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A corporate leniency program provides relief from government penalties to the first member of a cartel to come forward and cooperate with the authorities. This study explores the incentives to apply for leniency when each cartel member has private information as to the likelihood that the competition authority will be able to convict them without a cooperating firm. A firm may apply for leniency because it fears being convicted or because it fears another firm will apply. Policies by the competition authority to magnify concerns about pre-emption - and thereby induce greater use of the leniency program - are explored.

Price-fixing is characterized when firms are concerned about creating suspicions that a cartel has formed. Antitrust laws have a complex effect on pricing as they interact with the conditions determining the internal stability of the cartel. Dynamics are driven by two forces - the sensitivity of detection to price movements causes a cartel to gradually raise price while the sensitivity of penalties to the price level induces the cartel to lower price over time in order to maintain the stability of the cartel. While antitrust laws can lower collusive prices, they can also raise them by making it easier for firms to collude.

Standard methods in the U.S. for calculating antitrust damages in price-fixing cases is shown to create a strategic incentive for firms to price above the non-collusive price after the cartel has dissolved. This results in an overestimate of the but for price and an underestimate of the level of damages. The extent of this upward bias in the but for price is greater, the longer the cartel was in place and the more concentrated is the industry.

Price dynamics are characterized when a price-fixing cartel is concerned about creating suspicions of the presence of a cartel A dynamical extension of static models yields the counterfactual prediction that the cartel initially raises price and then gradually lowers it An alternative specification generates a more plausible result that the cartel gradually raises price For that specification the long-run cartel price is found to be decreasing in the damage multiple but is independent of the level of fixed fines A more stringent standard for calculating damages is shown to induce the cartel to price higher

Motivated by recent cartel practices, a stable collusive agreement is characterized when firms' prices and quantities are private information. Conditions are derived whereby an equilibrium exists in which firms truthfully report their sales and then make transfers within the cartel based on these reports. The properties of this equilibrium fit well with the cartel agreements in a number of markets including citric acid, lysine, and vitamins. (JEL D43, D82, K21, L12, L61, L65)

In the context of an infinitely repeated capacity-constrained price game, we endogenize the composition of a cartel when .rms are heterogeneous in their capacities. When .rms are sufficiently patient, there exists a stable cartel involving the largest .rms. A .rm with sufficiently small capacity is not a member of any stable cartel. When a cartel is not all-inclusive, colluding firms set a price that serves as an umbrella with non-cartel members pricing below it and producing at capacity. Contrary to previous work, our results suggest that the most severe coordinated e¡èects may come from mergers involving moderate-sized firms, rather than the largest or smallest firms.

To explore the efficacy of a corporate leniency program, a Markov process is constructed which models the stochastic formation and demise of cartels. Cartels are born when given the opportunity and market conditions are right, while cartels die because of internal collapse or they are caught and convicted by the antitrust authority. The likelihood that a cartel, once identified, is convicted depends inversely on the caseload of the antitrust authority due to an implicit resource constraint. The authority also chooses an enforcement policy in terms of the fraction of non-leniency cases that it prosecutes. Using numerical analysis, the impact of a leniency program on the steady-state cartel rate is investigated. Holding the enforcement policy of the antitrust authority fixed, a leniency program lowers the frequency of cartels. However, the additional caseload provided by the leniency program induces the antitrust authority to prosecute a smaller fraction of cartel cases identified outside of the program. Because of this less aggressive enforcement policy, it is possible that the cartel rate is higher when there is a leniency program.

An organization is a collection of agents that interact and produce some form of output. Formal organizations - such as corporations and governments - are typically constructed for an explicit purpose though this purpose needn't be shared by all organizational members. An entrepreneur who creates a firm may do so in order to generate personal wealth but the worker she hires may have very different goals. As opposed to more amorphous collections of agents such as friendship networks and societies at large, organizations have a formal structure to them (though informal structures typically emerge as well) with the prototypical example being a corporation's organizational chart. This structure serves to define lines of communication and the distribution of decision-making. Organizations are also distinguished by their well-defined boundaries as reflected in a clear delineation as to who is and who is not a member. This boundary serves to make organizations a natural unit of selection; for example, corporations are formed and liquidated though they can also morph into something different through activities like mergers.