Law and Economic Growth in Ancient Athens
In: Polis: the journal for ancient greek political thought, Volume 39, Issue 1, p. 203-212
ISSN: 2051-2996
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In: Polis: the journal for ancient greek political thought, Volume 39, Issue 1, p. 203-212
ISSN: 2051-2996
This essays studies the document inserted into the text of Andocides' speech On the Mysteries (96-98) and shows that it is not a genuine copy of the decree of Demophantus from an analysis of its contents and a comparison with the formulas and language of decrees from the late fifth and fourth centuries BCE preserved on stone. The final part of the essay analyzes the historical context of the decree of Demophantus and shows that it belongs in the period where Lycurgus (Against Leocrates 124-127) places it, that is, after the overthrow of the Thirty in 403 BCE.
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In: The Rule of Law in Action in Democratic Athens, p. 101-137
In: The Rule of Law in Action in Democratic Athens, p. 305-344
In: The Rule of Law in Action in Democratic Athens, p. 3-18
In: The Rule of Law in Action in Democratic Athens, p. 213-245
In: The Rule of Law in Action in Democratic Athens, p. 274-302
In: The Rule of Law in Action in Democratic Athens, p. 345-348
In: The Rule of Law in Action in Democratic Athens, p. 246-273
In: The Rule of Law in Action in Democratic Athens, p. 21-59
In: The Rule of Law in Action in Democratic Athens, p. 138-174
In: The Rule of Law in Action in Democratic Athens, p. 60-98
In: The Rule of Law in Action in Democratic Athens, p. 175-212
This essay examines the terms of the Judicial Oath sworn by the judges in the Athenian courts during the classical period. There is general agreement that the oath contained four basic clauses: (1) to vote in accordance to the laws and decrees of the Athenian people, (2) to vote about matters pertaining to the charge, (3) to listen to both the accuser(s) and defendant(s) equally, and (4) to vote or judge (dikasein) with one's most fair judgment (dikaiotatê gnômê). Some scholars believe that the fourth clause gave judges the right to vote according to their conscience and to ignore the law if they found it unjust. The first part of the essay shows that this clause gave judges the right to make decisions solely on the basis of their most just judgment only where the laws gave no clear guidance. It was a default clause invoked only twice in the extant orations; it was never used as justification to ignore the written laws. The second part addresses the view that the courts took political factors into account during trials. Although some trials involved leading politicians, the courts were bound by their oath to decide whether the defendant was guilty of the charge brought by the accuser. The only part of a trial where a defendant might mention his political achievements or his public largesse was at during the assessment of the penalty (timêsis) in a trial on a public charge (graphê).
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In: American political science review, Volume 106, Issue 2, p. 275-294
ISSN: 0003-0554