seed potato industry. Current regulatory and inspection procedures are perceived by small-scale seed producers as policing rather than facilitating quality seed production. This highlights compromises between achieving short term food security and managing risk of spread of plant diseases. The feasibility of different approaches to manage bacterial wilt and potato cyst nematode are discussed with implications for different scales of seed production. Several policy options are reviewed, with their trade-offs, emphasising the need to for inclusive stakeholder consultations to negotiate towards a common interest space. ; Non-PR ; IFPRI5; CRP3.4; CRP2; 1 Fostering Climate-Resilient and Sustainable Food Supply; 3 Building Inclusive and Efficient Markets, Trade Systems, and Food Industry; Capacity Strengthening ; DSGD; PIM ; CGIAR Research Program on Roots, Tuber, and Bananas (RTB); CGIAR Research Programs on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM)

Although Uruguay has only a small number of agricultural R&D agencies, the intensity with which the country invests in agricultural R&D is comparatively high, especially by developing-country standards. In 1996 total agricultural R&D expenditure as a share of agricultural GDP was 1.7 percent. ; PR ; IFPRI2; GRP31; Theme 10; Subtheme 10.2; Pro-poor science and technology policies; ASTI ; ISNAR

Si bien en Uruguay existen escasas agencias de I&D agropecuario, la intensidad de inversión del país en este tipo de investigación es comparativamente elevada, especialmente para un país en desarrollo. En 1996, el gasto total en I&D agropecuario representaba el 1,7 por ciento del PIB agropecuario. El Instituto Nacional de Investigación Agropecuaria (INIA), que se originó en los antiguos departamentos de investigación agrícola y ganadera del gobierno en 1989, es la principal agencia de I&D agropecuario del país. En 1996, el INIA contaba con el 47 por ciento del gasto total en I&D agropecuario de Uruguay y empleaba al 40 por ciento del total de los investigadores. El INIA es un instituto peculiar, comparado con otras agencias nacionales de investigación agropecuaria en América Latina debido a que goza de amplia independencia administrativa respecto del gobierno uruguayo y a su innovador mecanismo de financiación. En los años 90, casi el 30 por ciento de sus fondos procedía de un impuesto de 0,4 por ciento sobre el valor de la producción agropecuaria, aportando el gobierno fondos equivalentes. Las Facultades de Agronomía y Veterinaria de la Universidad de la República empleaban el 29 y 17 por ciento del personal total de investigación agropecuaria, respectivamente las otras tres agencias que se incluyen en el presente informe tenían participaciones menores en el total nacional. Las inversiones propios en I&D de agencias privadas con fines de lucro son mínimas y, a menudo, ad-hoc. -- Resumen ; Non-PR ; IFPRI2; GRP31; Theme 10; Subtheme 10.2; Pro-poor science and technology policies; ASTI ; ISNAR

In many developing countries, smallholder farmers cultivating vegetatively propagated crops (VPCs) have limited access to quality planting material. This constraint can limit both the yield of and returns on VPC cultivation. Yet policy and regulatory initiatives designed to strengthen access to quality VPC planting materials have been relatively unsuccessful to date. Part of the problem is the unique biological and economic characteristics of vegetative propagation and its distinctness from cereal crops, which dominate narratives on seed system reforms. Drawing on qualitative analysis of policy and practice, this study examines reform options related to quality assurance regulations in four crop-country combinations: cassava in Nigeria and Vietnam, and potato in Kenya and Vietnam. The study highlights theory and evidence on existing models of regulation; alternative models that may better incentivize cost-effective multiplication and distribution; and recommendations for policy, regulation, and investment in VPC seed markets. Findings indicate that regulations designed around strict and centralized quality control systems tend to limit market size, while more localized production systems are limited by both capacity and reach. These findings suggest the need for alternatives that balance a permissive regulatory regime with decentralized production systems, grassroots capacity development, market surveillance, and systems that integrate internal (producer-level) quality assurance with external (regulatory) quality assurance. ; Non-PR ; IFPRI1; CRP2; CRP3.4; 1 Fostering Climate-Resilient and Sustainable Food Supply; 3 Building Inclusive and Efficient Markets, Trade Systems, and Food Industry; 5 Strengthening Institutions and Governance ; EPTD; DSGD; PIM ; CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM); CGIAR Research Program on Roots, Tuber, and Bananas (RTB)

Seed systems for vegetatively propagated crops (VPCs) are frequently governed by a regulatory blueprint designed for major cereal crops. This approach tends to disregard the distinct biological characteristics of VPCs, in turn limiting farmers' access to high-quality planting material and increasing the risk of pest and disease transmission. In this paper, we ask what type of regulatory framework is appropriate for improving farmers' access to quality VPC planting material, and what the costs, benefits, risks, and unintended consequences are of alternative regulations. We explore this in the context of cassava and potato in Vietnam through secondary data and document analysis, key informant interviews, and focus group discussions. Findings indicate that despite a regulatory regime that imposes strict rules on the production and trade of planting material for VPCs, the market is largely unregulated due to weak enforcement capacity. In the absence of regulatory enforcement, however, producers and traders of VPC planting material signal quality to farmers through trust, reputation, and long-term relationships. Though effective at a small and localized scale, these informal systems are unlikely to accommodate the plans for rapid expansion of the cassava and potato sectors outlined in the Government of Vietnam's strategy for growth and development. Nor are they likely to prove effective in managing increases in pest and disease pressures that result from cross-border trade, climate change, or other factors. We discuss alternative policy approaches and argue that the most appropriate policy regime requires that a careful balance be struck between a permissive regime at the local level and strict regulatory surveillance and enforcement at the national and regional level.

Seed systems for vegetatively propagated crops (VPCs) are frequently governed by a regulatory blueprint designed for major cereal crops. This approach tends to disregard the distinct biological characteristics of VPCs, in turn limiting farmers' access to high-quality planting material and increasing the risk of pest and disease transmission. In this paper, we ask what type of regulatory framework is appropriate for improving farmers' access to quality VPC planting material, and what the costs, benefits, risks, and unintended consequences are of alternative regulations. We explore this in the context of cassava and potato in Vietnam through secondary data and document analysis, key informant interviews, and focus group discussions. Findings indicate that despite a regulatory regime that imposes strict rules on the production and trade of planting material for VPCs, the market is largely unregulated due to weak enforcement capacity. In the absence of regulatory enforcement, however, producers and traders of VPC planting material signal quality to farmers through trust, reputation, and long-term relationships. Though effective at a small and localized scale, these informal systems are unlikely to accommodate the plans for rapid expansion of the cassava and potato sectors outlined in the Government of Vietnam's strategy for growth and development. Nor are they likely to prove effective in managing increases in pest and disease pressures that result from cross-border trade, climate change, or other factors. We discuss alternative policy approaches and argue that the most appropriate policy regime requires that a careful balance be struck between a permissive regime at the local level and strict regulatory surveillance and enforcement at the national and regional level. ; IFPRI5; CRP2; CRP3.4; 1 Fostering Climate-Resilient and Sustainable Food Supply; 3 Building Inclusive and Efficient Markets, Trade Systems, and Food Industry ; DSGD; PIM ; Non-PR ; CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM); CGIAR Research Program on Roots, Tuber, and Bananas (RTB)