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The study of democratic theory and democratic politics is at the core of the discipline of political science. Yet the very centrality of democracy to the discipline may be what makes it difficult to sort out whether political science is doing the work of democracy rather than simply the analysis of it. Political science's origins were civic minded but it has evolved into a more professionalized observer of politics than a promoter or creator of democracy. Nonetheless, in recent years there has been, as in many disciplines, a renewed interest in the civic component of our work and a challenge to the dominant paradigms of disinterested analysis and formal modeling. There are promising developments in political science that are contributing to the deliberative democracy "movement," both in research and pedagogy.

AbstractThis article summarizes the previous behavior of presidents subjected to independent counsel investigations, and compares President Donald Trump's behavior to theirs. It concludes that while Trump's behavior is part of a larger pattern of presidential use of various executive prerogatives to try to counteract independent counsels, it departs from that pattern in several distinct ways. I conclude that several developments in the broader political environment over the last several decades have contributed to his distinctive behavior, including the highly fragmented media market, the degree of partisan polarization in the electorate, the conservative populist distrust of federal law enforcement, and the mainstreaming of the unitary executive theory in the courts and executive branch.

AbstractIn the debate about the legitimacy of judicial supremacy, Cooper v. Aaron, the Little Rock desegregation case, is identified by both sides as critical to their argument. Defenders insist that Cooper exemplifies the need for a final authority in matters constitutional. Critics argue that the Court was wrong as a matter of democratic theory or empirical reality. In this article I argue that while it is true as a matter of empirical reality that the Court's interpretation is not the final word, the Court's assertion can be defended nonetheless. Relying on archival sources from the case, I explore the conditions under which the Court made the claim. To defend Cooper, however, does not require the defense of all assertions of judicial supremacy. I conclude by offering a preliminary analysis of how we might distinguish between more legitimate assertions of judicial supremacy and less legitimate ones.